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If you are distressed by anything external, the pain is not due to the 
thing itself, but to your estimate of it; and this you have the power 
to revoke at any moment. 
  
Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 
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Abstract 
This thesis explores the relationships between experimental moral psychology and 
normative ethics. It specifically examines neuromoral theories, according to which a 
deeper understanding of the machinery for moral judgments could lead humans to make 
better moral judgments. In this thesis I use the widely discussed neuromoral theory by 
Joshua Greene as a case study. I first examine Greene’s descriptive claims in experimental 
moral psychology (Ch. 2). Then I review descriptive hypotheses concerning human moral 
cognition that are alternative to Greene’s and I conclude that the data available so far are 
not sufficient to rule all alternatives out. Theories in experimental moral psychology are 
presently underdetermined by the data. In Ch. 4 I critically delve into Greene’s neuromoral 
theory, highlighting its problematic points. Greene derives normative consequences from 
empirical results through the Argument from Morally Irrelevant Factors. This argument is 
not persuasive because it is not backed by an analysis of judgments about moral relevance 
of factors, such as “Spatial distance is a moral irrelevant factor”, which are key premises in 
Greene’s argument. I argue that these judgments cannot be taken for granted because they 
are often deeply controversial. Greene also falls in a recurring problem, i.e. the so-called 
‘meta-normativity problem’. It is not clear what kind of normativity neuromoral theorists 
are referring to when they say that empirical science could help humans make better moral 
judgments. These shortcomings make Greene’s neuromoral theory unconvincing. 
However, Greene’s descriptive work has greatly contributed to further the understanding of 
the machinery for moral judgments. 
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Introduction 
 
This dissertation explores the relationships between experimental moral psychology and 
normative ethics. Experimental moral psychology is the empirical study of human moral 
behavior, including the making of moral judgments, and is carried out with both the 
methods of experimental psychology (reaction times, eye-tracking, skin conductance 
response, and so on) and neuroscientific methods (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
– henceforth fMRI, electroencephalography, etc). Experimental moral psychology 
describes the machinery for moral judgments. This machinery underpins the formation and 
processing of moral judgments, where “moral judgment” is taken to refer to a kind of 
mental states rather than a kind of linguistic utterances. “Processing” comprises all the 
ways in which moral judgments are used within the mind after their formation, including 
the production of overt behavior. In moral judgments properties such as “morally 
mandatory”, “morally forbidden”, “morally praiseworthy”, “morally good”, etc. are 
attributed to an action carried out by a competent human being or to her character. There 
are similar normative concepts that originate from the aesthetic, economic, political, legal, 
prudential domains, and they give rise to mental states that are similar to moral judgments, 
i.e. political, economic, etc. judgments. The difference between non-moral normative 
judgments and moral judgments is an extremely interesting and debated issue, but I 
mention it just to set it aside. In what follows, I take for granted that there exists a moral 
domain that is significantly different from other forms of normativity, a domain to which 
moral judgments correspond
1
. Another very interesting issue amounts to whether this 
moral domain is almost fixed across cultural groups and historical periods, i.e. over space 
and time, or it undergoes substantial variations along these dimensions. Of course this 
issue is a matter of degree and, as all matters of degree, involves some vagueness. Again, I 
                                                 
1
 This assumption is in turn contested. I briefly discuss in § 3.6. what kind of charges have been addressed to 
it. 
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mention this just to put it aside. Even though I broach this problem at some point, I do not 
deal with this very interesting question in any extensive or systematic way.  
This dissertation tries to answer the question whether results in experimental moral 
psychology can have normative consequences, i.e. whether they can tell a Western 
audience which, among Western normative ethical theories (e.g. consequentialism, 
deontology, and virtue ethics in their multifarious flavors), they ought to follow. A lively 
debate about these issues started in 2001 due to the publication of two landmark papers 
(Greene et al. 2001; Haidt 2001) and has not stopped since. The debate is partially a re-
installment of an older debate about the role of evolutionary biology in ethics (cf. for 
instance Kitcher 2006/1993; Ruse 1986, Ruse and Wilson 2006/1986, Singer 1981; Wilson 
1975, 1979), but the older debate focused much more on meta-ethics than on normative 
ethics.  
Current empirical results in empirical moral psychology could have important 
consequences for meta-ethics too (whether this is the case or not is of course a moot point) 
but in this dissertation I deal with consequences for normative ethics only and I set aside 
issues that have to do with meta-ethics. As the debate about the relationship between 
empirical moral psychology and normative ethics has been monopolized in the last years 
by Greene’s (2008a) very bold claims, I focus on Greene’s descriptive and normative 
views.  
I make a series of claims.  
First, I maintain that there are many competing models in experimental moral psychology 
and that at present Greene’s model does not stand out of the fray as the uncontested 
winner. More data points are needed to decide which theory (if any) is the correct one.  
Secondly, I claim that, even assuming arguendo that Greene’s depiction of the machinery 
for moral judgments is correct, his main normative claim does not follow.  
Thirdly, Greene mostly uses the Argument from Morally Irrelevant Factors (henceforth 
AMIF) to derive normative conclusions from scientific data. This argument could work, 
10 
 
even though it features some problems. However, for it to run correctly, uncontroversial 
normative premises about the moral relevance of factors are needed. But since such 
premises can be deeply controversial, Greene cannot use this strategy to buttress the 
normative consequences he holds dear.  
Here is a short overview of the dissertation.  
In Chapter 1 I briefly examine the concept of moral intuition, since it is fundamental to 
address most descriptive models in experimental moral psychology, including Greene’s. So 
it is necessary to understand exactly what people in the debate are talking about when they 
use this expression. 
In Chapter 2 I examine Greene’s descriptive theory, reviewing the supporting evidence and 
discussing the main criticisms that have been made.  
In Chapter 3 I survey some important theories in experimental moral psychology that are 
alternative to Greene’s view and I show how the empirical evidence on which Greene’s 
descriptive theory is based is not sufficient to rule out these alternative hypotheses. At the 
same time, I survey some normative conclusions that have been drawn from some of these 
descriptive models and show that they suffer from recurring problems. 
In Chapter 4, I deal with Greene’s claim that an improved knowledge of the machinery for 
moral judgments ought to lead humans to reject deontology as a normative ethical theory, 
if not always at least under many circumstances. The problems that cripple neuromoral 
theories concern Greene’s theory too. Furthermore, Greene’s theory has specific issues that 
need to be examined. 
In a final appendix, I examine a methodological problem concerning most of experimental 
moral psychology, i.e. idiosyncratic sampling, and I discuss ways to address this problem 
in future empirical research.  
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Chapter 1: Moral Intuitions 
 
A full treatment of the concept of moral intuition, as well as a thorough discussion of the 
role of moral intuitions in moral thought, would deserve a dissertation in its own right. 
Therefore, I examine this concept here only insofar as this is required to discuss the 
relationship between experimental moral psychology and normative ethics.  
The expression “moral intuition” has at least three meanings.  
The categorization I am drawing is likely not to be exhaustive – it is possible that some 
other moral claims are called ‘moral intuitions’ by some authors and do not fit into the 
three categories I am going to sketch. However, this categorization will serve my purposes 
well: please take it as a working hypothesis. 
First, there is the concept of moral intuitions as it is mostly used in experimental moral 
psychology. The most famous definition of the psychological concept of moral intuition is 
found in Haidt’s (2001) landmark paper. Haidt defines a moral intuition as “the sudden 
appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence […] 
without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of searching, weighing 
evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (Haidt 2001, 818)2. Among philosophers, Sinnott-
Armstrong (2008a, 47) similarly describes a moral intuition as “a strong immediate moral 
belief.” “Strong” indicates that the believer will not give away the judgment easily. 
“Immediate” indicates the absence of inference and conscious processing, as in Haidt’s 
definition. A good example of a moral intuition in the sense of Haidt and Sinnott-
Armstrong is the moral judgment: “It is morally wrong that Mark and Julie, who are 
siblings, have sex with each other.” Following this definition, an instinctive response to a 
                                                 
2
 Moral judgments are in turn defined by Haidt as “evaluations […] of the actions or character of a person 
that are made with respect to a set of virtues held to be obligatory by a culture or subculture” (2001, 817). 
Haidt leaves this definition broad on purpose. Haidt (2012, 270) gives an idea of his overall conception of 
morality by defining ‘moral systems’ in the following way: “Interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, 
practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to 
suppress or regulate self-interest and make cooperative societies possible.” Therefore, Haidt describes a very 
wide moral domain. 
12 
 
moral case can be considered as a moral intuition. Although it was Haidt who lately made 
this concept popular, it can also be traced back to a long-standing tradition in philosophy. 
The concept of perceptual moral intuitions as “immediate judgment as to what has to be 
done or aimed at” is already present in Sidgwick (1907, 97). Sidgwick correctly noticed 
that an individual’s moral intuitions about a single case can be inconsistent over time and 
that moral intuitions of different people concerning the same case often diverge. Sidgwick 
distinguished three types of moral intuitions: perceptual, dogmatic, and philosophical. 
Haidtian moral intuitions roughly correspond to perceptual intuitions. I will deal later with 
Sidgwick’s philosophical intuitions, which represent the third meaning of “moral intuition” 
I avail myself of.  
Haidtian moral intuitions have some specific features. First, they are always about specific 
cases and are distinct from moral principles precisely because they are not general. 
Secondly, moral intuitions are not reflective. These judgments are immediate, in the sense 
that they are caused by a cognitive mechanism that is roughly akin to perception. I do not 
want to enter all interpretations of the concept of ‘intuition’ in philosophy (for a useful 
review, see Pust 2012). It is sufficient to my purposes to clarify that these judgments are 
incompatible with reflection. Reflection can be used in various ways. When one reflects, 
one can think carefully about the features of the given case, or can carry out inferences. 
However, this concept of intuition excludes all of this and these judgments are not only 
non-inferential. They are more generally unreflective
3
. Thirdly, these judgments are related 
to emotions, even if it is not so clear how. In the original formulation by Haidt (2001), the 
emotional component of this kind of moral intuitions was pretty important and moral 
intuitions needed to have an affective part. The emotions involved could be multifarious: 
possibly disgust for the incest taboo, empathy for pain in “It is morally wrong to torture 
this terrorist,” and so on. This has changed over time and Haidt now focuses more on 
immediateness than on emotion, but some non-necessary connection with emotion 
                                                 
3
 I assume reflection to be a necessary condition for inference. 
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remains. In other words, pangs of emotion (either negative or positive in valence) correlate 
with these judgments most of the times, although there is no necessary link.  
Due to these features, the set of moral judgments that is identified by Haidt’s and Sinnott-
Armstrong’s definition is quite broad: all moral judgments about cases that do not arise 
from conscious processing and are unreflective responses to some morally relevant
4
 event 
in the world can be considered as “moral intuitions” in this sense. Many (but not all) moral 
evaluations that are given by participants in moral psychology experiments behind the 
solid walls of the lab count as moral intuitions in this sense. It is also possible to survey 
moral intuitions in the field, via questionnaires, or through the World Wide Web, using 
tools such as the Amazon Mechanical Turk
5
 (cf. Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010), 
provided that participants are cued to give fast judgments and are effectively stopped from 
reflecting. 
Secondly, “moral intuition” can indicate the concept of “considered moral judgment” that 
has been used by Rawls and Daniels in the method of reflective equilibrium (henceforth 
RE) (Daniels 1979, 1980a, 1980b, 2011; Rawls 1951, 1999/1971). Please notice that I am 
referring to moral judgments as they are before going ‘back and forth’ in RE. Hence, 
“moral intuitions” in this sense are part of the input and not part of the output of RE. 
Whether “considered moral judgments” (henceforth CMJ) are the input or the output of RE 
is debatable as the interpretation of the Rawlsian text is quite complex. I stick here though 
to the interpretation of Daniels (2011), according to which CMJs enter together with moral 
principles and background theories in Wide Reflective Equilibrium (henceforth WRE) to 
yield justified judgments, principles, and theories. If “moral intuition” is thus interpreted, 
then a moral judgment must satisfy a long series of conditions to be seen as a “moral 
intuition,” enter RE, and interact with moral principles (and, depending on the version of 
RE, background theories). In particular, the authors of these judgments must not be in 
                                                 
4
 I now leave aside the very important and interesting issue concerning what events, actions, or personality 
traits count as morally relevant.  
5
 https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome. Accessed August 29
th
, 2012. 
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contexts that generate frequent errors, must be aware of the biases created by their 
preferences, must possess qualities such as intelligence, empathy, and reasonableness, and 
must have access to information about the world, the case at issue, and the interests in 
conflict (cf. Rawls 1951). Hence a simple gut reaction to a situation does not qualify as a 
moral intuition according to this standard. People are rarely under the correct conditions 
for making moral intuitions in the Rawlsian sense. Out of the very large number of moral 
judgments people make every day, just a few are CMJs. This means that these judgments 
are extremely rare and are unlikely to be recorded in survey studies done outside the lab. 
They could be rare even inside the lab, given the strident demands in terms of cognitive 
ability and level of information that are put on the person that makes them. This concept of 
“moral intuition” is so idealized that theorists sympathetic with RE (for instance Van Thiel 
and Van Delden 2010) have proposed to substitute it with the Haidtian concept in order to 
allow moral intuitions gathered via empirical research into RE. In order to better 
distinguish this concept from the previous one, I will make use of “CMJ” to refer to the 
Rawlsian concept. 
There is then a third concept, that I label as “rational moral intuitions”. They derive from 
Sidgwick’s third kind of intuitions, i.e. philosophical intuitions. According to Sidgwick, 
there are three philosophical intuitions, i.e. self-evident moral axioms. These axioms are 
too general for normative conclusions about cases to be deduced from them
6
, but at least 
they are not tautological, as in Sidgwick’s opinion many moral statements that purport to 
be self-evident are. The three ethical intuitions are the axiom of justice
7
, the axiom of 
prudence
8
, and the axiom of benevolence
9
. These three propositions are just examples of 
                                                 
6
 “There are certain absolute practical principles, the truth of which, when they are explicitly stated, is 
manifest. But they are of too abstract a nature, and too universal in their scope, to enable us to ascertain by 
immediate application of them what we ought to do in any particular case.” Sidgwick (1907, 379) 
7
 “It cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it would be wrong for B to treat A, merely on the 
ground that they are two different individuals, and without there being any difference between the natures or 
circumstances of the two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for difference of treatment.” Sidgwick 
(1907, 380). 
8
 “The mere difference of priority and posteriority in time is not a reasonable ground for having more regard 
to the consciousness of one moment that [sic] to that of another.” Sidgwick (1907, 381). 
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rational moral intuitions – others can be imagined, even though according to Sidgwick 
there are just three of them. Rational moral intuitions are general, are not about cases, and 
have a high level of plausibility. Another example could be “It is morally preferable to 
save more than one human life from death than just one” (cf. Singer 2005). These rational 
intuitions are interesting because consequentialist theorists often have to employ them even 
though they reject all other moral intuitions (cf. Singer 1974). As Sinnott-Armstrong 
(2008a) correctly notes, all theorizing in normative ethics has to start from some normative 
claims.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
9
 “The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the 
Universe, than the good of any other; unless, that is, there are special grounds for believing that more good is 
likely to be realized in the one case than in the other.” Sidgwick (1907, 382). 
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Chapter 2: Greene’s Descriptive View 
 
2.1. Greene’s dual-process model 
Greene’s main idea is that the machinery for moral judgments is not unitary, but divided in 
two separate circuits. According to his view, these two systems have different ways of 
working, i.e. they process information in different ways, and they have different outputs, 
i.e. they make different kinds of judgments (Greene et al. 2001, 2004, 2008, 2009). In 
characterizing the two systems, Greene draws on a well-established tradition in 
experimental psychology: dual-process theories have been employed to explain a wide 
gamut of cognitive phenomena. The most notable theorist that has made use of dual-
process models is Nobel-laureate Daniel Kahneman (2003, 2012), but these models have 
also been used by a wide range of scientists in other domains of psychology, e.g. in social 
psychology (cf. Chaiken and Trope 1999). Therefore, in Greene’s model there are two 
systems that are in charge with moral judgments. The first system is usually called 
System1
10
. Its operations are automatic, fast, inflexible, cognitive impenetrable (the subject 
is normally not aware of them), effortless, associative, and emotionally charged. The 
second system is known as System2
11
. In contrast with System1, its operations are 
conscious, potentially controlled, slow, flexible, cognitive penetrable (the subject is aware 
of them), effortful, and serial. System1 is evolutionarily older than System2 and is based 
on emotional reactions to particular actions. If the reaction is a negative one, the resulting 
moral judgment will be a negative one too, i.e. it will be a judgment that the action ought 
not to be done. If the emotional reaction is a positive one, the resulting moral judgment 
will be positive, i.e. the judgment will be that the action should be carried out. According 
to Greene, System1 reacts with negative pangs of emotion and ensuing moral 
                                                 
10
 Using an analogy with a camera, Greene also calls it the automatic mode. 
11
 Drawing on the same analogy as in Footnote 9, Greene also calls this system the manual mode. 
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condemnation to particular features of scenarios, such as violence carried out by means of 
personal force. Personal force is thus defined by Greene and co-workers: 
 
An agent applies personal force to another when the force that directly impacts the other is 
generated by the agent’s muscles, as when one pushes another with one’s hands or with a rigid 
object. Thus, applications of personal force, so defined, cannot be mediated by mechanisms 
that respond to the agent’s muscular force by releasing or generating a different kind of force 
and applying it to the other person. (Greene et al. 2009, 365). 
 
A cognitive system that reacted to personal force limited inter-personal violence in the 
Environment of Evolutionary Adaptiveness
12
 (henceforth EEA) and was hence fitness-
enhancing in a hyper-social mammal species such as Homo sapiens, in which some form 
of group selection is likely to have occurred and to occur now
13
. System1 is likely to react 
to other features of scenarios too, such as violations of fairness
14
, the intention of bringing 
                                                 
12
 I borrow this expression from Savulescu and Sandberg (2008). The EEA roughly corresponds to the 
Pleistocene hunter–gatherer existence. 
13
 The issue whether group selection really occurs in nature has been a topic of dispute for decades. There is 
no room to consider the arguments for the different positions, so that I will just describe how the consensus 
view changed over time. Group selection was commonly accepted in the evolutionary biology community 
until the 1960s. Then the influential critique by G. C. Williams (1966) changed the landscape. Altruistic 
behaviors in metazoans were then increasingly explained through kin selection and reciprocal altruism. These 
two mechanisms managed to account for many phenomena, but, however important, they were unable to 
explain the whole gamut of altruistic behaviors in humans. It is difficult, for example, to explain altruistic 
punishment (A punishes B because B has betrayed C’s trust or has violated an established rule of the human 
group to which A, B, and C belong) using kin selection and reciprocal altruism only. These difficulties have 
lead Sober and Wilson (1999) to re-introduce group selection, at least under certain conditions. To my 
knowledge, the position advocated by Sober and Wilson counts nowadays as the consensus in evolutionary 
biology.  
14
 Cf. for example the hemodynamic bilateral insular activation reported by Hsu, Anen, and Quarz (2008). 
This activation takes place when a participant perceives that goods have been distributed in an unequal way 
and acts in order to enforce equality. Concerning fairness, an interesting case is underscored by Dean (2010). 
It involves the moral dilemma called Lost Wallet, in Greene et al. (2001), Supplementary Material. In this 
dilemma you find the wallet of a wealthy person, who does not need the several hundred dollars present in 
the wallet itself. On the contrary, you have been recently hit by hard times and that money would help you 
and your family a lot. So, from the point of view of act consequentialism, keeping the money maximizes 
aggregate well-being, so that you ought to keep the money. However, most people give deontological 
responses to this dilemma and send the wallet back without touching the money. This seems to fit poorly 
with Greene’s model, because this is an impersonal dilemma whose emotional salience is close to none. 
There seems to be a dissociation between emotion and deontological judgments. Hence, what is triggering 
our alleged System 1 here? The BOLD activation reported by Hsu and co-workers helps Greene defuse this 
objection. Greene could assume that there are automatic settings that react to violations of fairness and that 
do not require high levels of emotional salience in the stimuli to be activated. Empirical research on this is 
still at the onset, but it is sufficient to allow the dual-process model to respond to this objection. 
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about physical or psychological harm (Greene et al. 2009), or disgust
15
. The moral 
System1 works well in most moral situations of everyday life. Greene compares System1 
to the automatic mode of a digital camera (Greene 2010): it is highly efficient but not 
flexible. In contrast, System2 is much more flexible, but it is much slower and less 
efficient. It carries out a cost-benefit analysis of the scenario and decides accordingly, 
roughly following the dictates of rational choice theory (henceforth RCT)
16
. In particular, 
System2 considers different possible actions. Then the consequences that such actions are 
likely to produce are identified, weighted for their probabilities, and compared. If this 
comparison arrives at the conclusion that a specific action is likely to bring about bad 
consequences – or consequences that are worse than those brought about by the 
alternatives – then a judgment that the action ought not to be done is formed. Mutatis 
mutandis the same holds for actions whose expected consequences are good and moral 
judgments of approbation.  
The two systems allegedly have different neural correlates. Greene tried to uncover the 
neural correlates of the two moral systems in his two fMRI papers (Greene et al. 2001, 
2004). He identified the middle frontal gyrus, the angular gyrus, the posterior cingulate 
cortex (henceforth PCC), parts of the superior temporal sulcus, and the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (henceforth VMPFC) as the neural correlates of System1. The 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (henceforth DLPFC) and the Inferior Parietal Lobule 
(henceforth IPL) are instead the main neural correlates of System2. Greene claims that the 
areas that correspond to System1 are areas linked to emotion and the areas that correspond 
to System2 are areas linked to reasoning. Partitioning the brain in emotional and rational 
areas is however complex and perhaps unfeasible (cf. Pessoa 2008).  
                                                 
15
 As in the case of consensual incest. Cf. Schaich Borg et al. (2008) for the (rather remarkable) neural 
correlates of incest-related disgust.  
16
 RCT is an application of the mathematical theory of games and it constitutes the groundwork of most of 
current micro-economics. It stems from the seminal work by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). In RCT 
the rational consumer is conceived as an utility maximizer. However, there is an important difference 
between RCT and moral System2. An agent driven by RCT is usually self-interested, whereas an agent 
driven by moral System2 is not necessarily so. In contrast, an agent that follows System 2 is often committed 
to impartiality, in the sense that for the impartial agent the good of any one individual is of no more 
importance than the good of any other (including herself). 
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By the way, it is not very clear what “emotion” means in Greene’s theory. Both emotion 
and cognition are in Greene’s opinion forms of cognition and in some texts, such as Greene 
(2008a, 40), we find a difference between narrow cognition and cognition in general. 
Narrow cognition equates with reasoning, whereas cognition in general refers to all forms 
of information processing and therefore includes emotion if this is understood as a form of 
stimulus-dependent processing
17
. A discussion of theories of emotions would be both 
unnecessary and unfeasible in a text like the present one. This is especially true because 
Greene never mentions the three theories that have been running the emotion debate in 
psychology in the last decades: basic emotions theory (cf. Ekman 1992), appraisal theory 
(among others, cf. Scherer 2009a, 2009b), and constructivism (cf. Russell 2003). Greene 
and co-workers take ‘emotion’ to indicate “representations that have direct motivational 
force” and ‘reasoning’ to indicate the processing of representations that have “no direct 
motivational force of their own” (Greene et al. 2004, 397-398). In addition to the exact 
nature of emotion in the model, it is also unclear how tight the emotion–System1 
connection is. In particular, Greene (2008a) interestingly introduces a distinction between 
two kinds of emotions: alarm-like emotions, that drive the automatic, blind responses of 
System1, and currency-like emotions, that are used as a means of comparison of different 
goods in cost-benefit analysis. Hence, currency-like emotions would be necessary to the 
correct working of System2. Shenhav and Greene (2010) suggest, with a strong backing 
from empirical literature, that the VMPFC is not simply an emotional area, but an area that 
has to do with the representation of value and reward and in which different emotions get 
integrated in order to yield an overall representation of value. They conjecture that 
currency-like emotions could be processed by the VMPFC. However, even if System2 
might process some emotional component in order to create moral judgments, this does not 
stop the DLPFC and parietal areas to be the neural basis of a control network whose main 
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 There are important theories of emotions, such as Russell’s (2003) constructivism, according to which 
emotion has little to do with stimuli and much more to do with the continuous categorization of a mental state 
known as ‘core affect’, whose two dimensions are arousal and pleasantness. 
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function is to inhibit prepotent emotional responses, as Cushman and colleagues (2011) 
clearly state. In other words, System2 cannot be taken to be ‘emotional’ as long as it is 
identified with a function of the DLPFC and a set of parietal regions. Even though Greene 
cannot at the moment spell out the exact role of emotion in his model and considers the 
integration of reasoning and emotion in decision making as an important topic for future 
research (Cushman et al. 2011), the distinction between narrow cognition and emotion in 
his model is pretty strong, as traditionally in dual-process theories of mental functioning.  
Leaving aside the topic of emotions, the two systems produce the same judgment most of 
the time. Actions that trigger the moral System1 are usually condemned by the moral 
System2 too, as they are likely to bring about more harms than benefits. But there are some 
cases in which the two systems evaluate a given scenario in different ways. One of these 
situations is the Footbridge version of the notorious Trolley dilemma. Consider these two 
variants of the dilemma.  
In the Switch scenario, one can hit a switch that will turn a runaway trolley away from five 
people and onto a track where another individual is located. As a result of this, the 
individual located in this other track will be killed but the five people – which would 
otherwise have died – will be saved.  
In the aforementioned Footbridge scenario, one can push a person (a bystander wearing a 
huge, heavy backpack) off a footbridge and into the path of a runaway trolley. This will 
result in the death of the bystander, but the lives of five individuals further down the track 
– which would otherwise have died – will be saved because the body and the backpack are 
heavy enough to deflect the course of the trolley.  
People react in very different ways to the two scenarios: cross-culturally, 89% of 
experimental participants judge that it is permissible to hit the switch, but only 11% judge 
that it is permissible to push the bystander (Hauser, Young, and Cushman 2008). These are 
not the only variants of the trolley dilemma: there are several others. The whole gamut of 
trolley cases have been one of the favorite topics in ethics in the last fifty years (Foot 
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1978/1967; Thomson 1976, 1985, 2008). The problem with these hypothetical scenarios is 
that people respond to them in very different ways even though they seem to be very 
similar from a philosophical point of view. In both Switch and Footbridge the agent can 
either kill one person to save five or let the five die, but the response is not the same even 
though the scenarios are apparently similar. Hence, philosophers have tried to spot the 
relevant differences between the scenarios in order to justify the divergence in people’s 
intuitive responses, but each explanation that has been devised so far has been 
unfortunately countered by some counter-example, so that trolley dilemmas are as puzzling 
to philosophers today as they were fifty years ago.  
Going back to Greene, the Footbridge case is an alleged instance of conflict between 
System1 and System2. System1 condemns pushing the bystander down to her death as a 
violent and illegitimate harm, whereas System2 favors the option of pushing the man 
because more human lives would thus be saved. From the descriptive point of view, 
System1 regularly prevails in case of conflict, even though System2 can sometimes (11% 
of cases) override the prepotent force of the emotional response and enforce the result of a 
cost-benefit analysis. However, when System1 is not engaged because the killing is not 
carried out by physical force, i.e. in Switch, System2 takes control and recommends the 
action that leads to the maximization of overall benefit among all people involved. Another 
important distinction in Greene’s theory is that between characteristically deontological 
judgments (henceforth deontological judgments) and characteristically utilitarian 
judgments (henceforth utilitarian judgments). Deontological judgments are moral 
judgments that are easy to justify in deontological terms and difficult to justify in 
consequentialist terms, such as the judgment that it is morally impermissible to kill one 
person in order to save five. This does not necessarily mean that they are carried out for 
deontological reasons or by experimental participants that subscribe to deontology. 
Conversely, utilitarian judgments are easy to justify in consequentialist terms and difficult 
to justify in deontological terms, such as the judgments that it is morally permissible to kill 
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one in order to save five
18. According to Greene’s dual-process hypothesis, deontological 
judgments are typically the product of System1, while utilitarian judgments are typically 
the product of System2. Deontological judgments have the typical features of moral 
intuitions in the Haidtian sense, as they share the traits of System1 described above. In 
contrast, System2 needs some rational intuitions to work and any way it requires some 
account of well-being to maximize it
19
. From the mapping between deontological 
judgments and System1 on the one hand and between System2 and utilitarian judgments 
on the other hand, Greene derives his most controversial descriptive claim: deontology and 
utilitarianism
20
 as substantive ethical theories count as “psychological natural kinds” 
(Greene 2008a, 36). So, not only the two systems generate judgments that are more easily 
justified by the one theory than by the other, but both theories themselves are attempts at 
justifying the operation of the systems. Hence, they exist because the systems exist and are 
the result of reflection on their output. This does not mean that the people that use System1 
or System2 must have any necessary knowledge of these ethical theories. Those who judge 
that the bystander must be pushed down the bridge do not need to be card-carrying 
utilitarians (Greene, forthcoming, footnote 10 in § II). Humans can avail themselves of 
System2 without necessarily subscribing to a substantive ethical theory. As a matter of 
fact, the systems exist before the elaboration of normative ethical theories, which stem 
from the necessity of justifying their output in front of other human beings. However, these 
two substantive ethical theories are closely linked to the systems, so that the upholders of 
deontology are defending the judgments that result from System1 and the upholders of 
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 However, it must be considered that the consequentialist may ask us not to push the bystander down the 
bridge to her death. For example, a rule utilitarian might say that it makes sense to uphold an across-the-
board prohibition against intentional killing of fellow humans because in the long run not allowing people to 
intentionally kill humans is more beneficial to society than allowing for exceptions in cases such as 
Footbridge. The freedom granted to individual agents of construing exceptions to this rule would lead to 
many instances of wrongful killing we do not want to occur. It is interesting to notice that this rule 
consequentialist argument also stops the agent to pull the switch in the homonymous dilemma, since it 
advocates a general ban against intentional killing and the intervention proposed in Switch amounts to killing 
a fellow human being.  
19
 For this requirement, cf. de Lazari-Radek and Singer (2012, 27). 
20
 I will refer to this theory both with “consequentialism” and “utilitarianism”, although this is imprecise. 
Greene has in mind a form of maximizing act utilitarianism. 
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utilitarianism are defending the judgments that result from System2. In case of conflict 
between the two systems, in Greene’s eyes deontologists claim that System1 should take 
precedence over System2 and, vice versa, utilitarians claim that System2 should take 
precedence over System1. As I argue in § 2.3, the empirical evidence for the 
‘psychological natural kinds’ thesis is weak, precisely because Greene admits that, at least 
in many cases, judgments and theories can be uncoupled and experimental results tell 
something about judgments only. 
 
2.2. The evidence for the dual-process view 
What kind of empirical evidence are Greene’s descriptive claims based upon? Some 
important piece of evidence comes from results obtained by Greene himself and 
coworkers, but Greene claims that the work of various labs all over the world contributes 
to corroborate the dual-process hypothesis. I briefly review the evidence here. One of the 
advantages of Greene’s supporting evidence is its being domain-specific, i.e. specifically 
linked to morality, as it directly comes from empirical investigation about moral dilemmas, 
i.e. the so-called “trolleyology.”  
In Greene’s opinion (2010, 28) the single strongest piece of evidence is the experiment 
carried out independently and roughly at the same time by Koenigs et al. (2007) and by 
Ciaramelli et al. (2007) on VMPFC patients. Lesions to the VMPFC are very famous in 
moral psychology, mostly due to two patients, 19
th
-century railway worker Phineas Gage 
(cf. Damasio 1994, ch.1 – Unpleasantness in Vermont) and patient EVR (Damasio 1994; 
Saver & Damasio 1991). Both showed preserved general cognitive activity, conserved 
capacity of understanding moral norms according to Kohlbergian standards
21
, but 
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 Of course Kohlbergian standards did not exist at Gage’s time, but Gage seemed to understand the content 
of the moral norms present in his society. Nevertheless, he often did not act upon them. For Kohlbergian 
standards, that assume that morality has mostly to do with reasoning and are relative to the justification of 
moral judgments, see Kohlberg (1969). 
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disastrous decision making in real life, both in moral and in non-moral situations
22
. The 
decision making deficit shown by these patients is multifaceted. They exhibit abnormal 
preference judgments (preferences tend to be inconsistent; Fellows and Farah 2007), 
difficulties in reversal learning
23
 (Fellows and Farah 2003), and abnormal information 
acquisition patterns in multi-attribute decision making (Fellows 2006). Finally, studies by 
Shamay-Tsoory and colleagues (2003, 2009) show that VMPFC patients are impaired in 
affective Theory of Mind (i.e., attributing affective mental states to others). Even though 
the cognitive deficits of these patients are complex, they regularly show a condition known 
as “emotional blunting,” i.e. most of their emotions are less intense than in the neuro-
normal population. In the experiments by the groups of Koenigs and Ciaramelli, VMPFC 
patients were administered moral dilemmas from Greene et al. (2001) and made 
significantly more utilitarian judgments, such as “it is morally permissible to throw the 
bystander down the footbridge to save five,” than healthy controls and non-frontal patients 
in high-conflict personal dilemmas, i.e. dilemmas that involve the use of personal force and 
that elicit a significant level of disagreement in the subject’s responses24. This utilitarian 
bias in emotionally blunted patients would support Greene’s idea that utilitarian judgments 
are driven by a cognitive system that regularly competes with emotions. If emotions are 
weaker, utilitarian judgments have the upper hand.  
The VMPFC result has been contested, though, by Kahane and Shackel (2008) on the one 
hand and by Moll, De-Oliveira Souza, and co-workers (2007, 2008) on the other hand.  
Kahane and Shackel underlined that the dilemmas used by Koenigs et al. (2007) have been 
selected on the basis of behavioral features of the subjects responses and not on the basis of 
content. They commented that the only factor that can make a response “utilitarian” is the 
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 Again, I assume arguendo that it is possible to identify the boundary between moral and non-moral 
domains in a vague but workable way. 
23
 Reversal learning is the ability to change behavior when the pattern of rewards and punishments in a 
situation is reversed. If for instance an experimental participant gets money if she presses a red button 
(instead of a blue button) when an electric bulb switches on, and then she is told that from now on she has to 
press the blue button when the light is on, otherwise she would have to pay money back to the experimenter, 
she should change her behavior. Doing so counts as an instance of reversal learning.  
24
 This in Koenigs et al. (2007). Ciaramelli et al. (2007) found the same effect, but for personal moral 
dilemmas, which is a somewhat less strict categorization. 
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content of the options proposed in the scenario. To buttress this claim, they asked 
professional moral philosophers to assess the dilemmas used by Koenigs et al. They report 
that these experts did not classify many of the “high-conflict” dilemmas as including an 
utilitarian option. Hence, Koenigs et al’s results did not show that VMPFC patients had an 
utilitarian bias
25
. Nonetheless, Koenigs et al. (2008) re-analyzed their VMPFC patients’ 
data using the classification proposed by Kahane and Shackel and found the same 
utilitarian bias they had spotted beforehand, so that this criticism doesn’t seem to be 
particularly dangerous
26
.  
Moll et al. (2007; 2008, 168) remarked a discrepancy between this VMPFC patients result 
and another result by the same scientists (Koenigs and Tranel 2007). This experiment had 
to do with a very famous economic game, the Ultimatum Game (henceforth UG)
27
. 
Koenigs and Tranel showed that VMPFC patients rejected proposals more than usual. 
Since rejecting offers in the UG is normally seen as an irrational behavior, this seemed to 
show that VMPFC patients were less rational than healthy controls, a finding that 
apparently contradicted the interpretation given by Greene to the Koenigs et al. (2007) 
result
28
. More specifically, Koenigs and Tranel (2007) interpreted the UG behavior of 
VMPFC patients as a consequence of their alleged inability to regulate negative emotions. 
But VMPFC patients cannot be more rational and more irrational at the same time, Moll 
and colleagues argued. They suggested instead that the VMPFC patients suffered from a 
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 Since Ciaramelli et al. (2007) have used roughly the same dilemmas as Koenigs and co-workers, the 
criticism by Kahane and Shackel (2008) would apply to the Italian experiment too, even though Kahane and 
Shackel did not deal with the paper by the Italian research group.  
26
 Greene correctly comments that “Kahane and Shackel proposed a more stringent test for the dual-process 
theory, and the dual-process theory passed with flying colors.” (2010, 29) 
27
 In the Ultimatum Game there are two players, a Proposer and a Responder. The Proposer is given a sum of 
money and must assign some part of it to the Responder. The determination of the exact amount, which can 
also be 0 or the whole sum, is left to the Proposer. The Responder can then accept or reject the Proposer’s 
offer. If the Responder accepts, the money is actually divided between the two players according to the 
proposal. If the Responder rejects, the researcher takes the whole sum back and both players earn nothing. 
RCT dictates that Responders should always accept any positive offer, but this is not what happens in the lab. 
Responders tend to reject very unfair offers, such as 10% or 15% of the total lot (or less). This constitutes a 
form of costly punishment toward the Proposer, who was seen as stingy by the punishing Responder, as she 
offered too little. 
28
 For a response by Greene to Moll’s attack, see Greene (2007). However, Greene’s reply is not very 
convincing because he could not avail himself of the decisive experiment by Moretti et al. (2008), which was 
published one year later. 
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specific dysregulation in prosocial sentiments that led them to make inappropriate 
utilitarian judgments, judgments that infringed upon well entrenched societal norms such 
as the prohibition towards intentionally killing fellow human beings. The interpretation by 
Koenigs and Tranel (2007) has been shown wrong, though. It is true that VMPFC patients 
rejected more in the UG than healthy controls, but not because they could not regulate their 
negative emotions. The key paper here is Moretti, Dragone, and Di Pellegrino (2008). 
Moretti and co-workers showed that VMPFC patients’ rejection bias appeared just in 
specific environmental situations, i.e. when the monetary rewards were not immediately 
available in cash. If the game was played with cash in sight and the money was 
immediately distributed, no bias was found. This dooms Koenigs’s and Tranel’s 
interpretation of their own results. The correct interpretation follows the lines of Damasio 
(1994, ch. 9): VMPFC patient exhibit a specific ‘myopia for the future’, so that they cannot 
take into account consequences of their actions if they lie in the future and are not directly 
experienced at the time of the decision. Since both criticisms against the VMPFC result on 
moral dilemmas fail, this seems to count as evidence for Greene’s model, provided that 
these patients are mainly seen as emotionally-blunted subjects. Nonetheless, as I have 
written above, the cognitive and affective deficits of these patients are extremely complex, 
so that it is not immediately clear why they make more utilitarian judgments than controls. 
However, Moretto and co-workers (2009) showed that VMPFC patients exhibited no Skin 
Conductance Response (henceforth SCR)
29
 when they make utilitarian judgments in front 
of moral dilemmas involving personal force, contrary to healthy controls and non-frontal 
patients. SCR is quite tightly associated with emotion. So Greene has sufficient empirical 
backing to claim that the reason why VMPFC patients make more utilitarian judgments on 
high-conflict moral dilemmas is emotional blunting. Finally, the VMPFC evidence has 
been recently enriched by a study (Thomas, Croft, and Tranel 2011) showing that the 
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 A very slight increase in the degree of sweat production on the skin, that is regularly associated to 
emotional arousal. It is impossible to perceive it with the naked eye, but a pair of electrodes can measure skin 
conductance and detect that sweat production has increased, since sweat contains salt and salty solutions are 
good electricity conductors. Cf. Dawson, Schell, and Fillon (2007). 
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patients’ utilitarian bias is even wider than previously thought. It also applies to dilemmas 
in which considerations of aggregate welfare are pitted against indirect violence to 
members of one’s family (e.g. a version of Switch in which the one person on the side-
track is the agent’s daughter). Furthermore, the utilitarian bias generalizes to both the Self 
and the Other condition
30. Summing up, the VMPFC evidence nicely dovetails Greene’s 
dual-process model because it shows that utilitarian judgments are in competition with 
emotions.  
Another similar piece of evidence is the study by Mendez, Anderson, and Shapira (2005). 
These researchers found a utilitarian bias on Switch and Footbridge in patients affected by 
Fronto-Temporal Dementia (henceforth FTD), another condition that brings about 
emotional blunting. However, the set of symptoms linked to FTD is very broad and to my 
knowledge no SCR measurement was made on these patients to show that emotional 
blunting was actually the cause of their utilitarian bias. Since this check is lacking, it is 
difficult to attribute the deficit to any particular facet of the complex cognitive deficit these 
patients exhibit, even though an analogical argument from VMPFC patients could be 
made.  
An utilitarian bias has been recently attributed to another population that is known for its 
emotional blunting: low-anxiety psychopaths (Koenigs et al. 2011). Please notice that 
psychopaths in general do not show any utilitarian bias (Glenn et al. 2009b; Koenigs et al. 
2011). Previous studies (Glenn et al. 2009a, 2009b) had shown that psychopaths in general 
show a reduced Blood Oxygen Level Dependent (henceforth BOLD) signal
31
 in the 
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 The Self condition is the one in which the agent in the dilemma is the experimental participant that must 
make a moral judgment. The Other condition is that in which the agent in the dilemma is some different 
person from the experimental participant that must make a moral judgment. The distinction is equivalent to 
the one between first and third person judgments. People usually have a Self-Other bias (Nadelhoffer and 
Feltz 2008): they are more likely to approve of characteristically consequentialist judgments in the Other 
condition. VMPFC patients are not immune to this bias, but they tend to approve of these judgments more 
than controls in both conditions (i.e. Self and Other). 
31
 The BOLD signal is what fMRI measures. It is a measure of cerebral blood oxygenation and flow. It 
correlates with metabolic neural activity. Cf. Logothetis (2008).  
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amygdala, a region that is usually connected with emotions
32
, when confronted with 
personal, emotionally-loaded moral dilemmas. Glenn et al. (2009b) also report that 
psychopaths exhibit an increased activation in the DLPFC, the chief cognitive control 
area
33
, when they read and judge about personal moral dilemmas. To sum up, most 
psychopaths have a hypo-emotional phenotype and a hyper-rational brain activation 
pattern, but low-anxiety psychopaths only show the utilitarian bias that is common among 
VMPFC patients. This seems to be good evidence for Greene’s dual-process model, 
though.  
In a very interesting study involving healthy participants, Koven (2011) measured two 
variables, ‘Attention to Emotion’ and ‘Clarity of Emotion’. Then she checked whether 
these two measures had any correlation with the judgments made by participants in 
response to Greene’s dilemmas. She found out that healthy participants with a high ‘Clarity 
of Emotion’, i.e. particularly good at understanding and distinguishing their emotions, 
tended to make significantly less utilitarian judgments. Drawing on work by Gohm (2003), 
Koven speculates that people that are particularly bad at grasping their moods and 
emotional states are very good mood regulators and emotion suppressors. They are 
normally overwhelmed by emotional states that they do not understand and hence 
systematically disregard emotions in decision making. People with a poor ‘Clarity of 
Emotion’ are likely to be among these “overwhelmed” participants, that are hence good at 
regulating emotions and ignoring their contents. So people that have bad ‘Clarity of 
Emotion’ make more utilitarian judgments and, on the other hand, people with high 
‘Clarity of Emotion’ pass more non-consequentialist judgments, as they are apt at taking 
emotions into account and regularly use emotional information to make their decisions. If 
the conjecture held, it would nicely integrate in Greene’s dual-process model. 
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 There are nonetheless alternative interpretations of the role of the bilateral amygdala in the brain. For an 
interpretation that sees the amygdala as a high connectivity hub, see Pessoa (2008, 152). 
33
 To use Greene’s words in a personal communication, “the accounting department.” 
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Bartels (2008, 393) shows, in the context of a much wider study, that participants with high 
‘Need for Cognition’, a measure of enjoyment of and reliance on conscious deliberation, 
pass significantly more utilitarian judgments on moral dilemmas than the rest of the 
sample. This perfectly fits with Greene’s view. 
There are two other results, based on manipulation of the judgment task, that support 
Greene’s view. Valdesolo and De Steno (2006) showed to participants a clip from a funny 
TV program
34
 and reported that participants were significantly more likely to approve of 
pushing the bystander down to her death in Footbridge after experiencing hilarity than in 
the control condition (no clip). Greene interprets mirth as an emotion countering the 
negative affect generated by System1 at the idea of committing an instance of personal 
violence. Hence, more mirth would mean less negative affect and more room for System2 
to drive the final moral judgment concerning Footbridge. 
Suter and Hertwig (2011) have recently either put participants under time pressure (they 
were given a fixed amount of time to read the dilemma and pass a verdict on a Likert scale) 
or asked them to be make judgments about a given scenario as soon as possible. In both 
cases people were more likely to make non-utilitarian decisions for high-conflict dilemmas 
under time pressure than in control situations where no time pressure was exerted. This 
dovetails with Greene’s idea that System2 is cognitively expensive and slow. Time 
pressure can easily count as a cognitive load and hence a prevalence of System1 judgments 
under time pressure conditions is predicted by Greene’s model.  
Then there is the evidence from Greene and his lab. Greene and co-workers carried out 
four important experiments: although the fMRI experiments (2001, 2004) are the ones that 
made Joshua Greene “rich and famous,” the behavioral experiments he conducted later 
(2008, 2009) are much more important for the dual-process model than the fMRI studies
35
.  
                                                 
34
 “Saturday Night Live” 
35
 This is Greene’s opinion too. “My fMRI research was designed to test a psychological theory, and that 
theory is in no way bound to the technology that was first used to test it.” (2010, 6). In personal 
communications he repeatedly stressed this point. 
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Greene et al. (2008) is a cognitive load experiment. Greene analyzed just high-conflict 
moral dilemmas, i.e. dilemmas that involve personal force and in which personal force 
brings about positive consequences from the point of view of aggregate welfare. The 
cognitive load consisted in a stream of digits crossing the screen: participants were asked 
to press a key each time they saw the digit 5 and they had to do that while they were 
reading the scenarios texts and passing judgments. Therefore, the experiment had two 
conditions: under load and in absence of load. It was predicted that (1) participants under 
load would make less utilitarian judgments than in the absence of load; (2) participants 
would take longer time to make utilitarian judgments under load than in absence of load, 
since cognitive load depletes cognitive resources needed to System2, while not stopping 
System1 from working; (3) even in absence of load the Response Times (RT) for utilitarian 
judgments in high-conflict dilemmas should be higher than those for non-utilitarian 
judgments. Just one of these three predictions is supported by the experiment. Greene and 
co-workers found that utilitarian judgments under load are indeed slower than in absence 
of load in a selective way (i.e. this effect does not extend to non-utilitarian judgments)
36
. 
This means that cognitive load slows utilitarian judgments only and it does nothing to 
deontological judgments. This seems to show that utilitarian judgments are linked to 
(narrowly) cognitive mechanisms, whereas deontological judgments are independent from 
them. This in turn buttresses the dual-process model of moral cognition. However, Greene 
and his co-workers found no effect of load on the number of utilitarian judgments made by 
experimental participants, nor any effect of judgment on RT in absence of load in the full 
sample. In other words, subjects under load do not make less utilitarian judgments than 
subjects in the control condition and utilitarian judgments are in general not slower than 
deontological judgments. A difference in speed would be expected if utilitarian judgments 
stemmed from reflection as posited by the dual-process model. These two null results are 
quite strong counter-evidence for the dual-process model, as Roskies and Sinnott-
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 In statistical terms, Greene et al. (2008) found a significant interaction between judgment and RT in the 
two conditions. 
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Armstrong (2008) and then Berker (2009) remarked
37
. Nonetheless, the RT interaction 
between judgment and cognitive load stands as evidence in favor of the model, since it is a 
specific result. The RT difference in absence of load is an important prediction of the dual-
process model, since utilitarian judgments in absence of load are thought to be the outcome 
of System2 overriding System1 and this necessarily takes more time than System1 acting 
directly to yield a deontological judgment. Greene et al. (2001) published RT data to the 
effect of such a RT difference but Greene later admitted (Greene 2009; Greene et al. 2008) 
that the RT results in the 2001 paper were due to very fast non-utilitarian responses to 
some scenarios in which the consequentialist response was completely unpalatable
38
 and 
that thus do not properly count as ‘dilemmas’. 
The 2009 experiment tries to identify what drives System1. The initial hypothesis, which 
can be found in Greene et al. (2001) and in Haidt and Greene (2002), was the so-called ME 
HURT YOU paradigm: System1 would react to an action if (1) it is likely to cause serious 
bodily harm; (2) to a particular person; (3) the harm does not result from the deflection of 
an existing threat onto a different party. However, there are some actions, as Greene 
(2008b) recognizes, that respect these conditions but not trigger the fast system, such as 
Kamm’s Giant Lazy Susan scenario39 (Kamm 1996, 154). Hence, the ME HURT YOU 
paradigm was abandoned and the 2009 study was run to find an answer to the factors 
problem: what factors of a situation does System1 respond to? The answer is the following: 
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 Sinnott-Armstrong (personal communication) still thinks that the 2008 null result shows that Greene’s 
overall theory just tells a part of the story about the machinery for moral judgments. 
38
 The most notorious case is the Hired Rapist dilemma, in which we are told of a husband whose wife has 
become estranged. In order to regain her affection, the husband can hire a rapist to rape her. Then, after 
hearing the horrible news, the husband would return swiftly to her side, to take care of her, and comfort her. 
She will thus once again appreciate him. It is obvious that almost no one decides to hire the rapist. The 
problem with the RT was pointed out by McGuire et al. (2009) and by Berker himself (2009), but had already 
been noticed by Greene’s co-workers before the publication of McGuire’s and Berker’s articles. Moore et al. 
(2008) tried to replicate the 2001 RT data (even though with different, better dilemmas) and failed to do so. 
39
 In this scenario case, a runaway trolley is heading toward five innocent people who are seated on a giant 
lazy Susan. The only way to save the five people is to push the lazy Susan so that it swings the five out of 
the way; however, doing so will cause the lazy Susan to ram into an innocent bystander, killing him. Lab 
experiments briefly reported in Greene (2008b, 108) showed that participants tend to respond in a 
consequentialist way to the giant lazy Susan variant of the Trolley dilemma. 
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intention to harm and personal force
40
. The 2009 article comprised more than 15 dilemmas, 
featured a big sample size, and showed that both intention and personal force have an 
influence on judgments. Neither of them is a necessary or a sufficient condition for 
eliciting emotional condemnation. In some cases intention to harm alone is sufficient to 
activate System1, in others personal force is sufficient, under still others circumstances 
both are required. Hence Greene’s and co-workers’ final hypothesis is that System1 
“operates over an integrated representation of goals and personal force - representations 
such as ‘goal-within-the-reach-of-muscle-force’.” (Greene et al. 2009, 370). The 
experiments reported in this article count as evidence for the dual-process model because 
they extend previous results to many different dilemmas and to a big sample, pin-pointing 
at the same time the factors that elicit the activation of System1.  
Moving to the fMRI experiments, Greene et al. (2001) is admittedly a weak paper. The 
dilemmas are too heterogeneous to yield credible results. The fact that most criticism 
attacked this paper is not casual. It was a bold attempt, managed to get published in one of 
the highest impact factor scientific journals in the world, and opened the field to 
neuroimaging investigation. But no matter how seminal it was, relatively little can be 
saved of it, apart the fact that reading ‘personal’ moral dilemmas (following the ME HURT 
YOU paradigm) causes the BOLD activation of ‘emotional’ areas of the brain, which is far 
from surprising since the actions described are often disturbing. Starting from the 2004 
article, Greene focused on high conflict dilemmas. The key result of the 2004 paper is that 
utilitarian responses to difficult or high-conflict moral dilemmas
41
 bring about a 
hemodynamic activation in areas related to cognitive control, i.e. the DLPFC ‘accounting 
department’ and the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC). However, both in the 2001 and in 
the 2004 papers there are strange BOLD activations that are not easy to explain away, e.g. 
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 Nonetheless, there is an important empirical result that qualifies this answer. Nichols and Mallon (2006) 
show that the different reactions to Switch and Footbridge are conserved when the entities damaged by the 
agent are not human beings, but china cups. This means that personal force and intention are important even 
when they do not constitute counts of battery or violence against sentient beings. 
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 Those which pit aggregate welfare and strong emotions one against the other.  
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DLPFC firing up less in personal dilemmas than in impersonal dilemmas and the PCC, an 
alleged ‘emotional’ area, firing up when utilitarian responses to personal dilemmas are 
made. Summing up, the fMRI evidence that made Greene hit the headlines is not 
particularly important to the survival of the dual-process model as a working hypothesis in 
experimental moral psychology.  
The relevance of the fMRI results by Greene and colleagues is further reduced by fMRI 
itself being a correlative technique. It is not good at establishing causal connections, 
because from BOLD signaling alone it is not possible to say whether the relationship 
between the activated regions and a mind function is of necessary condition, sufficient 
condition, or a mere correlation. In a standard (i.e. non multi-voxel pattern analysis
42
) 
fMRI experiment, subjects are shown a stimulus and a control. They are normally similar, 
except for one item that differs and that, according to the researcher’s theory, coincides 
with the mind function under examination. After data acquisition the researcher subtracts 
the activation at the moment of the control (e.g. neutral face) from the activation at the 
moment of the stimulus (e.g. scared face). Then regions that show a statistically significant 
activation after the subtraction are looked for. It is then possible to make an inference of 
this kind: 
Premise 1: condition C1 (scared face) correlates with a BOLD activation in region R1 
(amygdala); 
Premise 2: function F1 (vision of fear in other human beings) correlates to condition C1 
(scared face); 
Conclusion: function F1 (vision of fear in other human beings) correlates with a BOLD 
activation in R1 (amygdala). 
This is the so-called forward inference, or inference from function to structure. It is 
generally considered as legitimate. But there is also another kind of inference that is 
common in neuroscience: reverse inference, or inference from structure to function. 
                                                 
42
 For multi-voxel pattern analysis, cf. Haynes and Rees (2006). 
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Premise 1: function F2 correlated in previous experiments with an activation in R2; 
Premise 2: condition C2 correlates in this experiment with an activation in R2; 
Conclusion: condition C2 correlates in this experiment with function F2. 
For example, we might derive an engagement of the function ‘experiencing fear’ from an 
amygdalar activation even if the experimental condition does not yield particular cues to 
think that fear is active in that case. However, the conclusion of a reverse inference is not 
sure. The inference I used as an example is indeed very dubious. The validity of a reverse 
inference depends on the specificity of the activation of R2. If R2 is also activated by 
functions F3, F4 and so on, the conclusion is invalid. It is quite difficult to build specific 
correspondences between functions and regions, but this becomes easier when little areas 
of the brain are taken into account. Hence, this problem would be eased by increasing the 
strength of the magnetic field used in MRI. This would allow for a smaller voxel size while 
keeping the signal to noise ratio constant, so that smaller areas of the brain could be 
highlighted. But an increased number of Tesla also creates artifacts and problems such as 
vertigo (Theyson et al. 2007), so that the issue is unlikely to be solved through technical 
innovations only. As a result, the legitimacy of reverse inference in neuroscience is 
contested.  
Poldrack (2006; Poldrack and Wagner 2004) argues that reverse inference should be 
considered as a probabilistic inference and that it can be useful to create hypotheses that 
must be tested through forward inference in subsequent experiments. For example, if in a 
written word classification task a researcher finds an unexpected activation of a motor area, 
she can try to devise a theory to explain this activation and then test it through a different 
task and forward inference.  
Henson (2005, 2006) tries to save reverse inference by claiming that current cognitive 
neuroscience uses a one-to-one function-to-structure correspondence as a working 
hypothesis. We should assume this hypothesis, use reverse inference as though it was 
justified and then judge the assumed working hypothesis on the basis of the results, i.e. of 
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the empirical success of the research program at explaining empirical phenomena. 
However, some experts (e.g. Pessoa 2008, 155; Price and Friston 2002, 2005) claim that 
one-to-one mapping in the brain is impossible because we have a trove of empirical 
findings showing that most areas of the brain are involved with multifarious mental 
functions. A further problem comes from the poor clarity in defining and systematizing 
psychological concepts. Many psychological concepts have lots of synonyms (e.g. the 
notorious triad “executive function”, “working memory”, “cognitive control”) and we lack 
a list of functions we want to map onto the brain. If the aim of cognitive neuroscience is to 
create connections between brain structure and mental functioning, it seems that both sets 
must be carved at the joints, especially if we want to make experimental psychology 
incremental, i.e. if we want to build new scientific knowledge on the accumulation of 
single results from studies. A necessary condition if we are to do this is to make studies 
comparable and to build psychological ontologies, theories “about the structure of the mind 
that specify the component operations that comprise mental function” (Poldrack 2010; cf. 
also Price and Friston 2005). At any rate, it is exceedingly unlikely that a good ontology 
for mental processes, coupled with a good anatomical ontology for the brain, would justify 
the working hypothesis of a one-to-one mapping between functions and regions. However, 
Henson specifies that his proposed one-to-one mapping applies only to entities on the 
psychological or neuro-anatomical ontologies that lie on the same level of generality. 
Hence, there will be a one-to-one mapping between psychological functions and networks 
of brain regions at a certain level of detail. In other words, a general psychological function 
will map in a one-to-one way with a large, complicated network of neural structures, but at 
the same time a given general psychological function will map in a one-to-many way with 
smaller groups of neural regions that are more specific. So, it seems that the construction 
of precise ontologies both in the psychological and in the neural domain is essential to 
decide this debate. 
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Machery (forthcoming) distinguishes two interpretations of reverse inference. According to 
the Bayesian interpretation, a particular pattern of brain activation E supports the 
hypothesis that psychological process P is recruited by a given task T if and only if the 
probability of the occurrence of E if P is recruited is higher than the probability of E’s 
occurrence if P is not recruited. For example, a bilateral amygdalar activation supports the 
hypothesis that the emotion ’fear’ is recruited by the current experimental paradigm that 
involves judgments on gruesome moral scenarios if and only if the probability of the 
occurrence of a bilateral amygdalar activation if fear is recruited is higher than the 
probability of witnessing a bilateral amygdalar activation if fear is not recruited. Given that 
a single pattern of brain activation (e.g. bilateral amygdalar activation) is caused by many 
psychological processes, the probability of occurrence of E when P is not recruited is likely 
to be high, so that Bayesian reverse inferences are likely to be false. Machery contrasts the 
Bayesian interpretation with a ‘likelihoodist’ interpretation, according to which E provides 
evidence for the hypothesis that T recruits some psychological process P1 over the 
hypothesis that T recruits another psychological process P2 if and only if E is more likely 
to be found when P1 is recruited than when P2 is recruited. Machery backs this 
interpretation and notices that it is restrictive relative to current practice, since it solely 
works in comparative cases. As a matter of fact, current practice uses reverse inference in 
traditional experiments (as opposed to automated meta-analyses such as those proposed by 
Yarkoni et al, see below) to explain (albeit speculatively) BOLD activations that are not 
expected given the structure and content of the task. Since these instances of reverse 
inference are not necessarily comparative, most of them ought to be seen as unwarranted.  
Klein (2011) sees reverse inference as an instance of inference to the best explanation 
(IBE) (Lipton 1991) and claims that it is an invalid form of IBE because regions are 
pluripotent, i.e. associated with different mental processes at the same time. Instead of 
reverse inference, Klein proposes cross-domain abduction, which consists in looking for a 
theory that explains the activation of a region across all (or at least as many as possible) 
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tasks in which the region is activated by invoking a minimum amount of functions. Instead 
of considering only one task, as standard reverse inference does, we should take account of 
all of the tasks in which the region is involved; then we should minimize the number of 
functions we invoke to explain the BOLD activations. Klein takes as an example of cross-
domain abduction the treatment Price and Friston (2005) made of the activation of the 
Posterior Lateral Fusiform (PLF) gyrus. The PLF is activated by a long list of experimental 
paradigms: viewing words, picture naming, making unprimed semantic decisions, 
decoding Braille, and so on. By taking into account all the neuro-imaging data available, 
Price and Friston propose that PFL is mostly connected with sensorimotor integration, 
since these activities require such a function. 
This proposal is not very far away from that by Yarkoni et al. (2011). In a seminal paper, 
Yarkoni and co-workers claimed to have built an automated classification software that can 
extract BOLD activation foci from hundreds of already published neuroimaging articles 
and draw automated reverse inferences on the basis of these data with pretty good 
accuracy. In other words, Yarkoni and colleagues (among whom Poldrack) have found an 
automated way to probabilistically infer the mental function corresponding to a given set 
of hemodynamic activations. For instance, the BrainSynth system allows to insert a 
psychological term, such as ‘pain’, into the system. Then the system automatically carries 
out a meta-analysis of published material, retrieves the stereotactic coordinates of the 
relevant activation foci, and finally yields a brain map that shows what is the possibility of 
engagement of the different Brodmann areas for the psychological concept provided. This 
corresponds to forward inference, i.e. we move from function to structure. On the contrary, 
it is possible to feed a BOLD activation map into BrainSynth and retrieve the probabilities 
of engagement of each psychological function given the map. Selection of the 
psychological term with the maximal probability provides a neat reverse inference, i.e. an 
inference from structure to psychological function. If this is confirmed and replicated, this 
automated system would not only pave the way to reliable reverse inference, as I have just 
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said, but also to reliable mind-reading, i.e. decoding of BOLD patterns to mental states in 
an open-ended way without training or previous knowledge of the “ground truth,” i.e. on 
the basis of previous literature only. The system seems to be able to associate 
psychological terms to BOLD patterns simply drawing on already published foci and with 
a pretty good level of reliability. This would be a revolution in cognitive neuroscience.  
Summing up on reverse inference, the proposal by Klein makes sense and the work by 
Yarkoni and co-workers suggests that prior literature can effectively be mined to get 
information about function-to-structure mapping. So there are in principle no problems in 
making reverse inferences, provided that these two conditions are respected: (1) their 
probabilistic nature must be taken into account; (2) previous literature must be accessed in 
a non-anecdotic, systematic way. Experimental moral psychology should not assume a 
bijection between structure and function, since the latter is very unlikely to stand the test of 
experimentation. To increase the specificity of the correlation between structure and 
function, experimental moral psychologists could use, in addition to fMRI meta-analyses, 
other techniques, such as repeated Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS)
43
 and lesion 
studies. These techniques allow to verify if a region of the brain is necessary to the 
performance of a mental function. fMRI alone is unable to do so. By combining lesion 
studies, TMS and fMRI on the one hand, and deploying the automated meta-analytic tools 
proposed by Yarkoni and colleagues on the other hand, real causal connections between 
brain regions and functions could be established. Furthermore, traditional fMRI studies 
should avail themselves of much bigger sample sizes, as most neuroimaging studies are 
underpowered (in terms of statistical power, cf. Yarkoni et al. 2010). It must be stressed 
that the probabilistic nature of reverse inference is not per se a problem – entire areas of 
empirical science are probabilistic and in particular experimental psychology is such, since 
it chiefly relies on Null Hypothesis Significance Testing. Even forward inference in fMRI 
are essentially statistical, since Student’s T tests are necessary to establish which voxels are 
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significantly activated in a given fMRI contrast. Caution must be addressed only to the 
idea of a rigid one-to-one mapping between mental functions and regions that comprise 
millions of neurons. The fMRI experiments by Greene heavily rely on reverse inference, as 
they classify regions into ‘emotional areas’ and ‘rational areas’. If reverse inference turned 
out to be illegitimate, those results would have little import for experimental moral 
psychology. However, the dual-process model is backed by much more empirical evidence 
than those two papers, so that the destiny of Greene et al. (2001, 2004) is largely 
orthogonal to the destiny of the dual-process model of moral cognition. 
Going back to the work by Greene and colleagues, there are finally three experiments that 
are worth mentioning.  
First, Cushman et al. (2012) showed that Total Peripheral Resistance (henceforth TPR), a 
measure of physiological arousal that is a function of both cardiac output and mean arterial 
pressure, is a significant predictor of responses to moral dilemmas. Participants with higher 
TPR are significantly more likely than the rest of the sample to condemn the action of 
throwing a man out a lifeboat in order to save the other passengers from drowning. Hence, 
more emotional arousal leads to more deontological judgments. 
Second, in Paxton, Ungar, and Greene (2012) experimental participants had to perform the 
Cognitive Reflection Test (henceforth CRT). The CRT consists of three questions that 
elicit incorrect, intuitive responses, which can be overridden by correct, reflective 
responses through the application of basic math, e.g.: 
“A bat and a ball cost $1.10. 
The bat costs one dollar more than the ball. 
How much does the ball cost?” 
Nearly everyone has the intuition that the ball will cost $0.10. However, the solution of a 
linear equation and a bit of reflection are sufficient to discover that the correct answer in 
$0.05. Subjects that can answer correctly to at least one of the CRT items are considered 
more reflective than the others. Paxton and co-workers showed that reflective participants 
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as defined by the CRT are more likely to give utilitarian responses to high-conflict moral 
dilemmas, thus buttressing the idea that utilitarian judgments are linked to controlled, 
reflective cognitive processes.  
Thirdly, Amit and Greene (2012) divided participants into visual and verbal sub-groups 
through a visual-verbal working memory task. Participants that were better at associating 
pictures were labeled as ‘visual’, whereas the ones more apt at categorizing words were 
labeled as ‘verbal’. The experimental hypothesis that drove Amit’s and Greene’s 
experiment is that visual imagery should be correlated with the visualization of means in 
high-conflict dilemmas. When one imagines the Footbridge case, one mentally visualizes 
the man that gets thrown down the bridge and not the five human lives that are thereby 
saved. Furthermore, visual representations are more emotionally salient than verbal 
representations. Hence, Amit and Greene hypothesized that people who visualize more are 
more likely to engage emotions, to concentrate on the rights of the bystander in 
Footbridge, and to pass deontological judgments. The result of the experiment confirmed 
these hypotheses: visual participants are more ‘deontological’. This nicely dovetails with 
the result by Caruso and Gino (2011), who showed that keeping one’s eyes closed 
increases the degree of mental simulation one carries out and renders moral judgments 
more emotional and more extreme. Hence, there is an overall correlation between mental 
imagery, emotional arousal, and harshness of moral condemnation towards rights 
violations
44
. To further strengthen their finding, Amit and Greene assigned to the 
participants two different cognitive load tasks, one visual and another verbal, to be 
executed during the rating of moral scenarios. The visual load was expected to tax the 
capacity of performing mental imagery, thereby reducing deontological judgments. The 
verbal load was expected to work like the cognitive load used by Greene et al. (2008). The 
latter load had (quite curiously) no effect, whereas the former actually made judgments 
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more utilitarian relative to no interference, thereby confirming Amit’s and Greene’s 
research hypothesis.  
To summarize this overview of experimental results in favor of Greene’s dual-process 
view, it is admittedly a wealthy amount of empirical evidence. The fMRI evidence, that 
has been the focus of so much controversy because of both the relative novelty of the 
technique
45
 and the general “neuro-hype” that characterizes the later years, is not at all 
essential to the model or even particularly important. The dual-process model is a thesis in 
experimental moral psychology and not primarily in neuroscience of morality. The body of 
evidence for the dual-process model has one chief limitation: it comes almost exclusively 
from “trolleyology.” If “trolleyology” came up as an unsound or misconceived way of 
exploring the moral domain, the dual process model would be scientifically dead. It is not a 
case that Greene and co-workers advocate the usefulness of dilemmas as a tool in 
experimental moral psychology quite forcefully (Cushman and Greene 2011): their whole 
research program depends on the viability of this approach. However, there are many 
scholars who think that trolleyology is not a good way to investigate moral behavior from 
the experimental point of view. In the next section I examine, among others, some of these 
critiques. 
 
2.3. Critiques of Greene’s dual-process model 
Greene’s dual process view has so far been the topic of much criticism. I discuss some of it 
here and some in the next chapter, where I deal with alternative views to Greene’s 
proposal.  
As I have written above, one important criticism tries to show that moral dilemmas are not 
a viable method in experimental moral psychology. The criticism is often made by 
neuroscientists and philosophers close to virtue ethics (Casebeer 2003; Churchland 2011). 
These researchers often follow a reading of history of moral philosophy by McIntyre (e.g. 
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1982), according to which the Enlightenment movement reduced the thick (i.e. teleological 
and Aristotelian) concept of ethics to a thin concept in which attention was moved from the 
agent to the action and contexts were virtually obliterated from consideration. According to 
an Aristotelian conception of ethics, the character of the agent is central and a virtuous 
agent is able to deftly respond to diverse demands stemming from the precise context in 
which she is embedded. Aristotelians therefore evaluate this shift in a negative way and do 
not look kindly upon attempts at creating very artificial situations like those that appear in 
Trolley-like cases. They argue that artificial cases tell us little about what morality is in 
everyday life and yield a warped view of human moral behavior.  
Churchland (2011, 110) notices that some moral judgments vary a lot if the context is 
changed: drinking “fresh apple juice out of brand-new hospital bedpan” feels disgusting in 
the lab, but it is not disgusting when you are dying of thirst in a desert. However, this 
criticism is not hard to defuse. Churchland could surely grant that in most contexts (e.g. 
while one is parking her car, when one is watching a football match, while one is cooking, 
etc.) the idea of drinking apple juice from a brand new bedpan is perceived as disgusting in 
Western cultures. Thirst would be an experimental confound here, an additional factor that 
significantly changes the psychological process we want to investigate, i.e. the one that 
takes place in most contexts. The same holds for the case put forth by Casebeer (2003, 
646) that stealing weapons from terrorists is morally good. Casebeer wants to underline the 
context-dependency of moral judgments in this way: stealing is morally bad in most 
circumstances, but the context can exert such a powerful effect on normative standards that 
under specific circumstances this action becomes acceptable. However, war and police 
operations are precisely contexts in which social groups substitute their usual moral 
categories with others: the morality of a soldier (bravery, honor, obedience) is not the 
morality we use while we are shopping at the super-market and the former does not say 
much about the latter. Again, here the context of a police operation against a terrorist group 
would change the psychological process the experimenters want to untangle. What we 
43 
 
think when we evaluate the action “stealing a lollipop from a child” is not the same as our 
mental process when we evaluate the action “stealing explosives from terrorists,” even if 
one is not a police officer. Casebeer also maintains that moral cognition is emotionally 
loaded and social, but this does not necessarily count as an objection against hypothetical 
scenarios. Affective and social psychology are burgeoning fields of empirical investigation 
that study emotions and social bonding inside the clean walls of the lab, i.e. leaving aside 
the real-world context. These lines of research often create hypothetical cases that seldom 
happen in real life (cf. for example the famous – or notorious – experiments by Milgram 
1963). Of course ecological validity
46
 ought to be pursued as much as it is feasible to do 
so, but it cannot constitute an in principle objection neither to empirical inquiry, nor to 
some specific experimental strategy, unless more specific claims against distinct 
experiments are made. I concede that social and affective neuroimaging are more 
challenging than social and affective experimental psychology in general, but even in this 
case ecological validity is in general preserved to such an extent that experiments are 
considered valid by the relevant scientific community. It is difficult to simulate social 
bonds and emotions inside a 3T scanner that makes a lot of noise and in which only one 
person at the time can stay, but it can be done by careful selection of the stimuli and 
eventually with the costly technique of hyper-scanning, i.e. using two scanners, two 
participants at the time, and allowing the latter to communicate to each other while both of 
their brains are scanned (Montague et al. 2002)
47
. The most interesting criticism made by 
Casebeer is that moral knowledge
48
 is a knowledge-how and not a knowledge-that, and the 
paradigms used by Greene (and by many other experimental moral psychologists, I have to 
say) deal with moral knowledge as it was knowledge-that. Moral knowledge would be 
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knowledge-how because moral skills enable good navigation in a complex social 
environment where the individual is a moral agent as well as a moral judge. She decides at 
the same time what judgments to make and what actions to carry out. It might be the case 
that moral knowledge is actually knowledge-how. In this case we should change our 
experimental paradigms. However, some experimenters have already asked participants to 
carry out physical simulations of morally relevant actions in the lab (cf. Cushman et al. 
2012), for instance pretending to hit a person. In this specific case, participants were 
clearly informed that they were hitting a fake hand or using a fake knife, but any way 
subjects were asked to act, not to judge only. Of course the strict limitations to human 
experimentation stop researchers from going too far on this kind of experiments, and 
rightly so. Even though the possibility that moral knowledge is knowledge-how should not 
be neglected, I do not know at present of the existence of any evidence indicating that this 
possibility is actual.  
A third criticism of this kind is leveled by German psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer (2010). 
He is skeptical about moral dilemmas because he criticizes RCT by drawing on the works 
by Nobel-laureate Herbert Simon (e.g. 1955, 1956) on bounded rationality. In his opinion 
RCT and the associated normative ethical theory of maximizing consequentialism can 
work only in “small worlds,” realities in which all the probabilities and the values of 
outcomes are known to the agent. This knowledge is possible exactly because these 
settings are artificial and lack complexity. The real world in which humans live is not a 
small world, though. It is exceedingly complex and humans living in it systematically lack 
information, so that they have developed decision making strategies that are conducive to 
survival and reproduction even in absence of significant pieces of information. Bounded 
rationality embodies these decision making strategies. Hence, in Gigerenzer’s opinion 
experiments that are carried out in the small world of the lab would tell little about the 
large world outside its walls. Put in this extreme form, Gigerenzer’s argument seems to 
doom the whole of experimental psychology, including his own work, since most of 
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psychology is done in the lab to allow for precise elimination of confounding variables. If a 
more charitable reading is adopted, this claim seems to be reducible to an appeal to 
ecological validity, an appeal that is well taken but that is insufficient to condemn 
experimental strategies or paradigms unless more specific, circumstantiated claims are 
made.  
A fourth criticism is leveled by Jana Schaich Borg and colleagues (2006) who investigated, 
through fMRI and among many other moral phenomena, the neural correlates of the 
Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (henceforth DDA)
49
, a typical deontological tenet 
utilitarians regularly reject. The regions involved with the DDA were markedly cognitive 
areas such as the DLPFC. This is evidence against the idea that deontology is strongly 
connected with System1, assuming arguendo that a thing such as System1 exists. Schaich 
Borg and co-workers suggest that some deontological responses are mediated by reason, 
whereas other deontological responses are mediated by emotion: no specific mapping 
between reason/emotion and deontology obtains. 
Some different but however important criticisms of Greene’s descriptive work have been 
made by Oxford philosopher Guy Kahane, arguably the most perceptive of Greene’s 
critics. In Kahane and Shackel (2010) three criticisms are leveled.  
First, there is a criticism on words. Kahane and Shackel argue that Greene and colleagues 
have asked participants whether hypothetical actions are “appropriate” or “inappropriate,” 
but this does not allow the researchers to understand what kind of moral concepts the 
participants are deploying. Are participants that answer “appropriate” thinking that the 
action is mandatory? Are they thinking that the action is merely permissible? Are they 
thinking that the action is praiseworthy but not mandatory? The argument is not new, as 
you can find it in a similar form in Kamm (2009). This point is about the wording of the 
question that is addressed to the participant, not about the wording of the scenario. This 
criticism has been defused from the empirical point of view by O’Hara, Sinnott-
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Armstrong, and Sinnott-Armstrong (2010), who showed that studies whose questions 
featured different wording can be legitimately compared because subjects respond roughly 
in the same way when different (but similar) questions about the same scenario are made. 
Participants do not perceive as different concepts which professional moral philosophers 
deem different. There is another wording problem, though, that Kahane and Shackel do not 
mention. It has to do with the wording of scenarios. This wording can have serious effects, 
as famously noticed by the late Amos Tversky and Nobel-laureate Daniel Kahneman 
(1981). Describing the effects of a public health policy in terms of either deaths or lives 
saved from death itself
50
 dramatically changed participants’ responses. This type of 
wording effect was already discussed by the early experiments on Trolley-like scenarios 
carried out by Petrinovich, O’Neill, and Jorgensen (1993, 476) and by Petrinovich and 
O’Neill (1996, 152) and the result was that this wording effect is a potent explanatory 
factor for participants’ decisions, as it can account for roughly 25% of variance in 
responses. Greene’s scenarios do not seem to show this specific problem, but any way 
wording of hypothetical scenarios must be controlled in experimental moral psychology. 
Concluding, both criticism on wording do not seem to hit Greene’s experimental program 
that hard. 
Secondly, Kahane and Shackel criticize the choice of the dilemmas. This criticism is 
widespread (Berker 2009; Kamm 2009; Mikhail 2011; Moore et al. 2008). There are two 
different criticisms, though. The former is about the 2001 dilemmas (starting from the 
2004 paper Greene has analyzed just a subclass of personal moral dilemmas). As Moore et 
al. (2008) correctly notice, the personal and impersonal dilemmas used in the 2001 paper 
involved different kinds of violations (killing v. stealing, for instance), different levels of 
probabilistic reasoning, different levels of difficulty since some scenarios were not 
dilemmatic at all, and different lengths in terms of number of words. Moore et al. managed 
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to replicate Greene’s personal/impersonal effect51 using refined dilemmas, even though 
they failed to spot a link between a measure of working memory and utilitarian judgments. 
This null result counts as a piece of evidence against the dual-process model. That being 
said, Greene partially addressed this problem both by restricting his set of dilemmas to the 
high-conflict list first used by Koenigs et al. (2007) in his VMPFC experiment and by 
using completely different dilemmas from the 2001 ones in subsequent works (i.e. Greene 
et al. 2009). To my knowledge, changing the dilemmas has never overturned one of 
Greene’s results, except the 2001 RT result. At any rate, the 2001 dilemmas are technically 
very bad and should be jettisoned and forgotten. It is not difficult to come up with more 
refined, better crafted scenarios (for instance Cushman et al. 2011; Moore et al. 2008). 
Furthermore, a second criticism addresses the difficulty of using the dilemmas to map a 
distinction between utilitarian and deontological responses. It is the same difficulty 
discussed above while commenting on Koenigs et al. (2007) and, though reasonable, it is 
empirically defused by the re-analysis carried out by Koenigs and his co-workers while 
responding to Kahane and Shackel (2008).  
The third and last criticism by Kahane and Shackel (2010) is the one about moral theories. 
Patterns of responses to dilemmas, in their opinion, cannot be used to attribute to 
participants the belief in moral theories. In the case of utilitarianism, a person can be 
considered a maximizing act utilitarian if and only if she believes that the only thing that 
determines whether an act is morally right is whether it maximizes aggregate well-being. 
Experiments by Greene and others are insufficient to prove that any of the participants 
endorse such a belief. This is philosophically correct. It seems that this is what we want to 
know when we want to ascertain whether someone is a card-carrying utilitarian. But is 
Greene interested in the card-carrying utilitarian? Or is experimental moral psychology 
interested in who is a card-carrying utilitarian? Not necessarily. The focus of Greene’s 
model is on judgments, i.e. the output of the two alleged systems. As far as the analysis 
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stays at the level of judgments, we do not need to be concerned with the attribution of 
endorsement of substantive ethical theories, whose work is justifying moral judgments. But 
at the same time Greene’s model contains a claim on the theories being psychological 
natural kinds. It seems impossible to back this claim from the empirical point of view 
unless experiments on theories are made and Kahane’s criterion for attribution of belief in 
a substantive ethical theory is used. But there are little or no experiments on the issue of 
moral justification in experimental moral psychology, with the possible exception of 
Cushman, Young and Hauser (2006) and Hauser et al. (2007). Studies on moral 
justifications are so rare because they need to rely on self-reports, and self-reports have 
been looked on with suspicion in social psychology since the famous review by Nisbett 
and Wilson (1977) that shows that they are normally unreliable. In absence of solid 
experimentation on moral justifications little can be said about normative ethical theories 
from the experimental point of view. So, when Greene writes that “making 
’characteristically consequentialist’ and ‘characteristically deontological’ judgments 
requires no explicit or implicit commitment to consequentialist or deontological theories” 
(forthcoming, § I), he makes a reasonable point, but he does not realize that by conceding 
this point he is emptying his claim about substantive theories as psychological natural 
kinds of its alleged empirical backing. In this way he secures the part of his work that 
investigates judgments, but de facto jettisons claims about theories without realizing it. The 
problem gets even more serious if we understand, as Kahane and Shackel correctly 
suggest
52
 together with Frances Kamm, that it is very well possible for several non-
consequentialist theories to justify the judgment that it is morally permissible to push the 
bystander down the bridge to her death in Footbridge. It is for example possible for a card-
carrying non-consequentialist to consider the right to life of the five more weighty than 
considerations against voluntary and personal violence. Deontology has been admitting 
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conflicts between prima facie rights and resolution thereof at least since the time of Ross 
(2002/1930), so that the possibility for non-consequentialism to justify the 
‘characteristically utilitarian judgment’ in Footbridge should not come as a surprise. 
Concluding, it is useful to draw a distinction between a weak dual-process model, that 
simply deals with a System1 and a System2, and a strong dual-process model, that 
associates System1 to deontology, System2 to utilitarianism and makes the far-fetched 
‘natural kinds’ claim (Berker, personal communication53). Greene seems to have some 
evidence for the weak version, but little evidence for the latter, strong version. To stress the 
same point, I also endorse the criticism by Dean (2010), according to which even assuming 
arguendo that Greene can attribute to deontology the emotional reactions to personal 
dilemmas, this would just represent a tiny part of a deontological ethical theory. As Dean 
notices, just one of the Ten Commandments is about the intentional use of personal force. 
The rest of that deontological theory has little to do with the experiments we are 
considering here, so that it is hard to infer any conclusions on the whole of that substantive 
ethical theory on the basis of these data.  
There are another pair of objections that are worth mentioning. The first is made by Leben 
(2011) and is equivalent to the one by Fine (2006) against Haidt (2001) I discuss in 
Chapter 3. The rather Aristotelian point is that moral education and training can render 
automatic responses that at first required reflection and the deployment of reasoning. Habit 
and learning can create a ‘second nature’, i.e. automatic patterns of behavior that end up 
being almost as automatic as patterns that are regularly develop in ontogenesis, in a way 
that is robust to environmental perturbations. In order to apply the idea to Greene’s 
descriptive model, one could say that the products of System2 can become System1-like 
responses under certain conditions, that have to do with repetition and reinforcement. For 
instance, a card-carrying utilitarian could decide to regularly override his aversion to 
personal violence and act as though personal and impersonal ways of bringing about harm 
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were morally equivalent. If this objection is correct, the inhibition of System1 and the 
systematic passing of judgments that bypass the personal / impersonal distinction would 
become automatic and unreflective over time. Conceding such a point would weaken the 
dual-process model because it would make the two systems more enmeshed and less 
distinguishable. How damaging to the model this objection is depends on how often this 
learning takes place, though. In other words, in order to understand whether the dual-
process model is still descriptively useful after learning is taken into account, one needs to 
know how relevant it is in the overall economy of moral cognition. I leave this empirical 
question aside precisely because it is an interesting experimental issue on which, to my 
knowledge, no specific work has been done, also because it would require lengthy 
longitudinal studies. The objection seems to be plausible, but only empirical work can 
establish whether it actually holds and what scope it has. 
The last objection comes from an experimental paper by Kahane and co-workers (2012). 
The question that drives this article is the following: are there deontological judgments that 
look very counter-intuitive, in the sense that just a few people make them? Kahane et al. 
argue that the dual-process model seems to be incompatible with such judgments, if they 
do exist. Deontological judgments should be intuitive in Greene’s model. But there are 
some deontological positions that actually are very counter-intuitive in this sense. In the 
Anglo-Saxon world, deontological theories are regularly associated with the name of 18
th
 
Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant. Kant is notorious for a short text in which he 
construes a complete prohibition of lying, even when this is required to protect some 
important values, such as a human life, or the well-fare of many people (Kant 1966/1797). 
That is to say that some forms of deontology prohibit white lies. Kahane has speculated 
that these forms of counter-intuitive, deontological judgments are driven by System2 and 
not by System1. He created a set of dilemmas that are labeled as Utilitarian Intuitive (UI), 
in which the characteristically utilitarian response is far more common than the 
deontological response. Among these dilemmas White Lie cases, that pit telling the truth 
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against significant psychological harm, are prominent. Then Kahane and colleagues 
showed these dilemmas plus Deontological Intuitive dilemmas from Greene’s original set 
to experimental participants in a MRI scanner. Their results allegedly show that responses 
elicit no stable BOLD pattern according to whether they are utilitarian or deontological 
(i.e. according to content), but according to whether they are intuitive (i.e. partaken by 
most people in their social group) or counter-intuitive (i.e. relatively rare in the social 
group). On the basis of this result, Kahane and coworkers claim that the dual-process 
model is misconceived because the two alleged systems that would constitute the 
machinery for moral judgment lack identifiable neural correlates. Leaving aside technical 
issues with the interpretation of Kahane et al’s fMRI results, which are fairly complex, 
there are at least two broader problems with this article. First, when Greene says 
“intuitive”, he does not refer to agreement in a group. He refers to a cognitive process that 
has specific features and can be deployed under some circumstances and not deployed 
under some other circumstances. There are several dilemmas, such as Switch, in which the 
System1 (intuitive) response is a minority option from the empirical point of view, i.e. 
there are less participants that take the intuitive decision than the counter-intuitive 
decision. In Switch the cognitive process “intuition” is unlikely to be deployed due to 
specific features of the scenario. Kahane and coworkers classified responses as ‘intuitive’ 
or ‘counter-intuitive’ on the basis of the ratings of 18 independent judges, i.e. they used 
response ratings from a sample as classification criterion. So there is a definitional 
disagreement between Kahane et al (2012) and Greene on the concept of ‘intuition’. In 
Kahane’s opinion intuitive judgments are simply those that are made by the majority of the 
sample, whereas Greene makes use of Haidt’s concept and sees ‘intuition’ as a fast, 
unreflective cognitive process that is sometimes coupled with emotional phenomena. To a 
certain extent Kahane and Greene are therefore talking past each other and the experiment 
by Kahane et al. (2012) appears to be rather orthogonal relative to the dual process model. 
Indeed, the latter allows for very widespread System2 (counter-intuitive in Greene’s sense) 
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judgments and of very rare System1 (intuitive in Greene’s sense) judgments. For example, 
in a version of Footbridge in which the consequence of sparing the bystander’s life is the 
death of 500,000 humans due to the explosion of a nuclear weapon, the System2 (counter-
intuitive in Greene’s sense) response is very common in the sample. Secondly, in an article 
Joseph Paxton, Joshua Greene, and me are writing while I am typing this (September 8
th
 
2012), we report a behavioral experiment in which we used the CRT on a White Lie case. 
According to Kahane’s hypothesis, more reflection should induce people to become more 
deontological in that case, since the hardcore Kantian response to that dilemma is seen as 
mediated and counter-intuitive. On the contrary, if Greene’s model is correct on this point, 
correct answers to the CRT (which indicate more reflection) should correlate with more 
utilitarian responses to a White Lie dilemma. It is true by definition that priming through 
the CRT reduces ‘intuitive’ processing in a Haidtian sense as described in Ch.1, since those 
judgments are (again, by definition) unreflective judgments. Our results confirm Greene’s 
view, even though the effect is not very strong, possibly due to a ceiling effect: most of our 
participants already endorsed the utilitarian solution in absence of CRT and it was 
therefore difficult to make them even more “utilitarian.”54 However, when people reflect 
more, they tend to tell lies to avoid psychological harm to others. They do not become 
crusaders of truth for the truth’s sake. This shows that White Lie cases are not a counter-
example to Greene’s double mapping between System1 and characteristically 
deontological judgments on the one hand, System2 and characteristically utilitarian 
judgments on the other hand. 
Concluding the chapter, there is significant evidence for a weak version of the dual-process 
model, as defined above. The main point on which Greene’s project fails is the thesis that 
utilitarianism and deontology are psychological natural kinds. Much additional evidence, a 
significant part of which ought to be cross-cultural, must be marshaled by Greene in order 
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to make that very strong claim credible. Unless this empirical evidence is provided, 
Greene’s ‘psychological natural kinds’ claim strikes as false.  
In the next chapter I review theories in moral psychology that are partially or completely 
alternative to the dual-process model, in order to show that the dual-process view is not the 
only cock in the hen-house of experimental moral psychology. 
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Chapter 3: Alternative views in experimental moral psychology 
and their ethical consequences 
 
In this chapter I review some descriptive theories in experimental moral psychology that 
are alternative to Greene’s dual-process model. I also examine and discuss the normative 
consequences that their authors draw from them, if any.  
Two concepts must be explained at the outset.  
The first is the idea of a neuromoral theory. A neuromoral theory claims that knowledge of 
the machinery for moral judgments can help individuals make better moral judgments. 
This is the common ground of all neuromoral theories
55
. These theories diverge on two 
main issues:  
(1) What does it mean to say that the human ability to make good moral judgments can be 
improved?  
(2) How exactly can the scientific understanding of the machinery for moral judgments 
have a positive impact on this ability? 
(1) has to do with the standard according to which moral judgments are good or bad, better 
or worse than others. There are several possibilities. A cognitivist may think that moral 
judgments are belief-like, doxastic mental states. If the cognitivist is also a realist, then 
these judgments are good or bad insofar as they track the posited moral facts, whatever 
they are. In this case, knowledge of the machinery for moral judgments could help us make 
moral judgments that are closer to the moral facts than the previous ones. If the cognitivist 
is not a realist, he may be an error-theorist. An error theorist is committed to the view that 
moral judgments are doxastic states that are universally false, since there are no moral 
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facts. But the error theorist can say that some moral judgments are better than others. For 
instance, he can say that moral judgments, albeit universally false, are better if they 
promote stable and rewarding forms of cooperation between H sapiens specimens
56
. In this 
case, knowledge of the machinery for moral judgments could help us make moral 
judgments that lead to forms of cooperation that are more stable and efficient. 
Alternatively, the error theorist may uphold some other normative standard for moral 
judgments. A non-cognitivist thinks that moral judgments are non-doxastic mental states, 
that have little to do with beliefs. Also the non-cognitivist can say that some moral 
judgments are better than others. For instance, a good moral judgment may be a non-
doxastic mental state that helps humans interact in ways that are likely to generate the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number, or in ways that enhance stable and fruitful 
forms of cooperation, and so on
57
. In what follows, I remain agnostic on the disputes 
among cognitivists of the realist strain, error theorists, and non-cognitivists. 
What matters is simply to emphasize that different standards can be used to assess the 
relative goodness of moral judgments and that it is not per se evident which one is correct. 
(2) has more to do with the structure of the machinery for moral judgments, so that the 
answer provided by each neuromoral theory to this question quite heavily depends on the 
description of the machinery it is linked to. Not all descriptive views in experimental moral 
psychology are linked to neuromoral theories, but some are. Neuromoral theories have 
recurring problems, and I highlight them on a case per case base. 
The second concept that needs to be briefly addressed is the concept of moral domain, even 
though, as I have written in the Introduction, I do not delve into it. Descriptive theories in 
experimental moral psychology have many differences, but one important difference is that 
they draw the distinction between moral judgments / scenarios / problems / beliefs and 
their non-moral counterparts in different ways. In other words, different descriptive 
theories identify different moral domains. Hence, these theories are not exactly taking into 
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account the same domain and are not trying to make sense of exactly the same set of 
experimental results. Some theories may describe a moral domain that is rather limited and 
narrow, i.e. containing a small amount of kinds of actions. Other theories may identify 
broader domains and “moralize” issues that other theorists do not “moralize.” For instance, 
some theories, such as the one sketched by Turiel (1983), limit morality to the domains of 
inter-personal harm and fairness. Others, such as the tripartite view advocated by Shweder 
and colleagues (1997), is much more inclusive and features behaviors such as the quest for 
sexual purity, deference to established authority, and obligations due to high rank and 
status. However, some behaviors and related experiments are consistently perceived by 
theorists as part of the moral domain, at least to my knowledge. I know no moral 
psychologist that takes the deliberate killing of an non-consentient, healthy, adult human 
being as a non-moral issue. Truth be told, one theorist, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, claims 
that the moral domain is irreducibly pluralistic, so that scientific investigation ought to 
examine phenomena that are much more fine-grained than generally understood “moral 
violations.” I will briefly deal with Sinnott-Armstrong’s theory (2008b, 2012) in § 3.6. 
Apart from Sinnott-Armstrong, there is some degree of coherence in the amount of 
empirical material that these psychological theories have to cope with. To conclude, the 
purpose of this chapter is twofold: on the one hand, to show that there are many other 
descriptive models than Greene’s, and on the other hand, to discuss neuromoral theories 
that are connected to these alternative descriptive views. 
 
3.1. Haidt: The Social Intuitionist Model and the Moral Foundations Theory 
At the moment Jonathan Haidt is arguably the most influential experimental moral 
psychologist. His work has given rise to two popular books (Haidt 2006, 2012) and to 
several academic responses, mostly critical (Fine 2006; Paxton and Greene 2010; Pizarro 
and Bloom 2003; Saltzstein and Kasachkoff 2004; Suhler and Churchland 2011). I deal 
with some of these comments below. Haidt’s work is composed of two theories that are 
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rather independent: the Social Intuitionist Model (henceforth SIM) and the Moral 
Foundations Theory (henceforth MFT). I will start with the SIM and deal with MFT later 
on in this section.  
The SIM makes two main claims: (1) moral judgments are mostly intuitive, i.e. made 
without reflection, i.e. they are moral intuitions in the Haidtian sense I have discussed in 
Ch. 1; (2) moral judgments are a social practice in which the individual is continuously 
influenced by her fellow humans and her social milieu; in particular, moral reasoning 
regularly takes place at the social level (inter-personal discussion) and not at the individual 
level (solitary cost-benefit analysis before deciding how to judge a particular situation). 
The model was first expounded in Haidt (2001). It must be underlined from the outset that 
the SIM is a theory of moral judgment, and not (more broadly) a theory of moral decision 
making (Haidt and Bjorklund 2008b, 242). Moral judgment is a mental state in which a 
moral property of some sort is attributed to an action, an omission, or a character. It is 
typically in the Other perspective, i.e. a judge J evaluates actions, omissions, and character 
traits that are not carried out by J or that do not belong to J. However, there are also moral 
judgments in the Self perspective, although Haidt does not seem to take them into account. 
In contrast with this, moral decision making is much more complex, since it also includes 
selecting worthy goals, considering alternatives, and weighing different considerations (cf. 
Narvaez 2008). Haidt does not even endeavor to explain moral decision making in general 
– he tries to provide a theory of moral judgment (in the Other perspective) only. Haidt’s 
approach in the 2001 paper is explicitly emotivist, in the sense that Haidt seems to defend 
the extreme position by David Hume according to which “we speak not strictly and 
philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought 
only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve 
and obey them" (Hume 1960/1739, 415)
58
. The primary role of moral reasoning in the SIM 
is carrying out post-hoc rationalization. This is to say that moral reasoning concocts 
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explanations of emotionally-driven processes in order to make them consistent with the 
subject’s self-image. To use a comparison by Haidt, a moral reasoner is more like a lawyer 
that makes a case than like a judge that looks for justice: she tries to justify a judgment that 
has already been made at the emotive level
59
. Unbiased moral reasoning is rare: it only 
takes place when the subject has adequate time and processing capacity, a motivation to be 
accurate, no a priori judgment to defend, and when no relatedness or coherence 
motivations are triggered. This function of moral reasoning is similar to the activity of the 
“left-hemisphere interpreter” described by Gazzaniga (1998), a cognitive network located 
in the left hemisphere of the human brain which on the one hand fills the gaps in our 
perception of reality and renders it smooth and coherent, on the other hand confabulates 
just-so-stories for behaviors whose real causes cannot be acknowledged because they are 
destabilizing to the individual’s self-image. According to a common reading of Haidt’s 
paper, in the SIM moral reasoning has this function only. Most of the responses to Haidt 
(2001) were triggered by this interpretation of his claims
60
. Although it is true that some 
parts of Haidt’s long paper seem to uphold extreme emotivist claims, this reading is in my 
opinion uncharitable and does not do justice to the SIM. Even though moral reasoning 
actually carries out the confabulating function described above, this is not the whole story 
about moral reasoning in the SIM. Haidt actually embraces a dual-process view, in which 
moral reasoning can be effective on moral judgments, regularly in social context and rarely 
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at the individual level. The system is based on six links, that are depicted here (the figure is 
from Haidt 2001).  
The most powerful links from the explanatory point of view are number 1, 2, 3, and 4 (full 
lines), whereas links 5 and 6 are weaker (dashed lines). Unreflective responses to the 
environment cause moral judgments to appear suddenly in consciousness – this appearance 
is a moral intuition, and this phenomenon is represented by link 1. As Dwyer (2009, 277) 
correctly points out, the link between moral intuition and moral judgment is not spelled out 
in a very clear way by Haidt. In particular, in the 2001 paper it was not particularly clear 
whether a moral intuition is a moral judgment or some emotional phenomenon that causes 
a moral judgment to appear. However, Haidt later modified the definition by making 
explicit that moral intuition is the appearance of an evaluative feeling: a moral intuition is 
the  
 
sudden appearance in consciousness, or at the fringe of consciousness, of an evaluative feeling 
(like–dislike, good–bad) about the character or actions of a person, without any conscious 
awareness of having gone through steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion 
(Haidt and Bjorklund 2008a, 188). 
 
Moral intuitions are thus different from moral judgments. Be as it may, what matters here 
is that in the SIM emotional reactions to cases causally drive fast moral judgments. The 
emotions Haidt refers to are a subset of emotional phenomena known as the ‘moral 
emotions’. Haidt defines them as “those emotions that are linked to the interests or welfare 
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either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent” (Haidt 
2003a, 853). There are many moral emotions, but two sets are particularly important. The 
former is the so-called CAD set, Contempt, Anger, and Disgust, which are also known as 
the “other-critical” or “other-condemning” emotions, since they motivate punishment of 
moral violators or withdrawal from cooperation with them. The latter is the SEG set, 
Shame, Embarrassment, and Guilt, i.e. the so-called “self-critical” emotions, which 
promote cooperation and abidance by norms. The SEG emotions mainly aim at avoiding 
the CAD emotions of other members of the human group one lives in, so that the two sets 
are closely linked in a social context. These emotions are in turn triggered by specific 
events or situations. These sets of triggering events are innate, in the sense that they are 
“organized in advance of experience” (Haidt and Joseph 2007, 374) in the human brain. 
What these sets are is specified by the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). 
Link 2 represents the post hoc activity of reasoning. However, moral reasoning sometimes 
fails to provide convincing explanations for emotionally-driven moral judgments. In these 
cases, the subject cannot provide a justificatory reason for her moral judgment and while 
confronting the question “But why is behavior B morally wrong / praiseworthy / 
mandatory etc?” she finds herself unable to answer. This phenomenon is known as ‘moral 
dumbfounding’. The typical example Haidt quotes is disgust towards incest. Humans do 
not like incest, even in cases in which there is no possibility of reproduction and when no 
physical or psychological harm can possibly be involved. Our dislike for sexual intercourse 
between people that share a sizable part of their genetic endowment (or that at any rate 
have been raised together) may be explained by biological evolution and could only justify 
aversion to cases of incest in which reproduction is possible. If reproduction is made 
impossible by contraceptive methods
61
, there is no possibility to justify moral aversion to 
incest through biological evolution. Hence, experimental participants are usually unable to 
justify their moral responses in these cases, as instances of harm are equally excluded by 
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the scenario and both parties involved in the intercourse are adult and consenting. 
Importantly, this does not lead participants to revise their judgments, since the emotional 
responses that drove the judgment in the first place are still present and active.  
Link 3 constitutes the biggest output of moral reasoning: modification of others’ moral 
emotions, in particular through the reframing of scenarios. In the SIM, A’s reasoning does 
not influence B’s reasoning, but B’s emotional responses to moral cases. The existence of 
Link 3, together with its being considered important by Haidt, shows that a reading of this 
model that focuses solely on post-hoc rationalization is unwarranted. An individual’s moral 
emotions can be changed through another’s reasoning, but also in another way. If a 
member of B’s group or a friend of hers makes moral judgment J1, B is then induced to 
adopt J1. Similarly, an enemy of B’s making moral judgment J2 pushes B to reject J2. This 
is represented by the social persuasion link, which bears number 4. Link 5 and 6 refer to 
private reasoning, that can have causal efficacy but, as we have said, under particular 
conditions only. 
There are at least two interesting criticisms to the SIM: the former has been made by 
Pizarro and Bloom (2003), the latter by Fine (2006). Both try to show that the role of 
reasoning is not limited to post-hoc rationalization, but that reasoning plays an active role 
for moral judgment. As we have seen, Haidt largely concedes this at the social level by 
positing the existence of Link 3. However, these critics argue that moral reasoning is active 
at the individual level too – i.e. at the level of links 5 and 6 that Haidt deems to be rarely 
active. Pizarro and Bloom first notice a very important fact: intuitions can be shaped by 
processes that are rational and strictly cognitive even at the individual level. The most 
notable case is cognitive appraisal (or re-appraisal): the way in which a situation is 
construed (or re-construed) determines the kind of emotional reaction we have to it. To use 
the scenario proposed by Pizarro and Bloom, if you find a phone number scribbled on a 
piece of paper in a pocket in your spouse’s jacket, you may get very angry if you already 
have suspects that he/she might have an affair. In contrast, in absence of these cognitive 
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premises, i.e. of this kind of appraisal, you might dismiss the finding as morally irrelevant 
– it might well be just a random phone number linked to a work issue. Furthermore, role 
taking (putting oneself in somebody else’s shoes), which was one of the key component of 
the rationalistic model of moral development proposed by Lawrence Kohlberg (1969) and 
criticized by Haidt, is precisely, according to Pizarro and Bloom, a form of cognitive 
appraisal. Role taking elicits moral intuitions that are different from those that a moral 
judge would have in its absence, and often creates a positive feedback loop with empathy 
that can profoundly transform one’s moral views. For example, you can contemplate the 
plight of a member of a minority you despise and that is unjustly discriminated against. By 
means of role taking and empathy with her suffering, you can profoundly change your 
moral opinions on the matter. But this process, Pizarro and Bloom argue, starts with 
reasoning and then involves a non-social emotion-reason interaction. Haidt (2003b) 
responds by biting the bullet and saying that moral intuitions are of course responsive to 
what we learn about our environment
62
, yet this is relatively rare and happens mostly in 
social contexts. Haidt is making an empirical claim here, a claim that could in principle be 
tested and ascertained through an appropriate experimental setting. But it is not clear how 
to devise an experiment that shows how often role taking is used. It would be necessary 
both to keep the ecological conditions in the lab as close as possible to those present in 
standard social environments and to find a way to assess the use of moral reasoning vs. 
moral intuition in an implicit way, without availing oneself of self-reports, since those are 
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 It is useful to notice at this point that Haidt makes use of two different dichotomies. The former is between 
emotion and cognition in general, whereas the second is between intuition and reasoning. Intuition is meant 
to be a form of cognition as much as reasoning. Cf. for instance Haidt and Bjorklund (2008a, 200-201). In 
responding to Pizarro and Bloom, Haidt is claiming that intuitions have some cognitive component, i.e. are a 
part of cognition broadly construed. Therefore, they can react to changes in the environment and be 
influenced by role-taking under specific conditions. This might seem to be incompatible with a reading of 
moral intuition as a thoroughly emotive, non-cognitive phenomenon. Haidt seems to interpret moral 
intuitions in the latter way in some parts of his works, when he is more Humean than usual, but a more 
charitable reading of his position allows me to attribute him the view that moral intuitions have both a 
cognitive and an affective component. Of course this cognitive component is not a reasoning component. 
Furthermore, Haidt (2012, 45) explicitly maintains that intuitions are cognitive phenomena. The position by 
Prinz (2008), according to which moral judgments include the perception of an action and a sentiment, i.e. 
both a cognitive and an emotive component, seems to me to be more persuasive, provided that one has 
emotivist allegiances, than a strongly Humean reading of the SIM.  
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notoriously unreliable (cf. Nisbett and Wilson 1977). The empirical solution of this 
quandary seems thus not to be at hand. 
The criticism by Fine draws on the one by Pizarro and Bloom, but actually manages to 
marshal empirical evidence to the effect that in some cases moral intuitions directly result 
from cognitive control processes. Cognitive control
63
 is the capacity of reason to inhibit 
and override prepotent emotional or automatic responses. In a study, Monteith and 
colleagues (2002) asked participants to perform an Implicit Association Task (IAT)
64
, a 
common procedure in experimental psychology that is inter alia carried out for the 
assessment of unconscious racial biases. Then participants were explained the structure and 
purpose of the task they had just carried out and were given their scores. Then subjects 
were asked to perform a second task, in which they were shown a list of words and had to 
tell on spot whether they liked them, using a standard Likert-like scale. Subjects that were 
feeling guilty because they showed a racial bias against Blacks in the previous IAT 
unconsciously inhibited their responses to first names that are typical to Black people and 
were significantly more likely than the other participants to say that they liked Black 
names. In this case, the inhibitory control of the racist bias transfers to new moral 
intuitions relative to new stimuli. Fine speculates that this kind of cognitive control can be 
rendered automatic, so that in the end a new, stable moral intuition is formed and the 
original racial bias is permanently suppressed in that individual
65
. Most behavioral patterns 
can be made automatic through repetition – learning to dance or to practice a martial art 
involves for example a similar kind of learning in the motor domain. I in turn speculate 
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 Also known as “executive function” and closely related to “working memory”, i.e. short term memory 
used to store information that is necessary to perform a given task. 
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 The participant is presented with a series of words and names, and asked to categorize each word as 
‘pleasant’/‘unpleasant’, and each name as ‘White name’/‘Black name’. In the ‘incongruent’ condition, 
participants use the same keyboard key to categorize words as ‘pleasant’ and names as ‘Black’. In the 
‘congruent’ condition, the same key is used to categorize words as ‘unpleasant’ and names as ‘Black.’ If 
White participants are significantly slower at categorizing in the ‘incongruent’ condition, they demonstrate a 
negative affective association with Black names. 
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 After the publication of Fine’s critique, Haidt explicitly admitted that this is possible: “[I]t is possible that 
some intuitions are just moral principles that were once learned consciously and now have become 
automatic.” (Haidt and Bjorklund 2008a, 212) 
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that this could be one of the dynamics through which moral change takes place over time 
in human groups.  
Recently, empirical evidence has been provided to the effect that cognitive reappraisal can 
dampen emotionally-driven moral intuitions
66
. Cognitive reappraisal includes a 
reinterpretation of emotion-inducing stimuli that reduces the impact of emotional 
experience. Hence, Feinberg and co-workers (2012) tested whether cognitive reappraisal 
has a significant influence on moral intuitions using the classic disgust-inducing scenario 
from Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993): eating one’s own dead dog. Their results corroborated 
the hypothesis. A greater spontaneous tendency to re-appraise was linked to fewer 
intuition-based judgments and participants made less emotion-based moral judgments 
when explicitly instructed by the researchers to re-appraise the emotions stemming from a 
movie clip they watched prior to the moral scenario.  
Another recent claim on the same lines is the one by Campbell and Kumar (2012), 
according to which moral consistency reasoning, i.e. the requirement that similar cases 
must elicit the same kind of moral responses, can change moral intuitions in the long run. 
Let us suppose that cases C1 and C2 are similar, they elicit moral responses M1 and M2, 
the judge is more sure of her response to M1 than of her response to M2, and M1 and M2 
are very different. This situation creates an inconsistency, which in turn arouses a negative 
moral response. This response conflicts with M2, which is weaker than M1, and 
contributes to change it over time. According to Campbell and Kumar, System1 is 
impenetrable in the sense that controlled cognition has no immediate effect on its internal 
operation and the outputs it yields. However, it does not follow that cognition has no long-
term influence on System1. In short, while System1 is by definition synchronically 
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 Cognitive reappraisal can influence basic emotions too. For instance, suppose that Geoff is afraid of a dog 
because Geoff believes that (a) it will attack him, and in turn Geoff believes (a) because Geoff believes that 
(b) this dog is an American Pit Bull Terrier, (c) American Pit Bull Terriers regularly attack humans, and (d) 
American Pit Bull Terriers’ attacks are dangerous to humans. If empirical evidence can be marshaled to 
debunk one among (b), (c), and (d), e.g. if Geoff understands that (e) this dog is a West Highland White 
Terrier, that his fear ought to disappear (where the ‘ought’ has to do with rationality). I thank Bernard 
Baertschi for pointing this out to me. 
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impenetrable, it may nevertheless be diachronically penetrable. However, Campbell’s and 
Kumar’s perspective is thoroughly philosophical and they do not feel compelled to 
strengthen their case with empirical evidence. What they write is plausible, but needs to be 
supported by experimental data. 
Going back to Fine, she also has a precious theoretical insight. Consider a set of people P1 
who hold moral judgment J3 and can provide reasons to justify it, as the judgment was in 
their case the outcome of a rational process. Later on, P1 can teach J3 to another set of 
people P2, who nonetheless cannot justify the judgment because they lack either the 
required knowledge or cognitive ability. However, this does not make J3 unjustified when 
uttered by people in P2. So people in P2, who are morally dumbfounded, are not 
necessarily holding unjustified judgments, nor are they maintaining claims that have an 
emotive origin. On the contrary, they may be making judgments that had a rational origin 
in P1 and were then learned by P2. Levy (2006b) expands this point adding an item: 
Haidt’s emphasis on the social dimension of moral judgment. He correctly sees moral 
argument in human groups as a collective enterprise that is led by experts (who are not 
necessarily philosophers) and in which the work of moral justification is devolved to 
experts only. Moral believers would thus be rationally warranted to hold some moral 
beliefs even if they are victim of biases at the individual level: collective moral reflection 
among the experts may help to correct errors due to heuristics and biases. Hence, if Levy is 
correct, it is normal to find laymen who are morally dumbfounded: this is the regular 
outcome of the division of cognitive labor in society. Haidt’s model should try to rule out 
this alternative explanation of moral dumbfounding. To my knowledge Haidt never 
answered to Fine’s and Levy’s remarks, but I might conjecture that he would answer that 
the phenomenon Fine and Levy underscore exists and that it rarely takes place. 
The last point about the SIM concerns its empirical backing: what are the experiment that 
justify the SIM relative to competing views? First of all, there are Haidt’s own 
experiments, for instance his cross-cultural examination of how people react to victimless 
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crimes, i.e. actions that harm none but that are considered wrong all the same
67
, such as 
using your national flag as a rag to clean the toilet or eating your family dog once he is 
dead (Haidt, Koller, and Dias 1993). People who make moral condemnations against these 
actions are morally dumbfounded and their judgments are better predicted by their self-
reports concerning their emotional involvement than by their self-reports about the alleged 
presence of harm. Then, Haidt (2001) quotes a significant amount of empirical work but, 
as Levy (2006b) correctly points out, it is mostly domain-general, i.e. not linked to the 
moral domain in any specific way. Hence, it is not decisive to establish the validity of a 
theory in moral psychology, because the generalizability of results from experimental 
psychology broadly construed to the specific and normative domain of moral judgments 
must specifically be tested.  
The stronger empirical results in favor of the SIM have appeared after the publication of 
the original article. For example, Wheatley and Haidt (2005) showed that the hypnotic 
triggering of a pang of disgust in experimental participants made moral judgments more 
severe. Experiment 2 in this article also features the so-called Student Council case, a case 
in which moral violations are simply absent
68
. In absence of hypnotic disgust, participants 
rated that this case was not morally problematic. In presence of hypnotic disgust, 
participants said that the case was less uncontroversial than before, but still approved of the 
proposed action. This experiment hence does not show, as it has been suggested (for 
example by Prinz 2006), that emotions are sufficient for moral judgments, but it definitely 
shows that emotions causally modulate moral judgments in a statistically significant way. 
Of course, this has nothing to do with issues concerning the justification of such a 
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 Many ethical systems, such as Roman Catholic ethics and Kantian ethics, include the belief that there are 
crimes that require no victim at all (e.g. consensual homosexual anal intercourse for Roman Catholic ethics 
and lying or masturbation for Kantian ethics). Hence, “victimless crime” sounds as a paradoxical expression 
only if one starts from a Turiel-like point of view concerning the proper domain of morality. This has no 
repercussion on Haidt et al’s experiments, though. These experiments were just mapping who “moralizes” 
‘victimless crimes’ and who does not. 
68
 This is the precise wording: “Dan is a student council representative at his school. This semester he is in 
charge of scheduling discussions about academic issues. He [tries to take/often picks] topics that appeal to 
both professors and students in order to stimulate discussion.’’ (Wheatley and Haidt 2005, 782). It is 
admittedly difficult to see how this could involve moral problems. 
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judgment, i.e. emotion per se is unable to provide any kind of adequate justification
69
. 
Other results show modulation of moral judgments by emotions. For instance, Valdesolo 
and DeSteno (2006), whom I already mentioned in Ch. 2, showed that induction of positive 
emotions make moral judgments more lenient. Then, in a series of famous experiments, 
including the “fart spray” and “filthy desk” set ups, Schnall and coworkers (Schnall et al. 
2008; Schnall, Benton, and Harvey 2008) have shown that manipulations of the 
experimental environment, such as letting the participant sit at a filthy disk or perceive a 
strong stink, can make moral judgments more or less harsh. In particular, moral judgments 
were harsher when made near a purse that had been sprayed with a stinky gas or when 
made by a participant with a high private body consciousness
70
 and who at the same time 
sat at a filthy desk
71
. On the contrary, priming for the concept of cleanliness using a 
scrambled-sentences task
72
 made moral judgments less harsh. To add to this body of 
evidence, sentimentalist philosopher Jesse Prinz and his co-workers (Eskine, Kacinik, and 
Prinz 2011) have shown that bad tastes influence moral judgments in the same way as 
nasty smells.  
These results show that emotions pervasively modulate moral judgments, but they do not 
show, so far, that emotions are sufficient for moral judgments. 
The SIM is quite a flexible model and, as Haidt says, the emotional dog can easily learn 
new tricks. Therefore, there is no strong counter-evidence against the SIM at the moment, 
as Haidt can almost always answer “Yes, this phenomenon you have spotted exists, but it’s 
rare.” The most serious piece of counter-evidence is the experiment conducted by Paxton, 
Ungar, and Greene using the CRT. It shows that the manipulation of reflectivity at the 
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 Kass (1997) would disagree on disgust not providing justification, but I will not discuss Kass’s claim here, 
as it would bring us too far away. For positions opposed to those of Kass, cf. Nussbaum (2004). 
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 Private body consciousness is “people’s general attention to internal physical states” (Schnall et al. 2008, 
1100). 
71
 This is the description of the filthy desk: “An old chair with a torn and dirty cushion was placed in front of 
a desk that had various stains and was sticky. On the desk there was a transparent plastic cup with the dried 
up remnants of a smoothie and a pen that was chewed up. Next to the desk was a trash can overflowing with 
garbage including greasy pizza boxes and dirty-looking tissues” (Schnall et al. 2008, 1101).  
72
 Participants are given a set of 5 or 6 words and have to compose a meaningful sentence with them. The 
unconscious priming is created by putting a lot of words from a particular semantic area (e.g. “soap”, “wash”, 
“water”, “vacuum cleaner”, “pure”, “hygiene” etc for cleanliness) into the word pool for the task.  
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individual level influences moral judgments. Haidt’s standard reply seems to be available 
here, even though it is not particularly convincing. Furthermore, the SIM does not explain 
all the data either and it is admittedly silent on results at the neural level. The SIM is 
plausible, is supported by some empirical data, yet it is unable to deliver a knock-out strike 
to alternative hypothesis and has been subject to intensive, intelligent criticism.  
As to the MFT, it describes extent and structure of the moral domain and not directly the 
way in which moral judgments are formed. Therefore, it is rather orthogonal to Greene’s 
model. However, the MFT importantly complements the SIM, although it is independent 
from it. Haidt claims that there are five (or six, according to the latest news) roots of 
morality that correspond to related cognitive structures. According to the MFT, the pangs 
of emotion that bring moral judgments about are due to the activity of these foundations. 
So the MFT describes what generates moral intuitions in the Haidtian sense: this is the 
point of interaction with the SIM. The MFT is a nativist theory, i.e. a theory of the mental 
and neural bases of moral judgments that posits more innate components than a general, 
multi-purpose learning capacity. “Innate” is a very unclear and controversial term and I 
will not delve into details here
73
. However, Haidt means here that humans are “prepared” 
to develop emotional susceptibility to a set of stimuli, which are mostly actions and 
omissions. The development of this capacity for emotional reaction is rather robust in 
ontogeny, even though environmental input is required for it to develop and counts as a 
necessary condition for the capacity to arise. In this way social learning can modulate the 
details of this capacity for emotional reaction. Haidt introduced the MFT in Haidt and 
Joseph (2004) and then developed it in Haidt (2007), Haidt and Graham (2007), Haidt and 
Joseph (2007), and Graham et al. (2011). The latest version of the MFT is in Haidt (2012, 
Part 2). The MFT has important forebears. First, the aforementioned ethnological study in 
Orissa – India by Shweder et al. (1997) highlighted a structure of the moral domain 
composed of three clusters: Ethics of Autonomy, Ethics of Community, Ethics of Divinity. 
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The Ethics of Autonomy includes moral concerns about physical harm, psychological 
harm, and distributive justice. It largely corresponds with Western liberal morality and 
with the aforementioned description of moral judgments given by Turiel (1983, 3) as 
“prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining to how people ought to 
relate to each other.” Ethics of Community has to do with respect for hierarchy, loyalty, 
obligations towards one’s in-group, and so on. The violator is mostly seen as 
untrustworthy, treacherous, and cannot be considered a full member of the group. Ethics of 
Divinity has to with religious purity, and sex and food taboos. An upholder of an ethic of 
divinity sees the body as a temple that must be kept pure and would see violators of purity 
norms as breeching the boundary that separates humans from non-humans, i.e. losing their 
full human status to acquire some of the baseness of the beast. Rozin et al. (1999) suggest 
an interesting mapping between these three ethical codes and the moral emotions that 
belong to the other-critical triad: Contempt, Anger, and Disgust. Violations of the Ethics of 
Autonomy elicit Anger, violations of the Ethics of Community evoke Contempt and 
shunning, whereas violations of the Ethics of Divinity mostly elicit Disgust. Since the 
initials of the ethics and the emotions happen to correspond, this was dubbed as the CAD 
Hypothesis. In Haidt and Joseph (2004) four foundations are proposed, with the Ethics of 
Autonomy getting split into Suffering and Reciprocity. The five roots scheme, that has 
lasted for at least five years, includes (1) Harm/Care, (2) Fairness/Reciprocity, (3) 
Ingroup/Loyalty, (4) Authority/Respect, (5) Purity/Sanctity. These roots evolved in order 
to solve five adaptive challenges in the EEA: (1) caring for vulnerable children, (2) 
forming partnerships with non-kin to reap the benefits of reciprocity, (3) forming coalitions 
to compete with other coalitions, (4) negotiating status hierarchies, and (5) keeping oneself 
and one’s kin free from parasites and pathogens (Haidt 2012, 125). Haidt is currently 
adding a six root, Liberty, that represents the value humans usually attach to individual 
freedom. It was added to explain the morality of US Libertarians. Many criticisms could be 
leveled to this description of the moral domain. The set of roots or foundations is plausible 
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but seems to be arbitrary. In particular, it is not clear how fine-grained the Foundations 
ought to be. The results published by Graham et al. (2011, 375-376) show that there is an 
important gap between the first two foundations that came from the Ethic of Autonomy 
and all the others, thereby mirroring the theory Haidt has put forward to explain the distinct 
moral beliefs of conservative and liberals in the Western world (Haidt and Graham 2007; 
Haidt, Graham, and Joseph 2009; Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009). Haidt claims that 
liberals avail themselves of only two of the five existing Foundations, whereas 
conservatives have a richer morality that takes all of the five Foundations into account, 
thereby experiencing frequent trade-offs. So, it is unclear why there should be five 
Foundations instead of two, one that stands for Liberal ethics and another that indicates 
non-Liberal ethics. Alternatively, we might move from five to more foundations, since we 
might discover some moral judgments that fit only with difficulty into the current 
framework, as the case of liberty demonstrates. Suhler and Churchland (2011) quote other 
two candidates to inclusion: industry and modesty. Although modesty could be easily put 
into the Authority/Respect root, industry seems to be more independent, although it shows 
some ties with virtues in the Ingroup/Loyalty group. However, Suhler and Churchland 
successfully show that the taxonomy proposed by Haidt and co-workers is rather contrived. 
On the other hand, Haidt himself does not insist much on the exact number of the 
foundations, making this objection not very pointed. Indeed, he explicitly admits that the 
exact number of the Foundations might be different from five
74
. A second critique by 
Suhler and Churchland may have more bite. It concerns modularity. The standard 
definition of a module comes from Fodor (1983) and according to it a module is an innate, 
fast, informationally encapsulated, functionally specialized computational mechanism. 
Informational encapsulation refers to the idea that there is no or little transmission of 
information between the module and other neural/mental structures, i.e. the module has no 
                                                 
74
 “We do not claim that there are only five foundations. There are probably many more, but we believe the 
five we have identified are the most important ones for explaining human morality and moral diversity.” 
(Haidt and Joseph 2007, 385). 
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or just a few connections with other parts of the cognitive system, except at the input and at 
the output levels. Its internal workings are thus not influenced by other parts of the 
mind/brain. According to this stringent definition, there are just a few modules in the 
mind/brain. Nonetheless, drawing on the work of anthropologist Dan Sperber (1996), Haidt 
uses a much broader definition of “module”. According to Sperber (and therefore Haidt), 
modules are highly variable (some meet all of Fodor’s criteria, some meet only a few), 
they are often nested within each other, and are usually not innate: they are generated 
during development by a smaller set of “learning modules” which, in turn, are innate. So 
Haidt and Joseph (2007) maintain that the moral foundations must be seen as “learning 
modules” that produce a mass of second-order modules (‘teeming modularity’). Second-
order modules are in charge of the formation of moral intuitions by coupling the perception 
of some features of a situation (usually being an instance of a virtue or a vice) with a moral 
emotion, such as a CAD emotion or a SEG emotion. Suhler and Churchland (2011, 2105) 
object that this view of modularity is very expansive and risks becoming vacuous. 
However, Haidt’s proposal is relatively moderate in comparison with the idea of massive 
modularity brought forward for instance by Pinker (1997). There is no way Haidt’s 
position can be considered untenable if one considers the very diverse positions that have 
appeared in the modularity debate inside cognitive science. But Suhler’s and Churchland’s 
attack is more precise than this: they charge Haidt with providing no operational criteria to 
discriminate between the cognitive processes that are innately prepared in the brain and 
those cognitive processes that are not so prepared
75
. Furthermore, Suhler and Churchland 
claim that second-order modules seem to be “little more than a way of designating 
somewhat arbitrarily chosen (and, perhaps, arbitrarily fine-grained) stimulus–behavior 
patterns without shedding any light on the underlying processes’ computational workings” 
(2011, 2106). Finally, they claim that the recursive architecture of the brain, in which 
spontaneous activity is rampant and circuits are loopy more often than not makes the idea 
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 “But how do we know when a trait emerges from a learning module and when it does not?” (Suhler and 
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of neural modules rather far-fetched. Although the neuroscientific arguments marshaled by 
Suhler and Churchland to attack the idea of teeming modularity seem to be rather 
orthogonal with psychological modules such as Haidt’s, which could have multifarious 
neural instantiations, I agree with them on this: Haidt’s explanation of how his modules 
work remains quite generic. However, Haidt and Joseph (2011) claim that they are not 
required to give specific details on the computations that are carried out by the modules, 
and even less about the neural correlates of the modules (both learning and second-order). 
They even make the bolder claim that, at the state of the art of neuroscience, it is 
impossible that some psychological phenomenon, such as the informational encapsulation 
of moral dumbfounding
76
, can be debunked by neuroscientific results or dismissed because 
non-consilient with them. The latter claim is rather controversial. As Haidt and Joseph 
(2011) correctly notice, there are different traditions in cognitive science. Scientists that 
come from East Coast universities in the US tend to be nativist and to widely apply the 
notion of ‘module’, whereas West-coast empiricists are skeptic toward modularity and give 
more emphasis to general-purpose learning mechanisms. Their favored strategy of 
explanation is social learning. Suhler and Churchland come from the West, Haidt and co-
workers come from the East. So, West Coast cognitive scientists are unlikely to buy 
Haidt’s claim for the psychological irrelevance of present neuroscience, since they have 
very high standards for attributing the status of ‘module’ to a mental function, and this 
standards include neuroscientific specifications. In contrast, Haidt and Joseph stress that 
their modules ought to be seen as functional (as opposed to neuro-anatomical) ones and 
that the requests made by Suhler and Churchland to provide neuroscientific and 
computational details are unusual in experimental moral psychology
77
. Nonetheless, it is 
hard to tell whether this request is unreasonable or uncommon, as there is no central 
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 Moral dumbfounding is considered a form of informational encapsulation because unjustified moral 
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cognitive processes (e.g. those that are in charge with moral justification) does not then influence the output 
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authority that establishes what kind of features a theory in experimental moral psychology 
must have in order to count as a “good theory.” As for the notorious “burden of proof” in 
philosophical arguments, it seems that this kind of charge can be made quite arbitrarily by 
anybody against anybody else, since methodologies in the cognitive sciences are far less 
clear-cut than in physics or in molecular biology
78
. Of course it would be better for the 
MFT to feature Suhler’s and Churchland’s desiderata (and this is not controversial), but it 
is not obvious whether Haidt and co-workers must necessarily deliver these goods now in 
order to insure the survival of MFT. Perhaps the MFT might be seen as “good enough” 
even without details about computational mechanisms and neuro-anatomical correlates. At 
which height the bar must be placed seems to be largely arbitrary and to depend on the 
above-mentioned cultural affiliations in cognitive science. Hence, even the point about 
modularity and computational details fails to deliver a knock-out blow to the MFT. At the 
moment the MFT is a plausible hypothesis that is supported by some empirical results. 
However, it needs to address some problems of vagueness and to gain in computational 
detail in order to increase its credibility.  
 
3.2. Moll’s EFEC model 
Brazilian neuroscientist Jorge Moll has been one of the fathers of neuroscience of morality, 
together with Joshua Greene (e.g. Moll et al. 2002a, 2002b). Nevertheless, his model of 
moral cognition is very different from Greene’s. Contrary to Greene’s dual-process model, 
it is a single-process model. A single-process model hypothesizes that all moral judgments 
result from a single stream of mental operations, without conflicts between systems. In the 
view expounded by Moll and his co-workers (2005, 2008a, 2008b), moral judgments and 
moral emotions
79
 are caused by EFECs (Event-Feature-Emotion Complexes).  
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An example may be useful to give the reader an idea of how this model works. I quote it 
from Moll et al. (2005). In front of an orphan girl who stares sadly at us and who has little 
chances of being adopted because too old, we form three representations: an Event, a 
Feature, and an Emotion. The Pre-Frontal Cortex (henceforth PFC) provides the Event 
representation: “The girl is an orphan and the odds of adoption are low.” The posterior part 
of superior temporal sulcus (henceforth p-STS) and the Anterior Temporal Lobe 
(henceforth ATL) contribute the child’s sad facial expression and the concepts of 
“helplessness” and “sadness”, i.e. the Features. Lastly, the so-called limbic system, which 
is mostly sub-cortical, yields central motive states (feeling emphatic sadness, anxiety, and 
attachment), i.e. the Emotion. These three components generate a moral emotion of 
compassion toward the girl and a moral judgment that it would be morally praiseworthy to 
help her. 
As to the details of the model, the Event is a representation of some action or state of 
affairs. One of the characteristic of Moll’s model is its rootedness in neuroscientific data. 
Hence, each of the three components of an EFEC is instantiated by a specific brain area, as 
I have shown in the example. The Event cognitive component is computed by the PFC, i.e. 
the pre-frontal cortex, the most specifically human area of the brain, since it is the one that 
evolved last. Moll relies on the interpretation of the PFC’s activity provided by his co-
worker Jordan Grafman (1995), i.e. on the so-called Structured-Event-Complex (SEC) 
framework. The SEC framework maintains that the PFC carries out its cognitive control 
function over behavior through “long-term memories of event sequences that guide the 
perception and execution of goal-oriented activities, such as going to a concert or giving a 
dinner party” (Moll et al. 2005, 803). In other words, the PFC forces behavior to follow 
one of these representations, as though it were a rule. Furthermore, different parts of the 
PFC are allegedly in charge with distinct representations of this sort. Namely, the VMPFC 
is linked to social and emotional complexes, the anterior and lateral PFC with new 
representations or with representations that include branching outcomes and probability 
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assessment, and more posterior parts of the PFC with SECs that have already been learned. 
Hence, Moll hypothesizes that lesions to different parts of the PFC should cause 
differential deficits and in this he is backed, at least partially, by empirical evidence, such 
as the studies by Damasio (1994) on VMPFC lesions, both with late onset, as in Gage’s 
case, and with early onset (cf. Anderson et al. 1999).  
As to the second component of an EFEC, the Feature, it refers to context-independent 
social concepts, such as “sadness”, “helplessness”, “tactlessness”, “honorability”, etc. 
These social concepts must be read by the individual through the other’s verbal, postural, 
or facial expression. The p-STS and the nearby and partially overlapping Temporal-
Parietal Junction (TPJ) are, together with other regions
80
, in charge with mindreading and 
extracting this information from visual and auditory stimuli. In contrast, the concepts 
themselves are stored in the ATL, and especially in the temporal pole. It is well known that 
patients with Fronto-Temporal Dementia (FTD), a disease that deeply affects ATL 
neurons, exhibit important deficits in social behavior (cf. Mendez et al. 2005; Neary et al. 
1998) and that temporal poles are involved in the neural processing of representations of 
harm to other human beings (Heekeren et al. 2005). Furthermore, Zahn and coworkers 
(2007) have experimentally shown that abstract social concepts are correlated with 
activation in this brain area. As to the TPJ, there is plenty of evidence for its importance in 
general mind reading, i.e. attribution of mental states to others (Decety and Lamm 2007; 
Saxe and Kanwisher 2003; Saxe and Wexler 2005) and in the attribution of intentions and 
beliefs in moral judgments more specifically. To this effect, Liane Young and co-workers 
have on the one hand demonstrated through fMRI that r-TPJ BOLD signaling significantly 
correlates with participants reading descriptions of morally relevant actions in comparison 
with irrelevant actions (Young and Saxe 2009), on the other hand they have shown that 
rTMS on the r-TPJ specifically reduces the importance of the assessment of intentions on 
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moral judgments, bringing about evaluations that mostly focus on outcomes (Young et al. 
2010).  
As to the third component, Emotion, it is described by Moll as providing to moral 
judgments their motivational force. If the moral machinery were disconnected from 
emotional components that are embedded in sub-cortical areas such as the striatum, the 
tegmental area, the bilateral amygdala, and others, moral judgments could not influence 
behavior. Moll differentiates between emotions and “central motive states”, such as 
“undirected anxiety.” Emotions are, in Moll’s opinion, the result of a coupling between a 
stimulus and a central motive state, that must hence be seen as more basic than emotions 
themselves. So, what gets associated to an Event and a Feature is not an emotion sensu 
stricto, but a general affective state that gives to the complex its motivational drive.  
The moral domain Moll takes into account is very broad. The precise definition he gives is 
“the sets of customs and values that are embraced by a cultural group to guide social 
conduct” (Moll et al. 2005, 799). This definition seems to include positive laws and 
conventional rules, that are not universally regarded as having moral import. This 
expanded moral domain does not encompass moral judgments about cases only, but also 
moral emotions in general, so that phenomena such as pride for victory, embarrassment for 
the violation of a convention, and compassion towards the suffering of the victim of a 
natural disaster all fall into the purview of morality according to Moll’s view. Hynes 
(2008) indeed accuses Moll of conflating moral emotions and social emotions. In front of 
this attack, Moll and co-workers (2008c) bite the bullet and maintain that there are so far 
no empirical data that back the distinction between social and moral emotions. This gives a 
sense of how big the domain of morality is in Moll’s view. Indeed, Moll et al. (2008a) 
claim that their view is compatible with Haidt’s MFT, another example of extended moral 
domain. Nonetheless, Moll and his colleagues (2008a, 162) try at the same time to specify 
the difference between the social and the moral domain by claiming that moral cognition is 
specifically linked to altruistic actions, but some foundations of morality highlighted by the 
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MFT, such as purity, seem to have little to do with altruism. The Jewish prohibition to eat 
crustaceans, for instance, seems to me to be uncoupled from altruistic motivations or 
helping behavior. At this point, Moll cannot have it both ways: either he concedes that his 
link between altruism and morality cannot be a double conditional, or he concedes that 
food taboos are not moral issues, thereby jettisoning the MFT.  
That being said, the main point that interests me here is how Moll’s theory differs from 
Greene’s. Whereas Greene posits a potential (albeit rare) conflict between System1 and 
System2, Moll’s idea is that moral emotions always include affective and rational 
components, so that there can be no real conflict
81
. As to moral dilemmas, which are 
deemed by Greene fruitful epistemic tools able to flesh out the “fault lines” of the moral 
domain, Moll, following Haidt and Kesebir (2010, 807-808), Casebeer (2003), and others, 
thinks that they lack ecological validity and are therefore bad epistemic tools whose use 
contributes to create a distorted view of how the moral domain actually works. If there are 
conflicts in the moral domain, these are extremely rare and are due to the fact that the 
moral circuit produces two different moral emotions relative to a given situation. In any 
case, there is no possibility of conflict between reason and emotion per se, but between 
two complexes that are to the same extent both emotional and rational. In the light of all 
this, Moll claims that the concepts on which Greene bases his analysis — ‘personal’, 
‘impersonal’, ‘deontology’, ‘utilitarianism’ — ought to be analyzed into “clear cognitive 
components” (Moll et al. 2005, 801). Finally, there are also disagreements between Moll 
and Greene about the neural correlates of some mental functions. For instance, Greene 
takes the DLPFC (the ‘accounting department’) to be the neural basis of cost-benefit 
analysis, whereas Moll thinks that this function is carried out by both the anterior parts of 
the PFC and the limbic system, which alone can attribute value to choices. Hence, in 
Moll’s view, this function is both rational and emotional, whereas in Greene’s view it is a 
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clear example of rational function and perhaps even the rational function par excellence. 
Moll’s model does not fit well with all data points, since it contains an interpretation of 
VMPFC function that has been proven false on experimental grounds
82
. However, it fits 
non-trolley experimental results quite well and makes us understand how experimental 
moral psychology is still a very open game. Since it is a very different model from 
Greene’s, its viability shows that Greene’s descriptive idea cannot at the moment be taken 
for granted as the empirical “truth” about human moral behavior. Both Haidt’s theory and 
Moll’s deem emotions key causal antecedents of moral judgments. On the contrary, the 
view I examine in the next section sees emotions as outcomes of moral judgments, not as 
causal factors. 
 
3.3. Universal Moral Grammar and Gazzaniga’s neuromoral theory 
Both Haidt and Moll are to a certain extent emotivists, theorists that think that moral 
judgments are, inter alia or in toto, caused by emotive states. Hence, one of their targets 
are the old theories by Kohlberg according to which moral judgments are mostly caused by 
explicit, discursive reasoning. Apart from Greene’s view, there are several ways out from 
the Kohlbergian paradigm: one is the strong emotivism championed by Haidt, another is 
the single-process model by Moll. Here I explore a fourth one, that is the idea of a moral 
grammar. The idea was originally brought forward by John Rawls himself (1999/1971, § 
9). As the human sense for linguistic grammaticalness requires, in order to be explained 
along the lines of Chomsky (cf. for instance 1965), cognitive constructs that far outstrip in 
complexity the explicit content of the individual’s grammatical knowledge (i.e. folk 
grammatical concepts), so the explanation of the human sense for moral violations requires 
cognitive constructs that are much more complex than our folk moral concepts. The main 
advocates of this line of research in experimental moral psychology are philosopher Susan 
Dwyer (cf. especially 2009), legal theorist John Mikhail (2007, 2008, 2011), and 
                                                 
82
 I mentioned this above in Ch. 2, when referring to the Moretti paper. 
79 
 
psychologist Marc Hauser (2006; Hauser, Young, and Cushman 2008). Hauser’s career as 
a scientist ended abruptly in 2010 after a three-year internal investigation at Harvard
83
 
ascertained that he was responsible for eight counts of scientific misconduct, including 
data forgery. However, none of the counts involves experiments on humans in 
experimental moral psychology, so that I will consider valid the work done by his lab at 
Harvard on this topic. Furthermore, I deal here more with the theoretical positions by 
Hauser than with the experimental results from his lab. The advocates of the Universal 
Moral Grammar (UMG) differentiate themselves from the Haidtian mainstream by positing 
that moral judgments are the outcome of computations that are cognitive sensu stricto, i.e. 
devoid of affective content, and implicit, so that the subject is not aware of them. These 
computations are both unconscious and very fast. Hence, these processes are a direct 
challenge to Greene’s dual-process-model because they include some traits that are typical 
of System1 and some traits that are more akin to System2, thus blurring the demarcation 
dual-process theorists want to draw in human cognition. The theorist that more 
consequentially spells out the structure of the alleged grammar humans use to make moral 
judgments is Mikhail (cf. 2007, 2008). First, I examine the structure of UMG according to 
Mikhail’s version. Secondly, I discuss the role of emotions in this model, mostly taking 
into account Huebner, Dwyer, and Hauser (2009). Thirdly, I examine the proposal by these 
theorists that the cognitive bases of moral judgments form a domain-specific network, or 
even (on a more extreme formulation) a module in the Fodorian sense. UMG is a theory at 
the computational level, so that UMG is not interested in the neuro-physiological 
underpinnings of the computations that are identified by the theory. In contrast, Moll’s 
theory is for instance active both at the computational and at the neural level, as well as 
Greene’s dual-process view. Hence, it will not be possible to debunk such a theory by 
using neuro-scientific contents, unless one wants to assume with Suhler and Churchland 
(2011) that psychological theories have to provide neuro-physiological details on pain of 
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being declared invalid. The moral module ultimately operates as a function whose domain 
are instances of actions and omissions and codomain are deontic statuses. The moral 
module first takes a given action and parses it into a graph-like representation, like this one 
(picture from Mikhail 2007, 146). This graph represents the choice of turning the trolley to 
the side-track in the standard Switch dilemma. The module carries out this transformation 
(from action to graph) through specific conversion rules. 
   
Then a given structural representation yields a deontic status (such as mandatory, 
forbidden, non-mandatory, and non-forbidden, i.e. merely allowed — see box 2 in Mikhail 
2007, 144) through deontic rules. Hence, the work of the moral psychologist in this case is 
to discover both conversion rules and deontic rules. Both are often unconscious. Deontic 
rules correspond to moral principles, such as the Doctrine of Double Effect (henceforth 
DDE) and the DDA
84
. Cushman, Young, and Hauser (2006) have shown that these two 
principles, together with the Contact principle that resembles to Greene’s ‘personal force’ 
factor, are active in moral judgments, but they have different level of availability to the 
conscious mind. The DDE acts in an extremely covert way, whereas most subjects who 
avail themselves of the DDA can explicitly quote it as a justifying reason of their 
judgments. As to deontic rules, Mikhail focuses on two: the prohibition of purposeful 
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for harm. Cf. Quinn (1989b). 
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battery and the DDE. In his opinion, these two intuitions can account for most of our 
responses to physical violence, trolley-like cases included. As to conversion rules, they 
first examine the temporal structure of the event, then add a causal structure, identify good 
and bad outcomes, and then superimpose an intentional structure of means, ends, and side-
effects to the morally-evaluated causal pattern. In other words, the following features are 
progressively added to the raw stimulus, in this order: temporal features, causal features, 
moral features, intentional features. The final result is one of the graph-like representations 
above. Details need not interest us here: an overall view of Mikhail’s proposal on this is 
sufficient. What is most interesting is that conversion rules, in Mikhail’s opinion, are one 
instantiation of the poverty of the stimulus problem that prompted Chomsky to put forward 
transformational-generative grammar. Mikhail argues that causal patterns and intentional 
patterns are pieces of information that cannot be found in the stimulus and there is no way 
the subject can learn them from the environment. Hence, these notions (cause, effect, 
means, end, etc) need to be innate, in a sense of “preparedness” that is similar to the one 
that applied to Haidt’s MFT. So this theory, like Haidt’s, Moll’s, and Greene’s, is nativist, 
in the sense that it denies that morality can arise from a general learning mechanism 
coupled with environmental stimuli. Contrary to other nativist theories, however, UMG 
tends to favor simplification and indeed it does not attack trolley cases for being devoid of 
ecological validity. On the contrary, Mikhail is a fan of trolley-like cases since they allow 
him to show the essential structure of the moral module, to highlight the fault lines of the 
cognitive function of interest. Thus, as to this point, Mikhail and Greene are in perfect 
consilience. And this is enough as to the structure of the UMG. 
As we have seen, emotions play little or no role in the computations described above. 
However, it cannot be denied that emotions have something to do with morality, especially 
after the experiments by Wheatley and Haidt, Schnall, and others have been published. So, 
the moral grammarians need to explain us what to do with emotions. This kind of 
explanation is provided by Huebner, Dwyer, and Hauser (2009). Their line of defense 
82 
 
involves diverse facets. First, they posit a distinction between these positions: “emotion 
accompanies moral judgments” vs. “emotion constitutes moral judgments,” where they 
defend the former. This distinction looks unclear to me. From the experimental point of 
view, it cannot happen by chance that emotions accompany moral judgments in a 
statistically significant way. Therefore, there must be some sort of causal connection 
between the two. This connection could even be mediated by a third variable that causes 
both moral judgment and emotions, but some sort of causal story must be in place. Hence, 
to say that ‘emotions accompany moral judgments’ means one of these three: 
(1) Emotions are one of the causes of moral judgments; 
(2) Emotions are one of the effects of moral judgments; 
(3) Emotions and moral judgments depend on some common upstream cause. 
What does it mean that emotions ‘constitute’ moral judgments? If this means that emotions 
are necessary and sufficient conditions for a moral judgment to be performed, as for 
example Prinz (2006) claims, this is a qualified and stricter version of (1). The moral 
grammarians seems to uphold (2) instead. They argue that emotions are not part of the 
computation that maps actions and omissions onto deontic values, that emotions are an 
effect of these computations, and that they provide individuals with motivations to modify 
their behavior in the light of the attribution of deontic value that has been performed by the 
moral module. This position, which is dubbed as the ‘pure Rawlsian’ position in the 
Huebner, Dwyer, and Hauser paper, stands in contrast with experimental results, especially 
with the ones showing emotional modulation of moral judgments (Wheatley and Haidt 
2005, Schnall et al 2008, etc. Cf. § 3.1.). So the authors seem in the end to favor instead a 
‘hybrid Rawlsian’ position, according to which emotion causes moral judgments together 
with the output of the moral module, i.e. attribution of deontic values. Moreover, they 
claim that emotions could act on moral judgments via redeployment of attentional 
resources, i.e. prompting attention to some aspects of the scenario that are morally relevant 
for independent reasons. Nonetheless, there is no positive empirical evidence, at least to 
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my knowledge, to buttress this idea, however intuitively plausible it may be. On the other 
hand, there is no empirical evidence that emotions are completely sufficient for moral 
judgments, although it must be admitted that emotional modulation is powerful and 
widespread. The study by Wheatley and Haidt (2005) is unfortunately unable to show that 
disgust can create moral condemnation out of nothing, so that the idea that emotion is  
making some scenario traits more salient cannot be ruled out at the moment. So it must be 
concluded that the jury is still out. If somebody provided conclusive empirical evidence 
that emotions are sufficient for moral judgments, then the ‘hybrid Rawlsian’ model would 
be empirically discredited, but we are not there yet and perhaps we will never be. It is sure 
that emotions exert a causal role in the making of moral judgments, but we do not know at 
the moment whether they are sufficient causes. 
Thirdly, the moral grammarians think that the moral module is domain-specific. On a ‘hybrid 
Rawlsian’ view, this circuitry is unique in the way “the attribution of intentions and goals 
connects with emotions to create moral judgments of right and wrong” (Hauser 2006). 
Thus, this circuit works for moral judgments only. Domain-specificity is hotly contested in 
the neuroscience of morality. Both Greene and Haidt (2002) and Young and Dungan 
(2012) argue that moral processing is nothing specific, but resides in applying to particular 
stimuli (i.e. morally relevant stimuli, however defined) cognitive resources that are per se 
multi-purpose. Greene and Haidt claim that “If one attempts to ‘deconfound’ moral 
judgment with everything that is not specific to moral judgment (emotion, theory of mind, 
mental imagery, abstract reasoning, and so on) there will almost certainly be nothing left” 
(2002, 523). However, the point is very difficult to settle. In order to assess a claim for 
specificity, we ought to know whether this module performs other functions. Unless the 
neural correlates of the module are explored, it is very difficult to assess such a position. 
Even going to the neural level (which is precisely what Mikhail and likely-minded scholars 
refuse to do) and discovering that, for the sake of argument, the module is instantiated by a 
network of four given regions in the brain, the idea of domain-specificity seems to be 
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rather difficult to corroborate or refute. What we currently know about the human brain is 
by far too little to know exactly what the mapping between psychological processes and 
functions on the one hand and networks of brain regions on the other hand is. As I have 
said in the preceding discussion on reverse inference (§ 2.2.), we still have troubles to 
define both a psychological ontology of mental functions and a neuro-anatomical ontology 
of brain regions. Hence, this dispute cannot be solved now, provided that the domain-
specific moral circuit is seen as a complex network of brain regions and not as a single, 
continuous brain area. Indeed, if the module were a single patch of neural tissue, we would 
know that in the overwhelming majority of cases it is involved in more than one function. 
As I have argued above, the case for one-to-one mapping between mental functions and 
brain regions is exceedingly hard to make.  
Apart from my precedent objections to the idea of a UMG, there are other three pieces of 
criticism that should be addressed: one by Joshua Greene (2008b), another by French 
cognitive scientists Dupoux and Jacob (2007), and a last one by philosopher of biology 
Kim Sterelny (2010).  
Greene notices that Mikhail accepts “trolleyological” evidence and asks: “Please explain 
the moral dilemmas data using your UMG.” In particular, Greene asks Mikhail to explain 
why, assuming (as Mikhail does) that the only active rules for moral choice are a 
condemnation of battery and the DDE, (a) some people decide to throw the bystander 
down the bridge, (b) in the Loop case
85
, half of the sample behave in a way that is the 
opposite of what UMG predicts, i.e. UMG predicts that people shouldn’t turn the trolley on 
the side-track, but half of the sample does that anyway. Furthermore, Greene asks to 
explain the results by Wheatley and Haidt, Valdesolo and DeSteno that show modulation 
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of judgments by emotions. To my knowledge, Mikhail never replied, but I suppose he can 
reply in no convincing way. So far, there is no theory that fits the ‘trolleyology’ data better 
than Greene’s. 
Secondly, Dupoux and Jacob say that moral dumbfounding is good evidence for both 
Haidt’s SIM and UMG, so that that kind of evidence cannot adjudicate between the two 
theories. I wholeheartedly agree with them on this point. Furthermore, they implicitly 
follow the lines of Pizarro, Bloom, and Fine in their criticisms to the SIM, arguing that 
there are cases in which explicit moral principles do matter in moral judgments. According 
to Dupoux and Jacob, this creates a disanalogy between Chomskian grammar and UMG. 
Chomskian grammar posits a strong distinction between deep, implicit grammatical 
structures and folk-ethnological grammatical principles, but we cannot find this distinction 
in moral cognition. Another strong disanalogy between UMG and transformational-
generative grammar is given by intractable moral dilemmas. In Dupoux and Jacob’s 
opinion, all linguistic dilemmas are solved in a pragmatic way, whereas this is not possible 
for moral dilemmas. The presence of moral dilemmas indicates that the moral module does 
not work as a linguistic module à la Chomsky. A third point is that moral cognition 
violates various requirements for Fodorian modularity. Moral judgments violate 
encapsulation, because any added background information about an action or an omission 
may alter moral evaluation. It also violates compositionality, because the deontic value of 
an action cannot be deduced from the deontic value of its components. The single 
components (for instance, to use Dupoux’s and Jacob’s example, brewing tea, opening a 
bottle, pouring the content in a cup of tea, serving the tea to a guest) may have per se moral 
valences that are very different from the moral valence of the whole action (poisoning a 
guest to death). Because of all of these disanalogies, the idea of a UMG does not seem 
particularly helpful to explain moral cognition. Dwyer and Hauser (2008) try to defend 
themselves by saying that they do not necessarily subscribe to the idea that the moral 
module is a Fodorian module. Nonetheless, their reply does not defuse the other 
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disanalogies spotted by the French cognitive scientists, nor does it do anything to avoid the 
clash with ‘trolleyology’ and with the experiments showing emotional modulation of moral 
judgments.  
As to Sterelny (2010), he claims that morality is an adaptation, but this does not involve 
innateness. Adaptations can also require a big amount of learning to work properly. 
Sterelny admits that morality is an adaptation, but denies that it is innate. In his view, 
moral judgments are the result of generalizations from learned exemplars through pattern 
recognition. The child is exposed, e.g. through tales, to moral exemplars and then learns to 
recognize corresponding paradigmatic patterns of behavior in everyday life. In this way 
she joins a moral community, a community that has engineered her learning environment 
so that she and her fellow kids learn the values the parents already share. Sterelny stresses 
that moral judgments have gradients and are not categorical, unlike grammaticality 
judgments. This criticism seems to be warranted and adds up to the list of disanalogies 
already highlighted by the work of Dupoux and Jacob. Sterelny does not provide a spot-on 
criticism of the UMG, as Greene and the French cognitive scientists do. On the contrary, 
he offers an alternative view, a view that is alternative also to Haidt’s MFT, as both UMG 
and MFT are nativist. I find Sterelny’s position interesting because his work shows how 
underdetermined theories in experimental moral psychology are. We still need many data 
points to narrow the number of plausible theories down to a manageable amount. At the 
moment, very different theories still have a right of citizenship in the debate. 
Summing up, I think that, given the amount of disanalogies between grammatical capacity 
and moral capacity, the lack of compelling empirical evidence in favor of UMG
86
, and 
serious problems to fit with experimental results, UMG ought to be considered as an 
interesting working hypothesis which is not particularly substantiated at the moment. 
In closing this chapter, I would like to briefly deal with the position expressed by 
neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga (2005). Gazzaniga draws on Hauser and claims that most 
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ethical systems across history and around the globe evaluate certain things in similar ways. 
Almost the totality of human groups have held murder and incest as morally wrong, have 
condemned lack of care towards children, have chastised lies and violations of trust. Gazzaniga 
stresses the importance of the controversial concept of human nature and underlines 
similarities among specimens of H sapiens. He (2005, xix) posits that there is  
 
a universal set of biological responses to moral dilemmas, a sort of ethics, built into our brains. 
My hope is that we soon may be able to uncover those ethics, identify them, and to begin to 
live more fully by them. I believe we live by them largely unconsciously now, but that a lot of 
suffering, war, and conflict could be eliminated if we could agree to live by them more 
consciously.  
 
In particular, humans usually live by these ethical principles unconsciously, but if humans 
spelled them out more clearly through empirical investigation, we could live by them 
explicitly, in a conscious, reflective way.  
In this last part of this section, I examine Gazzaniga’s neuromoral theory. His idea is that 
the implicit principles of UMG sometimes fail to influence behavior. This brings about “a 
lot of suffering, war, and conflict.” What could we do to avoid this? Quite simply, apply 
the principles of the UMG in a conscious way. Hence, explicit knowledge of the principles 
(acquired through psychological and neuroscientific investigations) could allow us to make 
better moral judgments, i.e. moral judgments that lead less often than at present to “a lot of 
suffering, war, and conflict.”  
A first question that might be asked is whether it is de facto possible to apply those 
principles in an explicit way. It might be the case that human conscious computational 
power is too little to perform explicitly the processing required by implicit UMG 
principles. We experimentally know that the computational power of conscious reasoning 
is close to zero if compared to the computational power of implicit areas of the brain such 
as V1, the primary visual cortex in the occipital lobe (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren 2006, 96-
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97). Of course, it might also be the case that the opposite is true and that it is very well 
possible to follow those principles in a deliberate way. This is an empirical question and 
only experimentation can eventually address it. However, it cannot be taken for granted 
that what Gazzaniga proposes is feasible.  
Secondly, even assuming arguendo that what Gazzaniga suggests to do (i.e. to move from 
the implicit mode of making moral judgments to the explicit mode of making moral 
judgments) is possible, his theory runs into what I dub as the ‘meta-normativity problem’. 
This is a recurring problem of neuromoral theories. Gazzaniga’s suggestion amounts to 
this: “We ought to make moral judgments by deploying the principles of UMG in an 
explicit way rather than by deploying them in an implicit way.” What kind of normativity 
does this ‘ought’ express? There are at least two possibilities.  
The first possibility is that this claim is in turn a moral judgment. Yet this paves the way to 
new questions that a neuromoral theorist of this sort ought to answer: is this moral 
judgment true? And what resources can this neuromoral theorist use to justify it? Suppose 
a theorist of this kind suggests that our grasp of the normative moral standards derives 
from UMG itself. Would this mean that the only way we have to justify the moral claim 
“we ought to consciously apply UMG’s principles” is by appeal to the principles of UMG? 
If so, would this make the justification problematically and viciously circular? Or would 
the circularity be acceptable? I do not want to answer these questions here. It is up to this 
sort of neuromoral theorist to answer them. 
Another possible option is that, when this kind of neuromoral theorist says that one ought 
to consciously deploy the principles of UMG, the ‘ought’ in question is not intended to be 
a moral one but rather a prudential
87
 one. The claim would be that the deliberate 
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deployment of the principles of UMG is the best way people have – either as individuals or 
as collectives – to secure some desired outcomes, such as the reduction of suffering and the 
avoidance of conflict in the world. Given the phrasing of Gazzaniga’s claim, this is likely 
to be the correct interpretation of his position. But if this is the right way of interpreting the 
‘ought’, there are other questions one can ask. In particular, one can ask whether the claim 
is actually true. Is it actually true that deploying those principles in a conscious way would 
lead to better moral judgments, where ‘better’ refers to prudential standards? Let us grant, 
for the sake of argument, that there is such a thing as a UMG. What are the reasons for 
thinking that UMG does not contain principles that, say, in contemporary societies are 
likely to lead, at least in some circumstances, to conflict, suffering and other unpleasant 
things that people – either individually or collectively – would prefer to avoid? This is an 
empirical claim, and besides an empirical claim that is very difficult to test. 
Gazzaniga’s neuromoral theory incurs into both an empirical problem of feasibility (‘can 
we actually deploy the implicit principles of the UMG in an explicit way?’) and the 
conceptual ‘meta-normativity problem’. Gazzaniga seems to give a prudential answer to 
the meta-normativity problem, but this in turn opens up the big empirical question about 
the effectiveness of conscious application of UMG as a tool to pursue prudential goods. So 
Gazzaniga faces now two important empirical questions and his neuromoral theory has to 
address them if progress is to be made.  
If Hauser, Mikhail, Dwyer, and Gazzaniga take morality as composed of grammatical rules 
or implicit moral principles, the theorists I examine in the next section focus on fast and 
frugal procedures called heuristics. 
 
3.4. Moral heuristics: friends or foes? 
                                                                                                                                                    
one put forward by Joyce (2001). For a critique of the Kantian view of morality as a set of categorical 
imperatives and an attempt to build a morality on hypothetical imperatives, see Foot (1972). Foot’s idea of 
morality shares some similarities with the idea of prudence I am describing in this footnote. 
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In experimental psychology the word “heuristics” usually appears in the “heuristics and 
biases approach” championed by two of the most influential psychologists of the last 
century, the late Amos Tversky and Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman. The heuristic and 
biases approach, based on a series of famous studies published in the 1970s and in the 
1980s (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1981, 1983), aims 
at studying human rationality by means of the errors it commits. Kahneman and Tversky 
found that people behave irrationally in many circumstances: they are often insensitive to 
sample size and prior probabilities in statistical judgments, they do not follow basic logical 
rules such as the conjunction rule
88
, and are influenced by the wording of outcomes, since 
they prefer to avoid losses than to forfeit gains, if their absolute magnitude is the same. 
Some of these results, especially those concerning the different attitude of humans towards 
losses and gains and the fact that humans are risk-takers when they want to avoid risks and 
risk-averse when gains are involved
89
, are explained by prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979). Some other results are explained through heuristics, i.e. fast decision 
making procedures that take into account just a tiny part of the information potentially 
available to the agent and regularly use just fragments of incomplete information. The best 
known heuristics are the representativeness heuristic, according to which one item is 
associated with a category if it looks like the stereotype for that category
90
, and the 
availability heuristics, according to which things that more easily come to mind
91
 are seen 
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 According to which “A&B” needs to be less probable than “A” and less probable than “B”. 
89
 One example is the “Asian flu” case I mentioned above in Ch. 2. If outcomes are described in terms of 
“deaths”, they are seen as losses and people take risks; if they are described in terms of “lives saved”, they 
are seen as gains and people become risk-averse. 
90
 E.g. participants are given a description of a shy, meticulous man, are asked whether he is a librarian or a 
farmer, and are told that this man comes from a group in which there are more farmers than librarians. The 
man is regularly judged as a librarian by participants even though there are much more farmers than 
librarians in the population at large and the experimental participant knows this (cf. Tversky and Kahneman 
1974). 
91
 For instance, in English there are more words whose third letter is ‘r’ than words whose first letter is ‘r’. 
However, participants find the latter much easier to remember and hence usually think that there are more 
words which start with an ‘r’ than words whose third letter is an ‘r’. (cf. Tversky and Kahneman 1974). 
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as more frequent than things that less easily come to mind. There are of course many other 
heuristics, but this can be enough as an example. The final outcome of this approach is 
deeming most human beings irrational, relative to a standard that is constituted by RCT, 
the standard theory of rationality in games theory and micro-economics since the end of 
WW2. According to RCT, humans should be insensible to wording effects and just 
maximize their individual utility. Hence, Kahneman and Tversky see heuristics as 
deviations from the norm, i.e. as something bad relative to the ideal represented by the 
rationality of the sheer maximizer. This claim of widespread irrationality has given rise, 
mostly in the 1990s, to what in psychology are known as the ‘rationality wars’ (Krueger 
and Funder 2004; Stanovich and West 2000; Stein 1996). The front opposing Kahneman, 
Tversky, and most economists in the world features German psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer 
and his numerous followers. Gigerenzer heavily draws on the work of the late Nobel 
laureate Herbert Simon (1955, 1956), who famously criticized maximizing rationality by 
creating the concepts of ‘bounded rationality’ and ‘satisficing’. Satisficing is picking the 
first option that the decision-maker encounters which in turn satisfies some conditions she 
posited, i.e. choosing the first option she finds that is ‘good enough’ for her. Simon’s main 
take is that humans do not possess sufficient cognitive resources to carry out maximization 
and that maximization would be largely unnecessary for survival of organisms such as H 
sapiens specimens in the environment. Gigerenzer follows him on this path and claims that 
heuristics are not at all deviations from rationality. To quote the title of Gigerenzer et al. 
(1999), heuristics are what makes us smart. According to Gigerenzer the human mind can 
do little better than using heuristics. Heuristics make our survival in the environment 
possible and of course they bring about mistakes, but these mistakes are inevitable for 
creatures such as humans, so that we ought not to weep on them (cf. Gigerenzer 2005). 
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Heuristics are highly context-sensitive, and together with a description of the environment 
in which the choice takes place, they can often explain an agent's behavior. They are more 
conducive to success of an organism in the environment, defined as a match between 
behavior and environment enabling survival and eventually reproduction, than the 
informationally rich processes of conscious deliberation (cf. Gigerenzer 2000; Gigerenzer 
and Selten 2001). Thus heuristics are very rational, not irrational as Kahneman and 
Tversky have been claiming, and the RCT normative standard needs to be jettisoned.  
The discussion about moral heuristics is set in this context and features as main characters 
Gigerenzer himself and American legal scholar Cass Sunstein (2005), who takes the side of 
the ‘Kahnemanian’ mainstream. Gigerenzer (2008a, 2010) claims that most of humans’ 
decisions in the moral domain are driven by heuristics, exactly as it happens, according to 
his view, in most domains of human cognition. Heuristics ought not to be confused with 
Haidtian moral intuitions. Gigerenzer is rather skeptical about the concept of moral 
intuition and about dual-process talk in general (2008a, 15). He claims that moral intuition 
in the Haidtian sense is not a primitive notion, as Haidt takes it to be, and that intuitions are 
actually the result of the covert operations of moral heuristics. The heuristics people deploy 
to solve moral problems and to form moral judgments are not specific for thinking only 
about moral issues, so that there are no “moral heuristics” sensu stricto. Moral problems 
get solved by the same heuristics that are used to solve other kinds of social problems. So, 
in this perspective, heuristics make us smart and, at the same time, make us moral. 
However, Gigerenzer (2008a, 3) claims that the very same heuristics can in different 
circumstances result in morally good or morally bad decisions. For example, a simple rule 
such as “if there is a default option, do nothing about it (i.e. tacitly accept the default)” may 
result in morally good or morally bad decisions, depending on what the default option 
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actually is. In one of Gigerenzer’s examples, an opt-out policy for organ donation92 will 
result in most people’s tacit acceptance of the default option, that is, a (perhaps 
unconscious) decision in favor of organ donation. The same applies to heuristics such as 
“do what the majority of the members of your group do”. In a society in which most people 
behave in racist ways, this heuristic will result in racist behavior. As to the domain of 
morality, Gigerenzer claims that what counts as morally relevant or irrelevant is highly 
variable. There is a mobile ‘moral rim’ that separates issues of taste from moral issues. 
This rim moves according to historical periods and cultural groups. This is due to the fact 
that there are no specific moral heuristics. Gigerenzer claims that the rationality standard 
he contests in his debate with Kahneman and Tversky (Gigerenzer 1991, 1996; Kahneman 
and Tversky 1996) is used both in non-moral normativity (i.e. as a norm of what counts as 
rational) and in moral normativity (i.e. as a norm of what counts as morally mandatory). 
Thus, Gigerenzer makes two claims: (1) psychological theories that assume that a human 
agent is a utility maximizer are descriptively inadequate; (2) normative moral theories that 
maintain that a human agent ought to be a utility maximizer are normatively inadequate. 
As we will see, claim (2) amounts to a neuromoral theory. These two claims are closely 
connected, as in Gigerenzer’s opinion there is a strong genealogical link between RCT and 
consequentialist moral theories. RCT genealogically stemmed from normative (and not 
descriptive) frameworks that were popular in the Enlightenment Age, such as, indeed, 
Bentham’s maximizing consequentialism. So, these descriptive and normative views can 
be considered as parts of a single intellectual stream. Hence, RCT and similar descriptive 
theories of human choice conflate a desideratum for actual reality, giving rise to an 
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 In other words, a policy according to which all citizens are by default potential organ donors. 
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egregious case of wishful thinking, or, as Gigerenzer puts it, to an instance of “ought-to-is 
transfer” (2010, 532). 
Gigerenzer deems utility maximization impossible for humans. These are the reasons he 
provides. First, calculating the expected utility of different possible actions is in general a 
computationally intractable problem, as the possible outcomes are too many and 
probabilities hard to figure out. Secondly, utility has various components, such as health, 
income, freedoms, opportunities, and so on. Gigerenzer claims that, given that such 
components are in conflict with each other (i.e. there are trade-offs among them) and 
incommensurable (i.e. there is no common currency that can be used to weigh one 
component against the others), the maximization of utility will in general be impossible. 
As I have written above, maximizing utility is (in Gigerenzer’s opinion) possible only in 
“small worlds” (cf. Gigerenzer 2010), i.e. artificial scenarios such as trolley dilemmas and 
economic games, where payouts of actions and probabilities thereof are known, whereas in 
“large worlds”, such as the real one, the decision-maker lives in a constant lack of relevant 
information about outcomes value and outcomes probability and tries to survive by 
availing herself of the little information and computational power she can marshal. 
Furthermore, Gigerenzer argues that maximization is not even a good ideal benchmark for 
what constitutes a good decision: not only it is impossible to compute, but one ought not 
even to try to approximate it. Gigerenzer quotes here Lipsey’s (1956) general theory of the 
second best. In a situation in which fulfilling all the conditions required to achieve the 
optimal outcome is not possible, trying to fulfill as many as possible of such conditions is 
not necessarily the second best option. The second best option has usually features that are 
very different from the ones of the first best option, so that trying to realize as many traits 
as possible of the first best option does not help one to obtain the second best result. In 
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other words, doing things that in ideal conditions would lead to maximization is not a good 
way of trying to achieve our aims. Then Gigerenzer also argues that, in some cases in 
which maximization of monetary outcomes is feasible because the variables involved come 
in a manageable number, satisficing may outperform maximization. Satisficing strategies 
and heuristics regularly suffer for bias, i.e. they introduce systematic errors that are always 
in the same direction. In contrast, attempts at maximization suffer from variance, i.e. error 
in estimating the parameters of the population of interest from the sample data. Hence, in 
these cases, there is a bias-variance dilemma, and in a subset of these cases it may be better 
to have bias than variance.  
Let us now move to Gigerenzer’s neuromoral theory. One way in which knowing the 
machinery for moral judgments can help people make good moral judgments is the 
following. A proper understanding of the mind and of its heuristics ‘toolbox’ will help one 
see that many of the current theories of decision making – including many theories of 
moral decision making – are wrong. They are wrong both in that they do not accurately 
represent the way people make moral decisions (“descriptively”) and in that they give the 
wrong advice about the proper way of making decisions (“prescriptively”). An 
understanding of the heuristics toolbox will help one realize that one ought not to follow 
the advice of such theories when trying to solve moral decision making problems. 
According to Gigerenzer, one ought to rely on the heuristics toolbox instead. Trying, via 
conscious deliberation, to counteract or bypass the outputs generated by the heuristics 
toolbox is a bad idea. In arguing for this, Gigerenzer (2008a) discusses maximizing act 
utilitarianism. He takes this view to imply that in order to decide what ought morally to do, 
one has to determine the expected aggregate utility of all the available courses of action 
and then choose the one with highest value. But this is impossible for the reasons I have 
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explained above. So a proper understanding of the machinery for moral judgments may 
help us not be led astray by bad theories such as maximizing act utilitarianism. But there is 
also another, and more positive, way in which an understanding of the heuristics toolbox 
can have a positive impact on our moral-judgment-forming ability. If heuristics can give 
rise to good and bad judgments depending on the context, then arguably knowledge of the 
toolbox could be used to maximize the chances that people will find themselves in contexts 
in which the heuristics they will tend to use will result in good judgments. Knowledge of 
the heuristics toolbox can be used in this way both by individual agents and by policy 
makers who have some control on the contexts in which certain populations make choices 
(cf. the notion of ‘choice architect’ in Sunstein and Thaler 2003). That is, if a person can 
affect the context in which decision making takes place, either for oneself or for others, he 
can use an understanding of the heuristics toolbox to affect such context and, specifically, 
to affect it in a way that is conducive to good moral judgments (cf. Gigerenzer 2010; Todd 
and Gigerenzer 2007). The focus here is on shaping the decision making context rather 
than on changing the heuristics themselves, which in Gigerenzer’s view are triggered 
automatically, in the sense that their deployment comes natural and instinctive to human 
beings and – in the absence of interference at least – may be difficult to avoid. This being 
said, Gigerenzer’s neuromoral theory raises some questions that are similar to the ones 
evoked by Gazzaniga’s view. The meta-normativity problem applies again: what is the 
normative standard by which one should evaluate the maximizing act utilitarian’s 
recommendations?  
Before moving forward, it must be noticed is that maximizing utilitarianism need not be 
conceived as a theory of how one should determine what to do, as a theory in moral 
epistemology. It can also be conceived as a theory of what is the morally correct thing to 
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do, independently of how one determines that it is, as a metaphysical theory. This 
metaphysical variety of maximizing utilitarianism is an account of the nature of the 
normative standard that applies to actions and decisions. On this interpretation, the 
maximum can be used as a benchmark to assess the goodness of choices, even though it 
cannot actually be computed in everyday decision making.  
On one version of metaphysical maximizing utilitarianism so conceived, an action is 
morally right if it maximizes aggregate utility. Since trying to make evaluations and 
comparisons that are too difficult for creatures like us is certainly not conducive to the 
maximization of utility, a maximizing utilitarian of this sort can use Gigerenzer’s own 
arguments and recommend not doing all the calculations that Gigerenzer also recommends 
not doing. In particular cases, this utilitarian can also recommend using the heuristics that 
Gigerenzer describes, at least if some degree of control on the heuristics one deploys is 
possible – whether it is direct or indirect control, via environmental manipulations. This 
kind of theorist can argue that one should use the heuristics if and when doing so is the 
action that maximizes aggregate utility.  
On another version of metaphysical maximizing utilitarianism, an action is right if it is 
produced by decision making procedures whose deployment – in organisms like us and in 
a world like ours – tends, at least in the long term, to maximize aggregate utility. Again, 
this kind of utilitarianism is compatible with Gigerenzer’s focus on heuristics. If the 
heuristics turn out to be the decision making procedures whose deployment tends to 
maximize aggregate utility, then a utilitarian of this sort can recommend using them
93
. 
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 The distinction between the two versions of metaphysical maximizing utilitarianism is akin to the 
distinction between act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism, at least on some ways of understanding the 
latter distinction. Both of these ways of interpreting utilitarianism exclude that maximization should be a 
procedure for making decisions. On the contrary, the utility maximum is just taken to be a benchmark. On the 
first interpretation, what gets measured against the benchmark are actions, single instances of behavior. This 
is vaguely similar to act consequentialism: an action is morally required if its outcome gets closer to realizing 
the utility maximum than competing alternatives. On the second interpretation, what gets measured against 
the benchmark are decision making procedures. This is roughly reminiscent of rule consequentialism: the 
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Gigerenzer makes the following comment on the view that maximization can be seen as a 
normative standard (as opposed to a procedure by which to determine whether one should 
perform particular actions or adopt particular decision making procedures):  
 
I must admit that I fail to understand the logic. […] Even if someone were to stumble over 
the best action by accident, we would not recognize it as such and be able to prove that it 
is indeed the best. How can maximization serve as a norm for rightness if we can neither 
determine nor, after the fact, recognize the best action? (Gigerenzer 2008b, 44) 
 
If Gigerenzer is right about maximization being computationally out of reach for creatures 
like us and in a world like ours, then metaphysical maximizing utilitarianism can be 
accepted only by accepting the claim that humans can never have knowledge of moral 
facts, because – due to their computational limitations – they can never have knowledge of 
what action or what decision making procedure is the one that maximizes utility. This 
seems to be a hard bullet for the metaphysical maximizing utilitarian to bite, and so such a 
utilitarian would presumably try to argue that maximization is not computationally out of 
reach for organisms like us, at least not in general and systematically. Independently of 
human epistemic and computational limitations, Gigerenzer also suggests that, at least in 
some cases and for reasons that have to do mainly with incommensurability, maximization 
is impossible, in the sense that there is no fact of the matter as to which action (or which 
decision making procedure) would maximize utility. If he is right on this, then the 
metaphysical maximizing utilitarian has to accept that – at least in some cases – 
maximization cannot constitute a normative standard. A metaphysical utilitarian could of 
                                                                                                                                                    
adoption of a decision making procedure is morally required if the outcome, in the long run, of that decision 
making procedure gets closer to realizing the utility maximum than competing alternatives. Of course, this 
leaves open the possibility that adopting a given heuristic is morally required.  
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course deny Gigerenzer’s claims on incommensurability, or he could give up on 
maximization in specific cases, those affected by incommensurability problems, as long as 
he can argue that such cases are relatively uncommon. I do not want to enter this debate. I 
concede that Gigerenzer’s claims, when properly reconstructed, can be seen as a critique of 
the maximizing act utilitarian’s account (or accounts) of the normative standard for actions 
and decision making procedures. But, if so, an alternative account of the nature of such a 
normative standard needs to be provided.  
This being said, let us go back to the ‘meta-normativity problem’.  
One option is that Gigerenzer’s meta-normativity is in turn moral. If this were so, 
Gigerenzer’s normative claims would express moral judgments. Then one could ask 
whether these moral judgments are correct, what resources could be used to justify them, 
and whether one could appeal to the heuristics ‘toolbox’ in this context without incurring 
in circularity. Unfortunately, Gigerenzer does not explore these issues. 
Another option is that Gigerenzer’s meta-normativity is not moral, but prudential instead. 
The view being proposed then would be that relying on the heuristics toolbox and 
designing choice environments in certain fashions is the best way people have – either as 
individuals or collectives – to secure certain important desired outcomes, such as peaceful 
relations, stable and rewarding cooperation, etc. Is this Gigerenzer’s favorite option? He 
refers to what he calls “ecological rationality.” Heuristics are ecologically rational in the 
sense that, in most environments, they are the best or the only way to achieve “success.” 
As I have written above, success is about a match between a given organism and the 
environment; furthermore, it is measured in terms of “accuracy, frugality and speed of 
decisions” and involves “means suited to certain goals” (Gigerenzer and Sturm 2011, 13). 
But what are these goals? Gigerenzer suggests that some important goals for judging the 
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ecological rationality of heuristics are desire satisfaction and the fixation of true beliefs 
(ibidem). He seems to be claiming that we ought to rely on the heuristics toolbox in the 
sense that doing so is the best way we have to satisfy our individual or collective desires, 
including those desires that concern or involve attaining true beliefs.  
In an article on ‘moral satisficing’, Gigerenzer claims: 
 
My aim is not to provide a normative theory that tells us how we ought to behave, but a 
descriptive theory with prescriptive consequences, such as how to design environments that 
help people to reach their own goals. (Gigerenzer 2010, 530) 
 
This statement is somewhat puzzling, in that a prescriptive theory is normally understood 
as one that prescribes actions and tells people what they ought to do. I believe that 
Gigerenzer is trying to say something like the following. People can, either individually or 
collectively, select certain goals, acquire certain desires. Some of these goals are labeled 
“moral goals” and involve certain kinds of behaviors and outcomes. The labeling in 
Gigerenzer’s view is not very important: it is just a way of marking certain desires as 
particularly significant and different cultures do it in different ways (Gigerenzer 2010, 
543). Once a moral goal has been selected, one has to identify the best means of realizing 
it. The distinction Gigerenzer makes between normative and prescriptive is the distinction 
between a theory that tells you what you ought to do when you are trying to select your 
moral goals and a theory that tells you what you ought to do in order to realize a moral 
goal that you have already selected. He only wants to give a theory about what you ought 
to do in order to realize moral goals that you have already selected. Having clarified this, it 
must be noticed though that, once Gigerenzer’s meta-normative standards are interpreted 
as prudential, some important issues come into focus. Gigerenzer seems to be saying that 
no matter what individual or collective goal is selected, simple heuristics are going to 
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outperform informationally rich strategies and conscious reflection. But his arguments 
against maximization do not support this strong and general claim. In order to see why, I 
draw on some criticisms Cass Sunstein makes on Gigerenzer’s view. 
Sunstein (2005, 2008) objects that certain goals – especially collective goals that are 
determined through complex negotiation and collective deliberation – seem to be such that 
humans are more likely to realize them through slow and informationally rich conscious 
reflection. In particular, I add, conscious reflection seems to be the best tool social 
engineers and choice architects have for affecting environments in ways that will lead 
humans to decide and act – perhaps via the deployment of simple heuristics – in ways that 
are in turn conducive to outcomes that are desirable under a prudential standard. In other 
words, even if I granted arguendo that Gigerenzer is right at the level of everyday behavior 
and choice, this would not mean that he is also right at the level of choices about the ways 
in which environments need to be shaped. For instance, suppose that some public health 
officers must decide how to shape the decision environment for people that must choose 
between giving their consent to organs being explanted from their corpses and not giving 
such consent. It may be the case that conscious deliberation guides the officers’ decision 
better than a heuristic, since they have to take into account humans’ psychology, different 
trade-offs between individual autonomy and social beneficence, the interests of relatives, 
and so on and so forth. At least, this is what Sunstein is arguing for. In his opinion, in order 
to evaluate and compare heuristics and the outcomes they generate in different possible 
choice environments, policy makers may well have to perform informationally rich 
analyses, some of which could appeal to Gigerenzer’s own research. A neuromoral theorist 
à la Gigerenzer needs to make these distinctions and to assess their normative implications. 
Moreover, Sunstein makes another point. In accord with Baron (1994), he sees heuristics 
as undue generalizations. Some decision making procedures work well in most cases, and 
are hence generalized to all cases. However, this extension can prove dreadful in 
exceptional cases and bring about very bad consequences. For instance, “one ought not to 
102 
 
lie” works very well in many cases, but when an armed man who wants to kill your best 
friend asks you where she is, it works less well. Sunstein claims that moral heuristics could 
lead to moral errors and these errors ought to be avoided. As we have seen, Gigerenzer 
claims that these errors are a necessary part of the heuristic toolbox: if humans are to be 
intelligent, they also need make mistakes. Sunstein has a more traditional view on 
rationality, and hence thinks that moral mistakes are at least partly avoidable. Yet one must 
ask what it means for a heuristic to work ‘well’ or ‘less well’, or, which is equivalent, what 
is the meta-normative standard that defines what a moral error is. Sunstein recognizes that 
there is strong disagreement among both psychologists and philosophers about what 
constitutes a moral error. He claims, this time contrary to Baron (1994), that it is not 
possible to use a controversial standard such as straightforward consequentialism to assess 
what amounts to moral error. I agree with him on this. So Sunstein tries to locate a non-
controversial meta-normative standard to assess the goodness of heuristics. I am pleased by 
the effort and less pleased by the results. Sunstein puts forward a notion of ‘weak 
consequentialism’ according to which the consequences of a decision making procedure do 
matter and violations of rights and duties can be factored in the decision making process as 
consequences. This standard may admittedly reach a very high degree of consent, but it 
seems to beg the question against a staunch nonconsequentialist, such as Kant 
(1966/1797)
94
. Hence, weak consequentialism does not seem to help us much address the 
meta-normative issue. I find more helpful a suggestion by Pizarro and Uhlman (2005): if 
an agent A understands that her moral judgment depends on factors that A herself 
considers to be irrational or irrelevant, the judgment can be said to be in error. This is a 
plausible, albeit subjective, view on moral error. It will capture at least some cases of 
moral error.  
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 Another kind of nonconsequentialist, whom I could label as the ‘mild nonconsequentialist’, may not be 
committed to the claim that the duty not to lie is absolute – it could be a prima facie duty that might be 
trumped by your friend’s right to life and by special obligations you have implicitly stipulated with her due to 
your friendship. 
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Summing up, Gigerenzer is likely to support a prudential meta-normative standard, but 
does not address the very important problems this position brings forth, in particular the 
empirical issue that conscious deliberation is not conducive to the pursuit and obtainment 
of prudential goods such as peaceful relationships and stable cooperation. On the other 
hand, Sunstein’s attempt at finding a non-controversial meta-normative standard for 
decision making procedures is highly praiseworthy, but the attempted solution, weak 
consequentialism, does not live up to expectations because it begs the question against 
staunch deontologists, who cannot simply be dismissed as irrational.  
In the next section I describe views that, as Gigerenzer’s, attribute importance to 
unconscious thinking. 
 
3.5. Unconscious Thought: Dijksterhuis, Woodward, and Allman 
Unconscious Thought Theory is championed by Dutch psychologist Ap Dijksterhuis 
(Dijksterhuis and Nordgren 2006; Dijksterhuis et al. 2006). It is a theory in general 
experimental psychology and not only (and not necessarily) in experimental moral 
psychology. The theory posits that humans are capable of conscious and unconscious 
thought. Unconscious Thought (henceforth UT) can be defined as thought or deliberation 
in the absence of conscious attention directed at the problem. In contrast, conscious 
thought is defined by thought in which attention is devoted to the object or the task. In 
other words, conscious thought corresponds to cognitive or affective thought processes that 
occur while the object or task is the focus of one’s conscious attention. UT is what, in 
popular wisdom, is labeled as “sleeping on a problem.” Dijksterhuis claims that UT can, in 
a variety of circumstances, address problems better than conscious thought. Surprisingly, 
UT is better at dealing with complex problems, where lots of attributes for each available 
option are in play, than with simple problems, where conscious reasoning performs better. 
This happens because consciousness has a low capacity: it cannot store much information. 
In contrast, UT does not suffer from low capacity, so that the quality of choices does not 
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deteriorate with increased complexity. The theory is backed by experimental results. In 
Dijksterhuis et al. (2006), participants were either in the conscious thought condition or in 
the UT condition. Participants who were assigned to the latter condition were asked to 
choose an option among a list of cars and were allowed some time to reflect, but were 
distracted by a cognitive load task (for instance, solving anagrams) for the whole duration 
of the reflection period. So the participants in this condition were not able to reflect at all. 
The cars could be characterized by either a long or a short list of attributes. Conscious 
thought is better at selecting among cars that are described through a few attributes each 
than at selecting among cars which are coupled with a long list of attributes. Another 
feature of conscious thought is that, due to its poor capacity, it induces biases: it leads 
people to put disproportionate weight on attributes that are accessible, plausible, and easy 
to verbalize. In other words, conscious thought is more vulnerable than UT to 
‘Kahnemanian’ biases. However, there are some tasks that only conscious thought can 
solve, e.g. arithmetic tasks. UT cannot follow the strict rules that are required to perform 
these computations, whereas conscious thought is very good at that. On the contrary, UT 
excels in pattern recognition, which does not require precise rules to be followed.  
All of this seems to bring grist to Gigerenzer’s mill, but it is not actually so, since 
Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006, 104) specify that heuristics are carried out by conscious 
thought and not by UT. So the results by Dijksterhuis do not necessarily support 
Gigerenzer in his claims against maximizing act consequentialism, since both contenders 
(Gigerenzer and the maximizing consequentialist) are on the side of conscious thought in 
the conscious vs. unconscious thought dichotomy.  
Nonetheless, UT is connected with Haidtian moral intuitions, in the sense that these 
intuitions are the result of UT. This idea is further elaborated by Woodward and Allman, as 
I explain below. At variance with that, Dijksterhuis and Nordgren propose a normative 
view concerning general cognition: “One should give more weight to the unconscious 
intuitive feeling than to the conscious pluses and minuses.” (2006, 107).  
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For the purposes of this dissertation, the interesting point about Dijksterhuis’s views is the 
way in which it challenges Greene’s dual-process model. In particular, it characterizes two 
systems of thought that do not fit particularly well into Greene’s scheme. System1 is fast 
and inflexible, but UT seems to be at least as flexible as conscious thought, for example, 
and not to be necessarily fast, since UT yields better results if it is allowed more time to 
process information, i.e. if ‘incubation’ takes longer (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren 2006, 99). 
So, if Dijksterhuis’s general theory is valid, Greene’s descriptive model is undermined. Yet 
it is not clear whether Dijksterhuis is right. Lassiter and colleagues (2009) carried out two 
experiments to test an alternative explanation of UT. UT would consist, according to their 
hypothesis, in just recalling an on-line decision that has been made when the stimuli were 
presented to the participants. All participants in the original experiments by Dijksterhuis 
and co-workers were allowed to look at the experimental materials, i.e. the data about the 
cars, for a short time only, and at the same time asked to form a first impression. Then 
participants in the conscious condition had 4 minutes to “think carefully,” but they could 
access the material no more. However, they had not memorized the data, so that they were 
actually unable to carry out a conscious decision making process. They could not 
memorize because they were asked by the experimenters to form a first impression (as 
opposed to memorize) in the time when the experimental material was accessible. So their 
decision making process was impaired by the experimental setting Dijksterhuis and 
colleagues created. The good performance of the UT thinkers is, in Lassiter’s and co-
workers’ opinion, just an artifact due to a poor experimental design. Strick, Dijksterhuis, 
and Van Beeren (2010) replied with other experiments. Deciding who is right between the 
Ohio guys led by Lassiter and Dijksterhuis’s lab in Nijmegen (The Netherlands) would 
require delving deep into experimental details, and this, however interesting, would lead us 
too far away in this context. However, it is important to notice that the main experiment by 
Dijksterhuis and colleagues (2006) lacks an important control: there is no ‘immediate 
judgment’ condition in which participants were asked to make a selection forthwith. In 
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spite of this important shortcoming, the UT issue is still open because Nordgren, Bos, and 
Dijksterhuis (2011) have recently found that a combination of conscious and unconscious 
thinking is even more efficacious than UT alone at solving complex problems in which lots 
of attributes are involved. However it may be, this line of research suggests the possibility 
that UT is likely to be more than a series of automatic responses, as Greene instead posits.  
Let us move now to the neuromoral theories that have been created starting from these 
descriptive (and non-morally normative) views. James Woodward and John Allman 
(Allman and Woodward 2008; Woodward and Allman 2007) mainly deal with moral 
intuitions, that are defined along Haidt’s (2001) lines. As in Gigerenzer’s view, moral 
intuitions are for them a part of a broader set of social intuitions; moral cognition counts as 
a sub-set of social cognition. Moral intuitions are deeply intertwined with emotions and are 
created by a cognitive system that can process a “large number of disparate social cues” at 
high speed (Woodward and Allman 2007, 182). Moral intuitions are the result of implicit 
learning, so that, at variance with Gigerenzer’s social and moral heuristics, they are not 
necessarily frugal and depend on exposure to social stimuli to a greater extent than 
Gigerenzer’s heuristics seem to do95. Moral intuitions arise through a process that is 
remarkably similar to Dijksterhuis’s UT, even though Woodward’s and Allman’s 
interpretation features emotions in a prominent role. On the contrary, UT is not necessarily 
emotionally-loaded in Dijksterhuis’s descriptive hypothesis. This difference 
notwithstanding, Woodward and Allman de facto extend Dijksterhuis’s ideas to the moral 
case. They believe that moral intuitions relying on UT can lead to better decision making 
processes than more conscious procedures, if the amount of relevant information to be 
taken into account is massive and implicit learning is possible. In turn, such learning is 
possible when an individual has been, directly or indirectly, in contact with the relevant 
kind of experience. Given the limited capacity of conscious thought and the complexity of 
most morally relevant situations, conscious reasoning has little hope to come up with 
                                                 
95
 Yet Gigerenzer is never, at least to my knowledge, very clear about the development of heuristics and 
about how robustly they appear in children. 
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satisfactory decisions concerning these cases. At variance with that, moral intuitions can 
process in parallel big quantities of environmental and social cues, so that they usually 
result, according to Woodward’s and Allman’s view, in better moral decisions than explicit 
cost-benefit analysis.  
This amounts to a neuromoral theory: deeper knowledge of the machinery for moral 
judgments (i.e. knowing what cognitive processes moral intuitions are based on) leads to 
better moral judgments. Various considerations underpin this neuromoral theory.  
First, a positive aspect of moral intuitions is that they can take into account effects of our 
decisions on the future behavior of other human beings that, in Woodward’s and Allman’s 
opinion, would be difficult to figure out by making use of conscious cost-benefit analysis. 
For instance, negotiating with terrorists or paying a ransom to a kidnapper now might 
encourage further terrorist acts and further instances of kidnapping in the future. This 
might be missed by explicit cost-benefit analysis, but moral intuitions are likely to be 
perceptive to this aspect, albeit in an unconscious way.  
Secondly, Woodward and Allman distinguish two versions of consequentialism: strategic 
consequentialism and parametric consequentialism
96
. Strategic consequentialists 
understand that moral contexts imply an “ongoing interaction with other actors who will 
respond in complex ways that are not easy to predict, depending on the decision maker’s 
choices […] these responses will in turn present the original decision-maker with 
additional decisions and so on.” Moreover, strategic consequentialists are sensitive to “the 
incentives that their choices create, to the informational limitations and asymmetries they 
face, and to the opportunities for misrepresentation these create, and also to considerations 
having to do with motives and intentions, since these are highly relevant to predicting how 
others will behave.” (Woodward and Allman 2007, 185) In contrast, parametric 
                                                 
96
 The same distinction might be made for deontology, although Woodward and Allman do not explore this 
issue. The hardcore position by Kant on lying may count as an instance of parametric deontology. Parametric 
deontology includes absolute rights (and corresponding duties) that are not prima facie and must be followed 
without exception (pereat mundus, fiat iustitia). A deontological position according to which rights and 
duties are generally prima facie may count as a strategic form of deontological ethical system, since it allows 
the balancing of different moral claims and exceptions. I thank Bernard Baertschi for pointing this out to me. 
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consequentialism, whose main representative is Peter Singer, regards the behavior of other 
agents as independent of the agent’s behavior, so that it stipulates away the considerations 
that strategic consequentialism takes into account
97
. So, contrary to Gigerenzer who 
proposes a wholesale rejection of maximizing strategies, Woodward and Allman do not go 
for a wholesale rejection of consequentialism, but attack parametric consequentialism only. 
In contrast, they are sympathetic towards strategic consequentialism and they link moral 
intuitions to it. Woodward’s and Allman’s neuromoral theory claims, among other things, 
that an improved knowledge of the machinery for moral judgments leads us to reject 
parametric consequentialism, but not strategic consequentialism
98
. This being said, the 
most interesting feature of Woodward’s and Allman’s neuromoral theory is that they 
explicitly address the meta-normativity problem. In the experiment by Dijksterhuis and 
colleagues (2006), the benchmark for the goodness of a choice was not a problem, since 
the cars were described with traits that were uncontroversially positive or negative (for a 
car). But how to find a similar normative standard for moral decision making strategies? 
Woodward’s and Allman’s attempt consists in defining, albeit in a provisional way, 
morally relevant information:  
 
[O]ne is more likely to arrive at a morally defensible decision/assessment of [action] A if this 
assessment reflects the operation of some process that exhibits the right sort of sensitivity and 
responsiveness to facts having to do with how oneself and others will be affected by A, how 
others are likely to respond to A, how this will affect all those concerned and so on – call this 
the morally relevant information. (Woodward and Allman 2007, 193) 
  
Thus, the more morally relevant information a moral decision takes into account, the 
better. Still, this does not tell us whether the belief “One ought to rely on moral intuitions 
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 If this distinction is valid, then Greene’s descriptive idea of consequentialism as a unitary psychological 
natural kind is likely to be wrong, since these two variants of consequentialism seems to rely on quite 
different cognitive processes, as strategic consequentialism must process a significantly bigger amount of 
data. 
98
 It is unclear whether the distinction between strategic and parametric consequentialism maps in any 
significant way with the distinction between rule and act consequentialism. 
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and not to trust parametric consequentialism in morally relevant situations in which social 
learning is possible” is a moral judgment, a prudential judgment, or a judgment of some 
other sort. The nature of this ‘ought’ remains unexplained, even though at least we have 
been given a criterion that specifies under which conditions a moral judgment is better or 
worse than another. On the basis of this criterion, Woodward and Allman defend moral 
intuitions by claiming that, in many cases, they track morally relevant information. 
However, the parametric consequentialist could object that, at least in some cases, the 
information Woodward and Allman see as morally relevant is not morally relevant at all. 
To take for granted that some information is morally relevant seems to commit a petitio 
principii against the parametric consequentialist, as much as Sunstein was begging the 
question against a hardcore Kantian. If one says that the features mentioned by Woodward 
and Allman are important and that correct methods of moral decision making are those that 
track those features of the situation, then one is “stipulating away” parametric 
consequentialism, which regards those features as irrelevant in Woodward and Allman’s 
reading. Similarly, parametric consequentialists “stipulate away” those features themselves 
from moral discourse and would say that correct methods of moral decision making are 
those that do not track those features of the situation (i.e. separateness of persons, integrity, 
etc). The two contenders seem to be on a par and the proposed criterion fails to establish a 
common ground between different moral decision making procedures. The core concept 
here is “morally relevant factor.” I will deal with this concept below, in Ch. 4. Although 
Woodward and Allman realize that the problem of the criterion for the normative claims 
they make about moral decision making strategies is real and serious, the theory they 
sketch does not seem to possess the resources that are necessary to address it.  
Finally, there is another positive consequence of an increased understanding of the 
machinery for moral judgments, a consequence that is not part of Woodward’s and 
Allman’s neuromoral theory because it concerns the meta-ethical level. Through increased 
knowledge, we can jettison misconceptions about what moral intuitions actually are. 
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Drawing on neuroimaging experiments, Woodward and Allman attack the idea that moral 
intuitions are linked to a domain-specific module or that they have to do with logical 
processing or visual perception. Hence, in these authors’ opinion, philosophical views 
claiming that moral intuitions are connected with a priori, logical truths or with the 
perception of moral properties in the outer world are unlikely to be correct. But I mention 
this just to set it aside, as I cannot enter the topic of meta-ethical consequences of empirical 
investigation in this dissertation. 
 
3.6. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: the disunity of morality and the master argument 
Philosopher Walter Sinnott-Armstrong puts forward two theories in moral psychology / 
philosophy. The former is the Disunity of Morality Theory. The latter is the Master 
Argument about Moral Intuitions. I examine them in turn. 
The Disunity of Morality Theory is the view according to which a better understanding of 
the machinery for moral judgments makes us understand that the machinery for moral 
judgments itself does not exist as an object worthy of scientific investigation.  
Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument here runs like this:  
Premise 1: what we normally label as ‘morality’ is a set of judgments that are not unified 
by any feature that enables universal generalizations.  
Premise 2: what is bereft of features enabling universal generalizations is not a proper 
object of scientific investigation, as much as jade is not a proper object of mineralogical 
investigation because it is a compound of two minerals, jadeite and nephrite (to which 
mineralogical investigation applies instead). 
Sinnott-Armstrong takes Premise 2 as uncontroversial and I believe he is right in doing so. 
From these two premises stems the  
Conclusion: we ought not to investigate “moral” phenomena, but to look at finer categories 
such as harm, fairness, sexual disgust, etc. that may have unifying properties of the kind 
required.  
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In other words, researchers should isolate smaller classes of judgments within one of these 
regions of “morality”, present relevant scenarios from a single perspective, and look for the 
neural basis / evolutionary origin / psychological processes that correlate with that 
judgment. 
This does not amount to a neuromoral theory, since Sinnott-Armstrong does not claim that 
expanded knowledge of the machinery for moral judgments would lead us to make better 
moral judgments. The normative consequences belong in this case to the domain of 
scientific methodology, i.e. have to do with how experimental moral psychologists should 
work. 
Since Premise 2 is quite uncontroversial, everything hinges on Premise 1. Premise 1 
amounts to the idea that moral judgments are a non-unified set that includes all moral 
judgments that intend to express or apply moral standards in contrast with legal, economic, 
aesthetic, prudential, etc. standards. The judger’s intention is what makes the moral 
judgment moral, but in Sinnott-Armstrong’s view the judgments that are coupled with this 
intention do not have any kind of unifying features that allow for scientifically valid 
generalizations. Sinnott-Armstrong’s claim is in this case a negative existential: “There is 
no such a thing as a unifying feature of moral judgments that enables universal 
generalizations.” (cf. Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley 2012). It is of course very difficult 
to prove a negative existential, but not all good arguments need to be definitive proofs, as 
Sinnott-Armstrong correctly believes. Sinnott-Armstrong tries to debunk the most notable 
possible candidates, saying that this suggests that no actual plausible candidate to the role 
of unifying property can (or could in the future) be located.  
First, moral judgments are not based on harm, since a judgment like “It is morally 
praiseworthy to give a celebratory gift to your colleague who got tenure”99 is moral but has 
nothing to do with harm. 
                                                 
99
 This example is from Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley (2012). 
112 
 
Secondly, the MFT is commendable as it underlines the variety of judgments that are 
intended as moral, but it is incomplete and vague. In particular Sinnott-Armstrong re-
elaborates the objection by Suhler and Churchland (2011) and claims that the foundations 
could be many more than four, five, or six.  
Thirdly, Turiel’s (1983) characterization of moral violations as serious, harm-based, and 
authority independent clashes with some empirical results (Kelly et al. 2007) that show that 
some harm violations are authority dependent. For instance, 44% of participants said that a 
teacher is morally allowed to spank a student if the principal in turn allows her to do so, 
but only 5% of participants said that a teacher is morally allowed to spank a student if the 
principal in turn does not allow her to do so
100
. This shows that moral violations are not 
authority independent, or at least not with the kind of robustness Turiel and his followers 
took for granted. 
Fourthly, Hare (1981) claims that all moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. 
Sinnott-Armstrong objects that moral judgments concerning the past, such as “It was 
morally wrong for Brutus to kill Caesar”, and negative moral judgments, such as “It is not 
morally wrong to buy a lottery ticket”, do not entail any kind of prescription. 
Sinnott-Armstrong takes also other cases into account, but this brief review is sufficient to 
give an idea of his argumentative strategy. Having concluded his debunking, Sinnott-
Armstrong puts forward a view in moral epistemology
101
 called ‘epistemic variantism’ 
(Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley 2012, 373), according to which moral beliefs are 
justified by different methods or to different degrees in different areas of morality. Sinnott-
Armstrong’s argument is persuasive but not necessarily compelling. It is difficult to 
address this issue from the conceptual point of view only. What is more interesting for the 
                                                 
100
 This is the text of the scenarios: “Screen 1: It is against the law for teachers to spank students. Ms. 
Williams is a third grade teacher, and she knows about the law prohibiting spanking. She has also received 
clear instructions from her Principal not to spank students. But when a boy in her class is very disruptive and 
repeatedly hits other children, she spanks him. Screen 2: Now suppose that it was not against the law for 
teachers to spank students, and that Ms. Williams’ Principal had told her that she could spank students who 
misbehave if she wanted to.” (Kelly et al. 2007, 124) 
101
 Moral epistemology is the discipline that deals with the justifications of moral judgments. In turn, a belief 
is justified for A when A thinks that the believer ought to have that belief on the basis of some epistemic 
ground. 
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purpose of this work is that Sinnott-Armstrong avails himself of empirical data to buttress 
his views concerning the Disunity of Morality. Schaich Borg and colleagues (2008) 
differentiated between three kinds of disgust (non-sexual moral disgust, i.e. toward 
gruesome violent acts, incest-related disgust, and pathogen-related disgust, i.e. the one 
caused by sipping one sister’s urine) and showed that they elicit pretty different BOLD 
patterns in the human brain. But the most important study is by far Parkinson et al. (2011). 
Parkinson and co-workers parsed the moral domain into three domains: harm, disgust, and 
dishonesty. Then they wrote moral dilemmas that were ambiguous, in the sense that a pilot 
sample of participants were not making consistent judgments about the envisaged action or 
omission. Participants had to rate the action/omission as either morally wrong or not-
wrong, i.e. in a binary way. This fMRI experiment revealed that the judgments “wrong” 
and “not wrong” did not correlate with any distinctive hemodynamic pattern, but that 
BOLD response was widely dissimilar for the three domains of morality. Harm violations 
were associated with regions that have to do with understanding and imaging actions, such 
as the L-DLPFC, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (henceforth DMPFC), the ACC, the p-
STS, and the IPL. Dishonest transgressions recruited areas that are associated with Theory 
of Mind, non-mental representations, and the ability to simultaneously hold online multiple 
perspectives, such as the bilateral DMPFC, the TPJ, the IPL, and the L-DLPFC. Disgusting 
moral transgressions recruited social-emotional areas such as the amygdalae, the DMPFC, 
the ACC, the right temporal pole, and the PCC. Yet there is a cluster of voxels in the 
DMPFC that is consistently activated in all moral judgments. This area is traditionally 
associated with self-referential processes and to thinking about others in ambiguous 
circumstances, so that the authors conjecture that this area is processing ambiguity in this 
specific case. This empirical result suggests that no brain regions network common to 
diverse moral judgments can be found, but it is far from being definitive. A more 
systematic investigation of this kind ought to be carried out using clustering algorithms for 
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fMRI, possibly in a hypothesis-independent way. I know that Joshua Greene’s lab is at the 
moment carrying out such an experiment, but the results are not out yet
102
.  
Sinnott-Armstrong’s philosophical arguments are persuasive but not definitive, and the 
experimental evidence is again deeply suggestive, but not conclusive. Premise 1 in Sinnott-
Armstrong’s argument for Disunity is mainly empirical. It will be extremely interesting to 
see what experimental moral psychology will tell us about this in the next years and 
whether this young science will survive its own results. If Sinnott-Armstrong’s Disunity of 
Morality Theory were supported by further evidence, experimental moral psychology 
should be deeply changed and carried out in a much more careful way, with more precise 
stimuli selection and attention at one specific domain at the time. There would be an 
experimental psychology of dishonesty, an experimental psychology of physical harm, and 
so on. Furthermore, from that moment on “morality” should be considered as a folk 
psychological term with no right of citizenship in empirical science. Arguably, the whole 
empirical investigation on morality would greatly change, but common beliefs about 
morality would not be altered, just as Einstein’s general relativity theory has not 
substantially changed the folk concepts of time and space. According to the Disunity of 
Morality Theory, empirical results coupled with philosophical argument could leave a dent 
on scientific methodology and importantly alter the way in which experimental moral 
psychology is conducted.  
Let us pass now to the other theory by Sinnott-Armstrong, the Master Argument about 
moral intuitions. 
According to the Master Argument, whose full text is below, studies of framing effects and 
other psychological phenomena give humans reasons not to believe their moral intuitions à 
la Haidt (all of them).  
In Sinnott-Armstrong’s view, inference is any reasoning process that starts from one or 
more beliefs and is supposed to provide a justification for another belief. Moreover, a 
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 This is the research project of PhD Candidate Alek Chakroff in Greene’s lab at Harvard, actually. 
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moral intuition can be really justified in two ways only: inferentially or non-inferentially. 
An intuition, which is a kind of belief, is justified inferentially if and only if it is justified 
because the believer can infer it from some other belief. A belief is justified non-
inferentially if and only if it is justified independently of whether the believer can infer it 
from any other belief. If a belief is justified inferentially, the beliefs that justify it must in 
turn be justified. Moral intuitions are interpreted by Sinnott-Armstrong in the usual 
Haidtian way. Haidt’s SIM must not be confused with Epistemological Moral Intuitionism 
(henceforth EMI), that is a position in moral epistemology. SIM is a completely descriptive 
theory, whereas EMI is a theory in moral epistemology which has to do with the 
justification of moral beliefs. According to EMI, some moral intuitions are justified non-
inferentially in the sense described above. There are several methods of non-inferential 
justification normative intuitionists put forward, among which reflection, reliability, and 
others, but I do not need to give much detail on this here: the fact that these strategies for 
justification are non-inferential is sufficient for Sinnott-Armstrong’s purposes. Of course, 
the eventual inexistence of non-inferential justification creates a regress, since if judgment 
A is inferentially justified by judgment B, then we need to understand how judgment B is 
in turn justified. If non-inferential justification does not exist, we have to appeal to 
judgment C in order to justify B, and so on ad infinitum. Hence, the inexistence of non-
inferential justification brings grist to the moral skeptic’s mill, since the moral skeptic in 
moral epistemology claims that no moral judgments are justified
103
. Sinnott-Armstrong is 
an outspoken Pyrrhonian moral skeptic (cf. Sinnott-Armstrong 2006) and so he would be 
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 The moral skeptic normally claims that no moral judgment is justified without qualifications that have to 
do with the contrast class that is taken into account in the justification process. However, the contrast class 
ought to be specified. For contrastivism, see Sinnott-Armstrong (2006, ch. 5). More specifically, a moral 
skeptic about extreme justification (i.e. justification out of the extreme contrast class) claims that no moral 
judgment is justified out the extreme contrast class that includes extreme views such as moral nihilism. In 
contrast, he claims that moral justification is possible out of a modest contrast class that includes 
commonsensical moral views only and excludes moral nihilism. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, no moral 
claim can be justified when confronting the moral nihilist without begging the question against him. The way 
in which, according to Sinnott-Armstrong, justification out of the modest contrast class is possible is 
essentially coherentist – cf. Sinnott-Armstrong (2006, ch. 10). However, in Sinnott-Armstrong’s view, we 
cannot justify the claim that the modest contrast class, as opposed to the extreme contrast class and other 
contrast classes, is the relevant one for moral justification. This meta-skepticism about the relevance of 
contrast classes leads Sinnott-Armstrong to claim that moral justification (without qualification) is 
impossible.  
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very happy to show that non-inferential justification is impossible and, hence, EMI false. 
In order to do so, he marshals empirical evidence. His argument comprises 12 points and 
works in this way: 
 
1) For any subject S, particular belief B, and class of beliefs C, if S is justified in believing 
that B is in C and is also justified in believing that a large percentage of beliefs in C are false, 
but S is not justified in believing that B falls into any class of beliefs C* of which a smaller 
percentage is false, then S is justified in believing that B has a large probability of being false. 
(2) Informed adults are justified in believing that their own moral intuitions are in the class of 
moral intuitions. 
(3) Informed adults are justified in believing that a large percentage of moral intuitions are 
false. (from studies of framing effects) 
(4) Therefore, if an informed adult is not justified in believing that a certain moral intuition 
falls into any class of beliefs of which a smaller percentage is false, then the adult is justified in 
believing that this particular moral intuition has a large probability of being false. (from 1–3) 
(5) A moral believer cannot be epistemically justified in holding a particular moral belief 
when that believer is justified in believing that the moral belief has a large probability of being 
false. (from the standard above) 
(6) Therefore, if an informed adult is not justified in believing that a certain moral intuition 
falls into any class of beliefs of which a smaller percentage is false, then the adult is not 
epistemically justified in holding that moral intuition. (from 4–5) 
(7) If someone is justified in believing that a belief falls into a class of beliefs of which a 
smaller percentage is false, then that person is able to infer that belief from the premise that it 
falls into such a class. (by definition of “able to infer”) 
(8) Therefore, an informed adult is not epistemically justified in holding a moral intuition 
unless that adult is able to infer that belief from some premises. (from 6–7) 
(9) If a believer is not epistemically justified in holding a belief unless the believer is able to 
infer it from some premises, then the believer is not justified non-inferentially in holding the 
belief. (by definition of “non-inferentially”) 
(10) Therefore, no informed adult is non-inferentially justified in holding any moral intuition. 
(from 8–9) 
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(11) Moral intuitionism claims that some informed adults are non-inferentially justified in 
holding some moral intuitions. (by definition) 
(12) Therefore, moral intuitionism is false. (from 10–11) (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008c, 99-100). 
 
The impossibility of non-inferential justification is derived from the fact that experimental 
psychology results show that most of humans’ moral intuitions are unreliable and hence 
unjustified. In presence of this widespread unreliability of moral intuitions, the only way in 
which a moral intuition A1 can be justified is by showing that, in A1’s case, the conditions 
that cause moral intuitions to be unreliable are not active. But this amounts to a potential 
inference from “A1 has been made under circumstances that do not compromise 
judgments’ credibility and hence falls into any class of judgments C* of which a small 
percentage is false”104 to “A1 is morally justified”. Hence, there is no other justification 
than inferential justification for these judgments, i.e. moral intuitions. As a consequence, 
EMI must be jettisoned. However, all this crucially relies on premise 3, which is empirical. 
Without premise 3 the argument cannot work. This is the point where experimental moral 
psychology comes in. Sinnott-Armstrong avails himself of the results by Kahneman, 
Tversky, and many others to show that in most cases humans are under one of these 
conditions when making moral judgments:  
(1) partiality, i.e. the moral judgment affects the self-interest of the judge;  
(2) moral disagreement;  
(3) strong emotional states that cloud judgmental capacity;  
(4) various kinds of cognitive illusions such as context illusions
105
, generalization 
heuristics
106
, and standard heuristics such as availability and representativeness;  
(5) causal influence by unreliable or disputable sources.  
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 Of course, this belief ought in turn to be inferentially justified, and this makes us enter the regress Sinnott-
Armstrong cherishes. 
105
 For instance, to borrow Sinnott-Armstrong’s example, being near a giant redwood makes a man appear 
small and being near a bonsai makes a man appear big. 
106
 Such as the one according to which ovals that are shaded on the top appear concave (as a cave) and ovals 
that are shaded at the bottom appear convex (as an egg). 
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If any of these conditions obtains when a moral judgment is made, then the judgment can 
be justified only if it is confirmed by showing that we have some reason to believe that, in 
this specific case, the judgment is not influenced by these conditions, i.e. the judgment can 
be justified only through inferential justification. Sinnott-Armstrong claims that these 
conditions obtain, together or in isolation, often enough to justify Premise 3 in the Master 
Argument. Yet this latter claim is highly contentious. What is the meaning of “large” in 
Premise 3? It is not at all clear whether enough beliefs in the class of moral intuitions are 
false to make Premise 3 true. This is an empirical claim and it is almost impossible to test. 
Sinnott-Armstrong correctly specifies that any exact cut-off would be arbitrary
107
. 
However, since the proposed boundary is very vague and numbers are not available (what 
is the cardinality of the set of all existing moral intuitions?), it seems that Sinnott-
Armstrong’s quest to justify Premise 3 faces deep problems. How can humans decide 
whether a belief such as “Framing effects are pervasive enough to justify a general claim 
of unreliability for moral intuitions in absence of inferential confirmation” is correct? I see 
no way to do so. Therefore, judgment on this belief ought to be suspended. This belief 
cannot thus play any role in any argument, including Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument, which 
falls in absence of its key Premise 3. 
Summing up, Sinnott-Armstrong does not put forth a neuromoral theory, since an 
improved knowledge of the machinery for moral judgments, in his opinion, allows us to 
understand that most of human moral intuitions are false. However, this does not amount to 
making better moral judgments, but it amounts to making less moral mistakes. This would 
be possible by suspending judgment on our unjustified moral intuitions. Since in Sinnott-
Armstrong’s view it is very rare for a moral intuition to be correct, we would avoid lots of 
mistakes by stopping believing in unwarranted moral intuitions. This could thus be seen as 
a neuro-normative theory that recommends, on the basis of experimental results, 
widespread epoché about moral intuitions. This theory does not face the meta-normativity 
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 “I do not need or want to commit myself to any exact cutoff, since precise numbers are unavailable for 
moral beliefs anyway.” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008c, 101) 
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problem, because it does not differentiate between good or bad moral judgments. Yet it 
assumes too much from the available empirical results and takes experiments to justify a 
general claim on moral intuitions that they are likely never to justify.  
Summing up the whole chapter, I hope to have persuaded the reader of the truth of the 
following two points: 
(1) There are many descriptive alternatives to Greene’s dual-process model and their 
explanatory plausibility is rather good, so that they compete on a par with Greene’s 
ideas; 
(2) There are many neuromoral theories and they regularly fall into the meta-
normativity problem. 
In the next chapter I examine Joshua Greene’s neuromoral theory, arguably the most 
sophisticated so far, and by far the most discussed. 
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Chapter 4: Greene’s neuromoral theory 
 
In what follows I will grant arguendo that Greene is correct from the descriptive point of 
view, even though this is up for grabs, as I have tried to show in Ch. 2. Simply put, 
Greene’s claim in normative ethics is the following: System2 ought to be favored relative 
to System1 in all cases of conflict between the two systems. Given the link Greene 
establishes between, on the one hand, the two systems and, on the other hand, two 
normative ethical theories (i.e. deontology and consequentialism), this means that 
consequentialism must be preferred to deontology in all cases of conflict. As he puts it: 
“[F]or me at least, understanding the source of my moral intuitions shifts the balance, in 
this case as well as in other cases, in a more Singerian, consequentialist direction” (Greene 
2008a, 76). The position can be framed as a neuromoral theory: if we learn more about the 
machinery for moral judgments, we can make better moral judgments because we 
understand that we ought not to follow deontological intuitions when taking controversial 
moral decisions
108
. Yet, many details of Greene’s normative theory need to be explained 
and arguments must be spelled out in a more careful way.  
The first use of Greene’s experimental results to argue for a normative claim in substantive 
ethics is by Singer (2005). Greene then built on Singer’s paper to deliver his famous essay 
(2008a). Arguably, some of the arguments in Singer (2005) and Greene (2008a) are 
unclear and unconvincing. A step forward in the debate was made with the publication of a 
paper by Selim Berker (2009). Berker is critical towards both Singer and Greene. Even 
though I do not endorse all of the criticisms by Berker, the paper clarifies some of the 
important issues. Greene (2010), which is a response to Berker (2009), provides a 
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 This kind of neuromoral theory is structurally similar to the one put forward by Gigerenzer, with the 
important difference that the German psychologist argues that we should be wary of maximizing 
consequentialism and not deontology. Greene argues that improved knowledge about the machinery for 
moral judgment shows that deontology is unreliable because System1 often reacts to irrelevant features of a 
situation. Gigerenzer argues that improved knowledge about the machinery for moral judgment shows that 
maximizing consequentialism is unreliable because maximization is problematic due to the reasons 
highlighted in § 3.4. 
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substantially refined version of Greene’s normative arguments. It also defends his 
experimental claims, but, as I have said, I will assume arguendo in this chapter that 
Greene’s descriptive model is correct. Hence, I will mostly focus in what follows on 
Greene’s response to Berker’s paper and to the forthcoming paper by Greene. As a result 
of Berker’s critique, Greene (2010) seems to have abandoned some of the arguments that 
could be attributed to him in his (2008a). In the first five sections (4.1. through 4.5.) I 
examine these arguments, namely the ‘emotion good, reason bad’ argument, and the 
Evolutionary Debunking Argument (henceforth EDA). In 4.4. I examine the Cultural 
Debunking Argument (henceforth CDA), which only Singer avails himself of. Then, in the 
central part of the chapter, from § 4.6. up to § 4.13., I concentrate on the AMIF, which is 
the main weapon Greene wields to fight his (and Singer’s) anti-deontological battle. In the 
last part of the chapter, from § 4.14. to the end, I deal with other issues concerning 
Greene’s neuromoral theory, such as his attack against the DDE and a possible ad 
hominem argument against the consequentialist theorist.  
Here is a little preview of the main forthcoming attractions. I will claim that the AMIF, as 
it stands, is problematic because Greene assumes that some factors of a given scenario are 
morally irrelevant, whereas it is not at all clear that they are. Following Hare (1981), I will 
try to show that to say “Factor F1 is morally relevant” is equivalent to endorsing some 
moral principle that involves F1, such as for instance “Actions that possess factor F1 must 
be judged more leniently / more harshly than actions that do not possess it, ceteris 
paribus.” Hence, the choice whether to consider a factor as morally relevant is as morally 
controversial as endorsing a moral principle. There are many moral principles in 
philosophy. Some are not problematic, for instance the following: “If you can achieve W 
by doing X or Y, and X involves inflicting physical harm to somebody, while Y involves 
no harm to anyone, then choose Y.” In contrast, some are problematic, for instance the 
DDE, the DDA, and so on. Some claims Greene makes about the moral relevance of 
factors seem to be as controversial as these latter principles. For example, the role of 
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distance in morality seems to be very problematic. Some other claims Greene makes about 
the factors that affect people’s moral intuitions are less controversial, as the ones about 
personal force. However, these claims are problematic in other ways, as I will point out 
below. Greene moves the trolley problem from principles to factors via empirical science, 
but in the end he gains little in doing so. Finally, Greene’s neuromoral theory also falls into 
the meta-normativity problem, just as the other neuromoral theories I have examined in 
Ch. 3. 
 
4.1. Singer and the ‘Emotion bad, reason good’ argument 
Singer has been a staunch opponent of moral intuitions à la Haidt for a long time. His view 
is that that “all the particular judgments we intuitively make are likely to derive from 
discarded religious systems, from warped views of sex and bodily functions, or from 
customs necessary for the survival of the group in social and economical circumstances 
that now lie in the distant past” (Singer 1974, 516). Singer claims that Greene’s results, 
together with Haidt’s, show that moral intuitions cannot be taken seriously and must be 
substituted by rational moral theorizing. The main principle of rational morality is the 
equal consideration of the interests of all sentient beings (cf. Singer 1981, 102-103). 
Rational morality tells us to carry out the action that maximizes the expected furthering of 
those interests. Singer thinks that the experimental results buttress his claim against moral 
intuitions because they show that moral intuitions rely on emotions and are amenable to an 
explanation that does not require those intuitions to be true. In particular, it is possible to 
see Haidtian moral intuitions as adaptations that increased the inclusive fitness of ancestral 
hominid groups in the EEA, an environment that for sure “now lies in the distant past.” For 
instance, humans’ moral intuitions about consensual incest have increased the inclusive 
fitness of human groups in the EEA by preventing the birth of offspring with genetic 
diseases. There seem to be at least two arguments in Singer (2005). The former is the one 
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that Berker (2009, 316) dubs as the “emotions bad, reason good argument.” The argument 
runs like this: 
Premise 1: Deontological intuitions are driven by emotions, whereas consequentialist 
intuitions involve abstract reasoning. 
Premise 2: Moral intuitions that are driven by emotions do not have any genuine normative 
force. 
Conclusion: Therefore, deontological intuitions, unlike consequentialist intuitions, do not 
have any genuine normative force. 
This argument reflects the general rationalist stance that Singer takes towards moral 
philosophy and this is confirmed by the frequent reference to Kohlberg’s theory of moral 
development in Singer (1981). Instead of starting from moral intuitions and using some 
form of RE to find a balanced set of CMJs, moral principles, and eventually background 
theories about human beings and society, we should, in Singer’s opinion, follow a different 
path: “It seems preferable to proceed as Sidgwick did: search for undeniable fundamental 
axioms; build up a moral theory from them” (Singer 1974, 517) and again separate “those 
moral judgments that we owe to our evolutionary and cultural history, from those that have 
a rational base” (Singer 2005, 351). However, the “emotions are bad” argument begs the 
question against the proponent of the view that emotions help making better moral 
judgments
109
. For instance, Nussbaum (2001) holds such views. Singer provides no 
argument against the position of Nussbaum (and others). He seems to take for granted that 
rational information processing is better than emotional information processing at making 
“good” moral judgments or, equivalently, at tracking moral facts or the moral truth. But 
reasoning, as a decision making procedure, does not necessarily lead to “more desirable” 
or “more correct” decisions than following emotions. An argument is needed to establish 
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 I am referring to the idea that ‘emotions are good’, in the sense that emotions can be reliable guides to the 
moral good and help us to make good moral judgments. Apart from Nussbaum (2001), a similar stance is 
taken by Damasio (1994). This position ought not to be confused with sentimentalism, which I take to be a 
meta-ethical view. Namely, sentimentalism is the meta-ethical theory according to which moral judgments 
express (or are constituted by) emotions.  
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this. Perhaps reasoning brings about “better” decisions than following emotions under 
certain circumstances and “worse” decisions than following emotions under other 
circumstances. A philosophical theory about what counts as “better” in this context, plus 
empirical science, might tell us whether this is the case. A philosophical theory of this sort 
is necessary here because of the meta-normativity problem. It is not clear what is the 
normative standard according to which some decisions are “good” and some others are 
“bad.” I mention this just to set it aside. Be as it may, emotions and non-maximizing 
cognitive processes are often multi-faceted, complex, and subtle, so that it is not obvious 
that they are bad guides for moral decision making. So emotions could in principle lead to 
“good” decisions, at least sometimes. This cannot be excluded a priori.  
Secondly, Singer tries to use the ‘emotion bad, reason good’ argument to show that RE is a 
bad way of doing ethics. According to Singer, RE tries to systematize emotionally driven 
moral intuitions. However, this refers to Haidtian moral intuitions. The moral intuitions 
that enter RE are not intuitions of this kind, as I have explained in Ch. 1. Especially in 
WRE, where an equilibrium between CMJs about cases, general moral principles, and 
background theories about human beings and social institutions is sought, the moral 
judgments that enter the equilibrium process are both filtered, as they must be passed by 
impartial and competent judges that know very well about the case (cf. Rawls 1951), and 
revisable, since they can be modified at the margins when they do not fit with entrenched 
moral principles and background theories.  
So the ‘emotion bad, reason good’ argument does not seem to work for CMJs.  
Singer and Greene could argue that no matter how much filtering and balancing one does, 
the result of RE will be bad if one starts with “bad” moral intuitions. In relation to this, one 
can notice that the various forms of RE (and especially WRE) take all possible cautions to 
avoid “bad” moral intuitions. Furthermore, RE and WRE do not start with moral intuitions 
about cases only, but with moral principles, and in the case of WRE, with background 
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theories too. Singer
110
 could further claim that the idea of starting with emotion-driven 
intuitions – even in the presence of filtering techniques – is in principle wrong, i.e. that the 
idea itself of RE is misconceived. However, Singer lacks a credible epistemology 
concerning his rational consequentialist intuitions. It is not clear how such can be 
distinguished from other general moral principles. I examine Singer’s view about these 
consequentialist moral intuitions more in detail below, while speaking of the EDA. 
A second objection Singer and Greene could raise, even if to my knowledge they do not 
actually do so, is that CMJs are idealizations, i.e. they are cognitive acts that people never 
(or very rarely) actually carry out in real life because the conditions for a belief to qualify 
as a CMJ are too strict. Rawls and followers, such as Norman Daniels (1979, 1980a, 
1980b), might be seen as disconnected from experimental moral psychology because they 
have ideas concerning the formation of moral judgments that do not match with 
experimental results. An experimental philosopher would say that they have never left the 
armchair and ignored what came out of the lab. Yet, in order to condemn the upholders of 
RE and WRE in this way, experimental moral psychologists ought to reach some 
overlapping consensus about the workings of the machinery for moral judgments and 
persuasively show that CMJs are psychologically very rare. In other words, experiments 
should show that people are very seldom in the mental states described by Rawls (1951), 
because, contrary to Rawls’s desiderata, actual moral judges often lack information, are 
biased, and so on. In this case we would have empirical evidence that just a few CMJs are 
passed in the actual world, so that it would be very difficult to locate some CMJs when the 
theorist starts the RE and looks for some moral judgments to feed into it as raw material. 
Yet we face here the same problem I highlighted while discussing Sinnott-Armstrong’s 
Master Argument in § 3.6. When are CMJs experimentally rare enough to justify the claim 
that they do not actually exist, i.e. are idealizations? It seems hard to deal with this problem 
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 It is not clear whether Greene follows Singer on this, as in the last pages of (forthcoming) he advocates a 
form of “double-wide reflective equilibrium” that takes into account moral intuitions about cases, moral 
principles, background theories, and empirical facts about moral psychology. 
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of threshold arbitrariness. This problem aside, results in experimental moral psychology do 
not at the moment support the ‘idealization hypothesis’. Empirical science has not reached 
that level of detail, and by far. So this remains a potential objection, which will have to 
wait for further progress in experimental moral psychology. 
Greene would not necessarily share the ‘emotions bad, reason good’ argument, as he draws 
a distinction (see § 2.1. above) between alarm-like emotions and currency-like emotions. 
As I have written above, it is not clear whether this distinction has empirical backing and 
in general the role of emotion in Greene’s model is not completely clear. Furthermore, 
Greene does not claim that following deontology is always wrong, but that it is wrong in 
cases of conflict with consequentialism and more in general about unfamiliar cases. Even 
though Greene is generally wary of emotional influence, this argument is more properly 
Singer’s (2005) than Greene’s.  
 
4.2. The Evolutionary Debunking Argument: clarifying remarks 
A second argument Singer uses, together with Greene (2008a), is the EDA. An EDA, 
according to Kahane (2011), has the following structure: 
Causal premise: We believe that the evaluative proposition P1 is true because we have an 
intuition that P1, and there is an evolutionary explanation of our intuition that P1;  
Epistemic premise: Biological evolution is not a truth-tracking process with respect to 
evaluative truth. 
Conclusion: Therefore, we should not believe that P1.  
Singer limits the scope of the argument to deontological intuitions.  
In this section I will make some remarks that aim at making the discussion clearer. These 
considerations are not objections to the EDA or to Singer’s view. I will expound my 
argument against Singer’s use of the EDA in the following section. To repeat, the EDA is 
the second argument that Singer and Greene use to attack deontology. I have already 
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examined the ‘emotions bad, reason good’ argument. I will examine the AMIF in the 
sections below.  
First, many judgments in normative ethics, such as “it is morally wrong to kill an adult 
member of your in-group that has not tried to assault you,” are amenable to an evolutionary 
explanation. Given that humans are hyper-social animals and that human groups competed 
for resources in the EEA, evaluative judgments that decrease intra-group violence and free-
riding are likely to increase group fitness in inter-group competition
111
. These judgments 
can be explained via biological evolution. Other moral judgments require cultural 
mechanisms to be explained. For instance, ”It is morally mandatory to help the disabled 
70-year old woman to survive while the tribe is migrating to the south” cannot be 
explained through biological evolution only. As the elderly woman consumes resources, 
produces none, and cannot reproduce, the tribe is very likely to be better off without her, 
except under specific circumstances (e.g. the woman has some kind of technical expertise 
that she could transmit to other members of the group; the woman is endowed with some 
social role that makes her survival important for group cohesion and functioning, and so 
on). So it makes little sense, in the logic of biological evolution, to help the both sterile and 
weak – they just consume precious resources that could be spent in a more efficient way. 
But, importantly, this judgment can be explained through cultural mechanisms. For 
instance, one can imagine that, in a human group in the EEA, most members would be kin. 
Hence, human traits such as linguistic accent or ways of clothing would become proxies 
for kinship. The use of these proxies to distinguish kin from non-kin would lead to the 
formation of norms that promote helpful behavior toward those that exhibit the proxy trait, 
The above judgment concerning the elderly woman could be one of such judgments. I 
argue that the Axiom of Benevolence, deemed by Singer (2005) and by de Lazari-Radek 
and Singer (2012) an a priori truth, is likely to have evolved in this way, starting from 
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solidarity norms that are a cultural extension of helping behavior toward kin, but more 
about this can be found below.  
Secondly, causal explanations are not justifications. As Tersman (2008) pointed out, 
explaining why subject S1 holds the belief that P2 is true is different from explaining why 
it is true that P2. In some contexts, knowing how a belief was formed tells us little about 
whether the belief is epistemically justified or whether it is true. German chemist F. August 
Kekulé conjectured the structural formula of benzene starting from a day-dream in which a 
snake bit its tail, but the unreliability of the belief formation process does not indict the 
belief itself. The reverie was the cause of the belief, but it does not justify the belief, nor 
does it show that the belief is unwarranted. In this specific case, the justification depends 
on the epistemic standards of the empirical science known as chemistry and these 
standards are independent of how the belief was caused. If the belief about the structure of 
benzene helps explain experiments and data points that concern benzene, then this belief 
will enjoy an increasing degree of epistemic justification inside the empirical science it 
belongs to. Even though explanation and justification are normally uncoupled, there are 
some causal explanations that make justification of some beliefs unlikely. In contrast with 
empirical beliefs
112
, evaluative beliefs can be justified in many different ways: there are 
coherentist justification methods, that start from evaluative principles and evaluative 
intuitions already present in a social group (for instance, RE and WRE), then various forms 
of evaluative intuitionism of which EMI is the moral variant, various forms of moral 
naturalism that link evaluative justification to a set of natural facts, Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong’s (2006, Ch. 5) contrastivism, contractarian views such as Scanlon’s (1998), 
and many others. So different theories of justification of evaluative beliefs exist, but I 
mention this just to put it aside. Be as it may, many (but not all) positions in the 
epistemology of evaluative judgments assume that, in order for moral judgments to be 
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 I do not need now to enter the details concerning which beliefs are amenable to a debunking explanation 
and which are not. It is sufficient to note that evaluative beliefs seem to be beliefs that may fall prey to 
EDAs. 
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justified, there must be a tracking relationship between evaluative judgments and their 
factual grounds
113
. These grounds are constituted by alleged moral, aesthetic, political, 
economic, (add your evaluative domain of choice here) facts
114
. If it can be shown that 
evaluative belief P2 is caused by some causal process that is incompatible with the 
perception of such facts, then the evaluative claim seems to be debunked. Judgments that 
do not track the corresponding evaluative facts can be labeled as ‘off-track’ and they 
instantiate a ‘tracking failure’ (Lillehammer 2010, 365). The existence of evaluative facts 
is of course controversial. However, I will assume here that the concept of tracking, that 
requires the concept of evaluative facts, is important for the justification of evaluative 
judgments, among which moral judgments. If lack of tracking shows that justification is 
impossible, then some explanations of evaluative judgments, such as those that refer to 
biological evolution, can be seen as debunking.  
Nozick (1981, 346 ff.) interestingly tries to show that such explanations, which he calls 
‘invisible hand explanations’115, are not debunking. In order to do that, he uses two 
arguments.  
The former is an analogy with mathematics
116
. Nozick correctly points out that humans 
know nothing certain about mathematical facts – there is no agreement whatsoever on what 
they are, exactly as there is no agreement on the existence and eventual properties of 
evaluative facts. However, this does not lead us to reject mathematical statements. Hence, 
                                                 
113
 “It is widely, if not universally, accepted that tracking failure would impugn the epistemic credentials of 
our ethical beliefs” (Lillehammer 2010, 365) 
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 The notion of ‘evaluative fact’ is complex. I do not want to explore it in depth here. I assume that there are 
evaluative judgments, such as political judgments (e.g. ‘It is politically useful to do X’), economic judgments 
(e.g. ‘It is economically wise to do X’), aesthetic judgments (e.g. ‘It is beautiful to paint in such and such a 
way’), moral judgments (e.g. ‘It is morally praiseworthy to give all of one’s money to the poor’), and so on. 
Evaluative facts are the alleged facts that make these judgments true or false under a cognitivist and realist 
interpretation of these judgments. I do not include social, cultural, or evolutionary facts under the label of 
‘evaluative facts’.  
115
 An invisible hand explanation shows “how some overall pattern, which one would have thought had to be 
produced by a successful attempt to realize the pattern, instead was produced and maintained by a process 
that in no way had the overall pattern ‘in mind’.” (Nozick 1974, 18) 
116
 Albeit in a different way, this analogy is also suggested by de Lazari-Radek and Singer (2012). These 
authors think that both the capacity of identifying moral truths and the capacity of elaborating abstract 
mathematical theorems are not evolutionarily useful, but have evolved as a by-product of human reasoning 
capacity, that, contrary to the aforementioned capacities, could increase the inclusive fitness of the ancestors 
of man in the EEA and hence be selected for. 
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doubts about the corresponding facts are not sufficient to debunk the justification of some 
beliefs. If the analogy between mathematical judgments and evaluative judgments holds, 
then, in Nozick’s opinion, doubts about evaluative facts are not enough to debunk the 
justification of evaluative beliefs.  
To this argument I reply that there is a significant disanalogy between mathematical beliefs 
and evaluative beliefs. As Kitcher (2005) and Joyce (2006, 184) correctly note, there is a 
fundamental distinction between arithmetic and evaluative domain. Arithmetic capacity 
increased inclusive fitness in the EEA because the beliefs it produced tracked some 
empirical truths, such as “there are three gazelles, two on the left among the bushes and 
one on the right under the shadow of the big tree.” Arithmetic capacity seems to be an 
evolved ability that tracks empirical truths. Its being caused by biological evolution does 
not exclude tracking. In a similar way, the evolved abilities of H sapiens specimens to 
perceive and handle mid-sized objects were fitness-enhancing, have evolved because they 
were tracking some empirical truths, and their being caused by evolution does not exclude 
their ability to track relevant facts. In contrast, evaluative judgments increased inclusive 
fitness because they were believed to be true, but their actual truth was not required to 
make them fitness-enhancing. Thus, evolutionary explanations of empirical judgments 
include their truth, whereas evolutionary explanations of evaluative judgments do not 
include their truth. Hence, evolutionary explanations of the former judgments are not 
debunking, whereas evolutionary explanations of the latter could (at least) be.  
According to the latter argument by Nozick, evaluative judgments have been enriched, 
along human evolution, with new cognitive abilities such as language, writing, and 
increasingly abstract thinking. Hominids have become rational. Hence, even assuming 
arguendo that moral judgments were not tracking moral facts in the EEA, it is well possible 
that they are tracking moral facts now, thanks to the added abilities. Even if primitive 
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forms of morality, such as kin altruism
117
 and reciprocity
118
, might have evolved simply 
due to the positive effects on fitness of the behaviors they favor, succeeding forms of 
morality might have acquired a link to human reasoning that would transform them into 
something substantially different from what morality used to be in hominid groups
119
. 
These new forms of morality could track moral facts even though the preceding forms of 
morality were not.  
I am skeptical about Nozick’s argument. If there is an ‘invisible hand explanation’ for a 
given evaluation, it would be a miracle for the evaluation to track an evaluative fact
120
, 
since the evaluation is causally driven by factors that have nothing to do with such facts. If 
evaluative judgments were tracking selective pressures in the EEA and not alleged 
evaluative facts, it is not clear how the appearance of higher capacities would necessarily 
modify this causal link and transform off-track evaluative intuitions into on-track 
evaluative intuitions. We need empirical data to understand what the import of these new 
abilities (i.e. rational abilities) on tracking is. Besides, these data will not be easy to gather, 
since these abilities have appeared in a distant past.  
Concluding, I think that the proponent of the EDA is correct in asserting that some kind of 
explanations, such as invisible hand explanations, are a problem for the justification of 
evaluative claims. As this kind of explanation makes the tracking of the relevant facts 
rather implausible, and it is commonly assumed that tracking is a necessary condition for 
justification, evaluative judgments that are amenable to explanations of this sort seem to be 
difficult to justify. EDAs do not prove that evaluative facts do not exist, yet evolutionary 
explanations make their existence quite unlikely. In my opinion, since they are not required 
for explanations, these alleged facts would quickly fall prey to the celebrated blade of friar 
William of Ockham. It is not clear why there should be evaluative facts if evaluations can 
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 For this form of altruism, see Dawkins (2006/1976, 94) 
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 For this form of altruism, see Trivers (1971). 
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 This argument could be useful to defend the position of Singer, that I attack below in § 4.3. However, to 
my knowledge Singer does not use this argument.  
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 For a similar view, cf. Street (2006). 
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be explained by processes that have nothing to do with evaluative facts. The amount of 
offspring that survive until reproductive age in a given hominid group could be one of such 
processes. Hence, an argument that starts with evolutionary causality and ends with anti-
realism about evaluative facts, such as the one crafted by Street (2006), is at least plausible.  
 
4.3. The Evolutionary Debunking Argument: the case against Singer  
Singer aims at concluding that:  
(1) a general EDA along the lines of Street (2006) and Joyce (2006) does not hold,  
(2) it is possible to target the EDA against deontological moral judgments.  
On the contrary, I see no ways to use the argument in a limited way. As Levy (2007), 
Tersman (2008), Kahane (2011) and others have already pointed out, the consequentialist 
tenets cherished by Singer and Greene seem to be as amenable to an EDA as deontological 
tenets. I also think that consequentialists could have a lot to lose from EDAs.  
Two parts of a typical consequentialist theory can be attacked.  
First and foremost, consequentialism requires an account of well-being in order to decide 
which consequences are good and which are bad. Utilitarian variants of consequentialism 
require this account even more than non-utilitarian forms of consequentialism because it 
seems to be very complicated to make sense of utility in absence of elucidations on well-
being. Claims about well-being, such as “It is good to avoid pain” or “It is good not to get 
sick”, are evaluative claims121. However, they are easily explained through biological 
evolution. Organisms that do not believe that pain ought to be avoided make fewer efforts 
to avoid it than organisms that believe that pain ought to be avoided. Hence, organisms of 
the former kind usually compromise their physical integrity and die early
122
. Organisms 
that are diseased face lower chances of reproduction, decreased coping with environmental 
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 Of course, not all organisms avoid pain because they believe that pain ought to be avoided. Indeed, most 
metazoans do not reach any plausible threshold for belief attribution. Most metazoans, such as for example a 
specimen of Drosophila melanogaster, avoid pain because of blind neural mechanisms. Nonetheless, 
avoiding pain still produces positive effects for inclusive reproductive fitness. 
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challenges, and increased probability to die. There is no need of specific prudential facts in 
order to explain these claims. Empirical facts are sufficient to provide an explanation. So, 
if one admits that an EDA undermines justification for other kinds of evaluative claims, it 
is difficult to say why it should not work for these evaluative judgments about well-being. 
In other words, if the EDA works in general, then it debunks claims about well-being too. 
In order to reply to this objection, de Lazari-Radek and Singer (2012, 28) write that “we 
will limit ourselves to pointing out that if no theory of well-being or intrinsic value were 
immune to a debunking explanation, this would show only that no theory could be 
preferred over others on the ground that it alone cannot be debunked. It could not show 
that no theory of well-being is true.” In other words, what de Lazari-Radek and Singer are 
claiming is that, even if an EDA against judgments about well-being works, it does not 
show that they are false, but simply that they cannot be put into a ranking order relative to 
their resistance to EDAs, as all of them have been debunked. This is true, but it is not 
sufficient for the consequentialist theorist. If a successful EDA for well-being judgments 
were available, these judgments ought to be suspended and declared neither true nor false. 
Pyrrhonian skepticism about well-being would ensue and no forms of consequentialism 
(let alone utilitarianism) would work. If the justification of a claim is debunked, then we 
have no reason for believing that it is true and no reason for believing that it is false. In this 
situation we ought to suspend judgment. And no version of consequentialism can work if 
claims about well-being are under epoché.  
Secondly, also consequentialist “ethical axioms” (Singer 2005, 351) or Sidgwickian moral 
intuitions
123
, that count as the fundamental tenets of consequentialism, are potentially 
vulnerable to EDAs. A group of people that endorse “It is ceteris paribus morally better to 
save more human lives from death than less” will be advantaged relative to a group that 
does not partake this principle, since the latter group will incur in avoidable losses of 
human lives that could have been prevented and that imperil the standing of the group in its 
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competition with other human groups for the access to resources. Hence, if the EDA works 
in general, then it works for (at least some) rational moral axioms too
124
.  
Singer’s response to this criticism (de Lazari-Radek and Singer 2012) hinges on the Axiom 
of Benevolence. In agreement with Singer, I think that the endorsement of this principle is 
widespread in many cultures and the principle is often taken to be a fundamental moral 
claim. But contrary to Singer, I think there is a more plausible explanation for this than the 
one he provides. De Lazari-Radek and Singer (2012) argue that an EDA for the Axiom of 
Benevolence is not available. They namely think that this axiom is a rational, a priori truth. 
It is true that believing in the Axiom of Benevolence does not seem to increase the 
inclusive fitness of the individual believer. Even accepting some form of group selection, 
evolutionary pressures seem to recommend nastiness toward the out-groups and non-
human animals. This point gives credibility to Singer’s idea that no EDA for the Axiom of 
Benevolence is possible. However, in order to resist this idea, it could be argued, following 
Kahane (2011, 119), that universal altruism is a reasoned extension of altruism towards kin 
and in-group, that an EDA is available for the latter form of altruism, and that, as a 
consequence, the EDA also strikes the universal form that has come out of the limited 
form. In other words, there are forms of altruism that were favored, under certain 
conditions, by biological evolution in the EEA, for instance altruism towards kin and 
reciprocal cooperation
125
. However, broader forms of altruism are created by 
generalization of these primitive and more limited forms through the use of human rational 
faculty. Hence, these more ancient forms are essential for the more general ones to 
develop. But, as Kahane points out, there is an EDA against those primeval forms. Since 
these are the necessary bases of the more modern forms, their debunking also leads to loss 
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of justification for the newest ones. I add that a notable Christian principle, i.e. the idea that 
all human beings count as brothers and sisters, embodies pretty well from the cultural point 
of view the extension of kin altruism into the idea of universal benevolence
126
. Hence, 
there is cultural evidence of the extension of altruistic behavior Kahane’s argument hinges 
on. 
Singer replies to Kahane’s challenge by claiming that we believe in the Axiom of 
Benevolence because it stems a priori from human beings’ rational capacity and the 
human capacity of finding such an a priori moral truth is a by-product of a more general 
human rational capacity. So Singer does not connect the Axiom of Benevolence and the 
impartial, universal altruism it implies to preceding forms of altruism. This fits well with 
his overall rejection of Haidtian moral intuitions. Hence, the Axiom of Benevolence is 
uncoupled, in Singer’s view, from forms of altruism that humans share with primates and 
that are amenable to eventual EDA. According to Singer, it derives from the structure of 
rational justification itself: “the element of disinterestedness inherent in the idea of 
justifying one's conduct to society as a whole, and extending this into the principle that to 
be ethical, a decision must give equal weight to the interests of all affected by it” (Singer 
1981, 100).  
Of course, there are moral systems that do not necessarily include this Axiom. There were 
cultures, such as the ones embodied by the Nazi party in the 1930s and early 1940s
127
 and 
by Stalinist communism, that considered a moral duty, and sometimes a burdensome moral 
duty, to kill the members of other human groups, such as Jews, Gypsies, communists, 
homosexuals, class enemies, deviationists, and so on. There were cultures in which slavery 
was ordinary and expending the lives of slaves for fun was no problem at all
128
. A 
memorable article by Bennett (1974) describes the sense of guilt that Huckleberry Finn, the 
well-known fictional character by American writer Mark Twain, experiences when he frees 
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an African American slave from his owner. Huck thinks he has wronged the owner and 
feels very badly about his act.  
Singer is well aware of this. He thinks that the Axiom of Benevolence, in his opinion 
embodied by well-known principles in important ethical traditions such as Christianity, 
Confucianism, Hinduism, and Buddhism (de Lazari-Radek and Singer 2012, 26), is the 
necessary and a priori end of a process of moral progress whose steps are dictated by 
historic contingencies, but whose direction is fixed as long as human rational capacity is 
not fundamentally altered. As long as human beings have the brains they now have, Singer 
thinks, there will be a slow moral progress that will ultimately lead to the equal 
consideration of the interests of all sentient beings. Admittedly, the possibilities of 
falsifying such a hypothesis are tiny. What kind of empirical evidence can be marshaled to 
disconfirm it? At the same time, Singer provides little positive data to buttress this 
hypothesis.  
I provide here an alternative and more plausible explanation of the belief in the Axiom of 
Benevolence and the belief that it is a fundamental ethical tenet. It can be hypothesized that 
this “axiom” has appeared due to contingent cultural causes, and not because it tracks or 
represents some rational and a priori moral fact. So I provide here a cultural explanation 
for the Axiom of Benevolence. The need for a morality that facilitated the cooperation of 
unrelated individuals in urban societies in which trading and market relationships were 
increasingly common and the boundaries between in-group and out-group were becoming 
more and more blurry could provide a reasonable account of the appearance of the Axiom 
of Benevolence, assuming arguendo that it actually enjoys a high degree of cross-cultural 
consensus
129
. If this is a reasonable explanation, as I think it is, the Axiom of Benevolence 
could have appeared to enhance human cooperation in urban societies. Similarly, 
preceding systems of norms, such as the very widespread norms against physical harm, 
were already bringing about the same effect in small-scale, hunter-gatherer society. Hence, 
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the Axiom would roughly play the same function as those earlier norms. The Axiom would 
result from a slow expansion in the number of those that were entitled for moral protection 
and status. Reciprocal altruism got extended into harm norms valid for the in-group. More 
inclusive norms came in as society became more complex, anonymous, market-based, and 
large. This is of course just a hypothesis, but it has the advantage of parsimony relative to 
Singer’s, which invokes rational moral facts130. If this hypothesis is correct, it is possible to 
run Kahane’s argument: if universal benevolence is a cultural extension of norms that have 
originated from limited altruism and reciprocity, and the EDA hits moral beliefs linked 
both to reciprocity and to limited altruism, then universal benevolence may be in trouble. It 
must be underscored that the EDA cannot show that the Axiom is false. It can show that it 
is unjustified, which is different. In other words, if the EDA can indirectly reach humans’ 
belief in the Axiom of Benevolence, what we ought to do it is to put it under epoché. The 
Axiom might still be true, but we have no reasons to think so. It is sometimes the case that 
we hold true beliefs even though we have followed an unreliable and wrong method to 
acquire them. For example, I can learn at 8 pm that it is 8 pm from a non-working clock 
that just happens to be displaying 8 pm. So I do not claim that, if Singer does not succeed 
in shielding the Axiom from an EDA, then the Axiom is false. Pyrrhonian skepticism about 
the Axiom of Benevolence would follow. 
Besides, even assuming arguendo that this Axiom is immune, the utilitarian theorist would 
still have big problems to defend her standard claims if EDAs were valid, since EDAs 
undermine other important tenets of this normative ethical theory and, especially, accounts 
of well-being. For example, it undermines the claim that it is better to save more human 
lives rather than fewer. 
What precedes concerned the EDA as presented by Singer. I have shown that if the EDA 
works, it can potentially cut down all normative ethical theories and to lead to moral anti-
realism (as argued by Joyce 2006 and Street 2006). Singer wants to use the EDA in a 
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targeted way, but it is not clear how he can stop the argument from affecting the moral 
principles he holds dear and sees as fundamental. If the EDA works (and I do not take a 
stance on this), then it hits both globalist and very general moral intuitions, such as the 
ones of the act utilitarian, and local moral intuitions about cases that are important for 
deontological theorizing. 
 
4.4. The Cultural Debunking Argument 
Before passing to Greene’s recent positions, I would like to consider another kind of 
debunking strategy that Singer employs, the CDA. I claim that CDAs are different from 
EDAs and that they are worse. The CDA runs like this:  
Causal premise: We believe that the evaluative proposition P1 is true because we have an 
intuition that P1, and there is a cultural explanation
131
 of our intuition that P1;  
Epistemic premise: Cultural history is not a truth-tracking process with respect to 
evaluative truth. 
Conclusion: Therefore, we should not believe that P1.  
To my knowledge, Singer does not spell out the argument in an explicit way in any of his 
texts. So this is my rendition of the argument. If it is difficult to assess the soundness and 
scope of the EDA, the CDA raises fewer problems, as it is a weak claim. Singer seems to 
consider this argument as valid. His quote above about “warped views on sex and bodily 
functions” seems to point in this direction. The epistemic premise of this argument seems 
to be highly questionable. In opposition to biological evolution, that has in principle 
nothing to do with moral facts or how humans ought to live, cultural history could track the 
moral truth. If Singer himself is right about his rationalism and his idea of moral progress, 
cultural history looks like a process of slow but constant nearing to the moral ideal 
embodied by the Axiom of Benevolence. Furthermore, there are many normative ethical 
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systems that tried to spot the moral truth. Hence, either there is a good argument leading us 
to believe that they all fail, or a prima facie claim that cultural history cannot track moral 
facts is unwarranted. Perhaps some cultural traditions have got it right and have grasped 
some moral facts – it might be Tibetan Mahayana Buddhism, or Mormonism, or act 
Utilitarianism, or you name it. If a given moral claim is explained by a certain cultural 
tradition, it might be the case that the tradition is right and has pin-pointed a moral truth, 
since (at least some) cultures make conscious efforts to locate moral truths. Of course it 
may also be the case that a certain cultural tradition has failed to track moral facts even 
though its members think that they have grasped them and see themselves as holding the 
moral truth. But this need not concern us here: the point is whether a cultural tradition can 
grasp the moral truth, not under which conditions it actually does so. I am not interested 
here in discriminating between successful and unsuccessful moral cultures. I am trying to 
understand whether cultural explanations are debunking. It seems that, irrespective of 
whether such cultural beliefs (that were created by some human group in some contingent 
historical circumstances) successfully track the moral truth or not, a reference to the efforts 
of cultures to form moral beliefs in an explanation of a moral claim does not undermine the 
justification of such claim. There will be some cultural processes that grasp some kind of 
evaluative truth and preserve it through time, and some other cultural processes that do not 
do so.  
We can apply here the point by Fine (2006) and Levy (2006b) about Haidt I mentioned in 
§ 3.1. It may be the case that an individual, I1, learns an evaluative belief from someone 
else, I2. Suppose that I2 has in turn acquired the evaluative belief in a non-cultural way 
that guarantees tracking relative to the relevant evaluative facts, e.g. personal experience or 
reasoning or you name it. In this case, the facts play no role in the explanation as to why I1 
holds that belief. However, the evaluative belief might still be true and justified because of 
I2’s acquisition. It is likely that I1 cannot justify her belief, but this does not rule out the 
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hypothesis that the evaluative belief is true and justified. This is another reason to maintain 
that cultural learning does not exclude truth tracking relative to alleged evaluative facts
132
.  
Another difference between biological and cultural mechanisms is that biological evolution 
makes no reference to moral facts, whereas cultural traditions in moral thinking do, at least 
sometimes. I see no reason why cultures should fail to track moral facts, assuming 
arguendo that these exist. Hence, EDAs might work (again, I am not taking a stance on 
this), but CDAs lead nowhere. In my opinion, a cultural explanation is simply irrelevant 
for the eventual truth of a given moral belief. If “It is morally forbidden to eat lobster” is 
explained by a reference to Hebraism, then this does not show that this moral belief is 
right, as much as it does not show that this belief is wrong. So I argue that the whole idea 
of CDAs is misconceived. Therefore, Singer has a weapon less to strike the deontologist.  
On the same topic, it could be argued that Singer’s position on the CDA is self-defeating. 
Tersman (2008, 402) correctly notices that the Axiom of Benevolence Singer cherishes so 
much might be explained by reference to a cultural tradition. A part of the axiom states that 
“The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may 
say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other.” Tersman pointedly remarks that 
“replace «Universe» with «God» and you get a doctrine that will impress many a 
Christian.” Sidgwick’s views are easily explained by England's Christian heritage. If the 
Axiom of Benevolence exists outside Christianity, this explanation is insufficient, but in 
the specific case of Sidgwick this explanation might be correct. Only historians of 
philosophy could tell us. Therefore, if CDAs are actually debunking, the Axiom of 
Benevolence (at least insofar as Sidgwick’s version is concerned) is doomed. Singer wants 
to use CDAs to attack the deontologist and get rid of traditional views in ethics. However, 
the argument cuts both ways, since it explains the bases of Singer’s moral system away. 
So, even assuming arguendo that Singer’s CDA works, it works too much for Singer’s 
purposes.  
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4.5. Greene on the Evolutionary Debunking Argument 
Greene (2008a) does not use the CDA
133
 and, as far as the EDA is concerned, he runs on 
roughly the same lines. Nonetheless, Greene provides two arguments that make his 
position slightly different from Singer’s. I will now discuss these arguments. 
The former argument (2010, 19) distinguishes philosophical intuitions, that he describes as 
“natural, untutored judgments,” and psychological intuitions, whose driving mechanisms 
are not accessible to consciousness and that depend on System1. Of course, Greene claims 
that deontological intuitions such as the one against consensual incest are psychological 
and that consequentialist intuitions such as the Axiom of Benevolence are philosophical 
only.  
In the latter argument, Greene (forthcoming, § VI) says that consequentialist intuitions are 
‘philosophical’ (in Sidgwickian terms134) and not ‘perceptual’ or ‘dogmatic’, i.e. they are 
very general. They are not linked to particular cases, so that they seem, in Greene’s 
opinion, to have to do with neither evolved evaluative responses to specific kinds of 
situations nor raw gut feelings that are tightly connected with emotions.  
The long and the short of both arguments is that consequentialist intuitions have not been 
caused by evolutionary dynamics in a direct way, so that they cannot be targeted through 
an EDA. The distinction that Greene draws is similar to the point by Levy (2006a) that 
consequentialists are ‘globalists’ and deontologists are ‘localists’. Consequentialist 
theorists start from very general claims about the nature of the good and derive from those, 
through detailed empirical descriptions, moral judgments about cases. In contrast, the 
deontologist looks for principles that account for already formed moral judgments about 
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cases
135
. As Levy (2006a) correctly noticed, a global moral intuition is no less a moral 
intuition than a local moral intuition. As I have written above, it is not obvious and it is at 
least disputable that consequentialist moral intuitions are immune to EDAs, as Greene 
seems to assume. In particular, the Sidgwickian idea that consequentialist moral intuitions 
are more general than those used by other normative ethical systems does not seem to 
confer advantages to the consequentialist theorist relative to the EDA. Being general or 
abstract does not have any link with the EDA as an argument, nor is it a factor that makes 
the EDA less cogent, if it is cogent at all. In order to assess his claims on this topic more 
carefully, Greene ought to give more details about his ideas on consequentialist basic 
tenets. I hope he will expand this important topic in his upcoming book.  
Summing up, Singer and Greene do not seem to be justified in using the EDA in a targeted 
way against deontology, since they cannot differentiate epistemologically between the 
rational intuitions they want to defend and the emotive intuitions they want to abandon
136
. 
However, I have not provided here an argument that shows that it is in general impossible 
to restrict the EDA to some moral intuitions without affecting all moral intuitions. This 
would require delving into complex meta-ethical issues and this would lead this thesis out 
of topic. My claim is solely that the kind of restriction of the EDA Singer and Greene 
advocate seems to be deeply problematic because they fail to provide epistemological 
details about their cherished ‘consequentialist intuitions’. It is thus very unlikely that 
Singer and Greene can at the moment make use of this piece of philosophical machinery to 
further their sheer consequentialist agenda. I do not want to take a stance here about both 
the general validity of EDAs and the validity of EDAs in the moral domain more 
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specifically. Again, this would lead me out of the topic of this text and into deep meta-
ethical problems.  
So both the EDA and the ‘emotion bad, reason good’ argument do not give much traction 
to Singer’s and Greene’s neuromoral claim. To repeat, Singer’s and Greene’s neuromoral 
claim is that a better understanding of the machinery for moral judgments leads us to be 
wary of Haidtian moral intuitions and hence of the normative theory (deontology) that is 
allegedly based upon them. The most interesting argument to buttress this neuromoral 
claim is the AMIF. 
 
4.6. The Argument from Morally Irrelevant Factors (AMIF) on personal force: 
introduction  
Greene (2010, forthcoming) uses one general argumentative structure to derive normative 
conclusion from empirical facts and normative assumptions. The argument may be made 
clearer through an example made by Greene himself (forthcoming, § IV), even though this 
example is not specifically linked to Greene’s experimental work. 
Empirical premise: decisions of capital punishment are sometimes affected by unconscious 
racist biases. 
Normative premise: capital juries ought not to be affected by unconscious racist biases. 
Normative conclusion: capital juries sometimes make wrong decisions. 
The conclusion implies that these juries sometimes take decisions that are different from 
those they ought to take. It follows that such juries ought to try, or to try harder, to avoid 
being influenced by racist biases. 
From this structure Greene draws the AMIF, that in its last version (2010) functions in the 
following way: 
Empirical premise: moral judgment M1 is a response to factor F1 in the situation under 
scrutiny. 
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Normative premise 1: Moral judgments that are responses to morally irrelevant factors of a 
given situation ought to be rejected because those factors would lead us astray; 
Normative premise 2: F1 is morally irrelevant; 
Normative conclusion: M1 ought to be disregarded from a moral viewpoint. 
I think that the first normative premise is uncontroversial
137
. I grant it and I do not discuss 
it further. When I henceforth write “normative premise” of the AMIF, I refer to the second 
normative premise, unless explicitly noted. The AMIF is valid: if the premises are true, 
then the consequence follows. The AMIF (also known as the ‘direct route’) is a good way 
to derive normative conclusions from premises that are in part empirical. Since there are 
normative premises, this argument is compatible with Hume’s Law138. However, the weak 
point of the argument is the Normative Premise 2, which is likely to be controversial. 
Hence, the argument will be sound for some people, and for others it will not. In what 
follows, I will mostly discuss Normative Premise 2 and its meaning.  
I have shown in Ch. 2 that Greene and coworkers (2009) have found out that 
characteristically deontological judgments in scenarios such as Footbridge are driven by 
two factors: (1) a necessary means vs. foreseen side-effects distinction
139
, and (2) personal 
force. Let us recall that Greene defined personal force (see § 2.1. above), in this way: “An 
agent applies personal force to another when the force that directly impacts the other is 
generated by the agent’s muscles, as when one pushes another with one’s hands or with a 
rigid object.” Greene actually thinks that both of these factors are morally irrelevant, 
because he thinks that the DDE does not hold. Yet he recognizes that the necessary means 
vs. foreseen side effect distinction is deemed morally important by many. In contrast, he 
thinks that personal force is considered as morally irrelevant by almost all people, both 
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laymen and professional philosophers. Hence, the AMIF can be re-written to target 
personal force, in the following way: 
Empirical premise: Characteristically deontological judgments in Footbridge and similar 
dilemmas respond to the presence of personal force;  
Normative premise 1: Moral judgments that are responses to morally irrelevant factors of a 
given situation ought to be discounted, because those factors would lead us astray; 
Normative premise 2: Personal force is a morally irrelevant factor; 
Normative conclusion: We ought to discount characteristically deontological judgments on 
Footbridge and similar cases. 
This is the AMIF against personal force. This argument has a limited scope, since it applies 
to Footbridge-like dilemmas only. In spite of this, it raises some problems, so that in what 
follows I spell out a series of objections to this argument. 
 
4.7. The AMIF against personal force: the interaction between personal force and 
intentions 
My first objection to the AMIF on personal force is that the empirical premise does not 
take into account that, according to Greene et al. (2009, 370) (as quoted in § 2.2. above), 
System1 reacts to “representations such as ‘goal-within-the-reach-of-muscle-force’.” 
Moral judgments produced by System1 respond not to personal force only, but to a 
combination of intentions and personal force. There is a significant statistical interaction 
between the two. This means that personal force induces more deontological responses in 
participants only when coupled with the necessary means vs. foreseen side-effect 
distinction (cf. Greene et al 2009, fig. 4 at p. 368). In other words, actions that include both 
the use of personal force and harming others as a necessary means to reach one’s goal 
elicit more deontological responses than other actions. 
The moral relevance of intentions is well entrenched. The presence of some beliefs in the 
agent’s mind, which can at least be linked to the means vs. side-effect distinction, is 
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described as morally relevant for the evaluations of many experimental participants (e.g. 
Cushman 2008; Young and Saxe 2008; Young et al. 2007). So it seems to be the case that 
laymen (often unconsciously) take into account the presence/absence of personal force and 
the presence/absence of intention when passing moral judgments. But of course it could be 
claimed that laymen are wrong in taking the necessary means vs. foreseen side-effect 
distinction as morally relevant. However, there are many moral philosophers, such as 
Quinn (1989b), that endorse the DDE. Therefore, the AMIF cannot be run against the 
means vs. side-effect distinction in the same way it is run against personal force. That 
distinction is not prima facie morally irrelevant. In contrast, there seem to be very few (or 
none) explicit defenders of personal force as a morally relevant factor. Nonetheless, what 
is more important for my objection is the influence of intentions on the AMIF against 
personal force. If Haidtian moral intuitions respond in Footbridge-like cases to both 
intention and personal force, i.e. to a factor that is morally irrelevant and to a factor that is 
maybe morally relevant, but is not prima facie irrelevant, can we say that these intuitions 
are off-track and ought to be rejected? This seems to be far from clear. Maybe tracking 
intention is so important for a correct moral assessment of a given scenario that we can 
tolerate tracking also personal force in some cases. Can we afford being led astray by the 
presence or absence of personal force, if this is the only way we have to track the means 
vs. side-effects distinction? It might be imagined that tracking intention correlates with 
tracking important moral facts and that, at least in some cases, tracking personal force 
correlates with tracking intention. This is a hypothetical case in which a prima facie 
morally irrelevant factor (personal force) tracks a prima facie morally relevant factor, i.e. 
intentions. What about the AMIF against personal force in this case? Of course it is again 
far from clear that it is empirically the case that these correlations hold and that personal 
force tracks intentions. Only further empirical work in experimental moral psychology will 
tell us whether tracking personal force is in some cases necessary to detect the means vs. 
side-effect distinction. Again, this is just a hypothesis so far. Be as it may, I can state that, 
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according to many moral philosophers (i.e. those that see intentions and agential beliefs as 
morally relevant), characteristically deontological judgments as described by Greene and 
colleagues (2009) do not track morally irrelevant factors only. They track a mixture of 
morally relevant and morally irrelevant factors, which makes their status and their 
credibility rather murky and confused. It is at least disputable that the AMIF against 
personal force can correctly run under these conditions. 
It could be objected that, if one believes that p only because of (X&Y), where neither X 
and Y is sufficient for one’s belief but both are necessary, then one should give up p if 
somebody demonstrates that X alone is not evidence for p. In other words, if one’s 
intuition is a product of two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, showing that either 
condition is not truth-conducive should be sufficient to demonstrate that the intuition is 
unreliable. In this case, if X is personal force and Y is the means v. side effect distinction, 
then showing that personal force is morally irrelevant ought to lead us to give up the 
deontological response to Footbridge. It is unclear whether this holds, both as a general 
principle and as in this specific case. If a judgment is a response to the conjunction of two 
factors, one relevant and one irrelevant, it is not clear whether the judgment must be 
discounted. The decision about this depends pretty much on the importance that is 
attributed to the relevant factor (in this case, the means v. side-effect distinction). 
 
4.8. The AMIF against personal force: is personal force morally irrelevant? 
It is also possible that personal force tracks a morally relevant factor in another way. 
Berker points out (2009, 324, footnote) that “it’s one thing to say that whether one has 
committed a harm in an «up close and personal» manner is a morally irrelevant factor, and 
quite another thing to say that whether one has initiated a new threat that brings about 
serious bodily harm to another individual is a morally irrelevant factor.” Of course, if A 
uses personal force on B, it can mean that A initiates a new threat that brings about serious 
bodily harm to B. So it is possible that there is a significant correlation between ‘being an 
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instance of use of personal force’ and ‘initiating a new threat that brings about serious 
bodily harm’ to somebody. Initiating such a new threat can safely be assumed to be 
morally relevant. If such a correlation was present, this would be a case of a prima facie 
morally irrelevant factor (personal force) tracking a morally relevant factor (initiating a 
new threat of the kind specified above). But this correspondence is by no means necessary: 
there are counterexamples. One may use personal force on a fellow human to perform an 
injection to cure a disease or to win a judo competition. There is plenty of uses of personal 
force that Westerners do not see as morally objectionable. However, whether this 
correlation holds is an empirical question that has not been addressed so far, at least to my 
knowledge. Moreover, it is possible to initiate a new threat that brings serious bodily harm 
even at a distance (e.g. by pulling the trigger of a firearm). None seems to think that the 
means by which the new threat is initiated is morally relevant. As Greene (forthcoming, § 
IV) puts it: 
 
Were a friend to call you from a footbridge seeking moral advice, would you say, ‘Well, that 
depends… Will you be pushing or using a switch?’ If questions such as this […] are not on 
your list of relevant moral questions, then you, too, should say “no” [when asked whether 
moral judgments ought to be sensitive to factors like personal force].  
 
What morally matters is that a new threat that brings about serious bodily harm is initiated, 
not how this threat is brought about. Personal force seems to concern this latter aspect only. 
Contrary to Berker, I think that there is a general consensus about personal force as defined 
by Greene and colleagues in 2009 being a morally irrelevant factor. Of course 
deontologists will deny that characteristically deontological judgments respond to this 
factor, but this is an empirical issue, so that they must bring data in order to buttress this 
denial and to show that Greene and colleagues are wrong on this
140
. Summing up, I do not 
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 As W. Edwards Deming famously said: “In God we trust. All others must bring data.” 
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think that personal force tracking the initiation of new threats of harm is an argument that 
makes any dent in Greene’s armor. 
 
4.9. The AMIF against personal force: judgments about moral relevance 
My second and most important objection to Greene’s neuromoral views comes from an 
analysis of judgments such as Normative Premise 2. I have granted Normative Premise 2 
in the AMIF against personal force. However, before the argument can run, it ought to be 
examined what kind of judgment Normative Premise 2 is. That premise is a judgment 
about the moral relevance of a factor. The general form of such judgments is “X is a 
morally relevant factor.” Several questions about these judgments need to be asked and I 
think that the AMIF is deeply problematic if they are not answered. For instance, is the 
belief “Personal force is a morally irrelevant factor” justified? If yes, how can it be 
justified? Does this judgment track anything morally significant? What factors drive this 
judgment, i.e. what are the psychological conditions that lead us to make it? What would 
the results of experimental inquiry on this judgment be? If it turned out that it depends on 
some Haidtian moral intuitions, how could it be shown that these intuitions are reliable and 
not unreliable? 
I will carry out a preliminary analysis of judgments about moral relevance. This analysis is 
important to understand whether the AMIF succeeds, both against personal force and as a 
general argumentative strategy. 
Let us start by making the safe assumption that card-carrying consequentialists like Singer 
and Greene
141
 endorse this claim: “The number of people that incur harm in a given 
situation is morally relevant.”142 But what does this exactly mean? In order to explore this 
issue, it is useful to start by a suggestion of Hare’s (1981, 63), who writes: “It is a mistake 
to suppose that we could first pick out the morally relevant features of a situation and only 
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 Also Unger (1996), that I mention below, is likely to endorse this claim. 
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 It is interesting to note that also this apparently uncontroversial claim has been contested (Taurek 1977), 
as I have written above. For a reasonable comment on Taurek’s famous paper, see Parfit (1978). 
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then start asking what moral principles to apply to the situation. It is the principles which 
determine what is relevant.” If a factor is morally relevant in a given moral framework, 
then there is some principle that appeals to that factor, and vice versa. Kumar and 
Campbell (2012, 318) claim that “a principle that something is (or is not) a relevant 
difference is justified because it makes sense of distinctions we intuitively make (or refuse 
to make).” As I understand it, this position is not significantly different from Hare’s 
(1981), at least for my purposes, even though it involves a relationship of justification Hare 
does not mention. Hare actually believes that prima facie moral principles are established 
at the intuitive level of moral thinking and that claims about the moral relevance of factors 
are connected with those principles
143. In Hare’s opinion (1981, 63), then, talk about moral 
significance relates to the intuitive level only: “It is only when we come to intuitive 
thinking, guided by relatively general prima facie principles, that we need to be able to 
pick out the morally relevant features of situations, so as to leave out of consideration all 
the other features.” Hence, in Hare’s opinion, the moral relevance of factors has to do with 
the intuitive (and not the critical) level of moral thinking. As Hare put it, the critical level 
of moral thinking is the one that has to solve the controversies between distinct moral 
intuitions and “consists in making a choice under the constraints imposed by the logical 
properties of the moral concepts and by the non-moral facts, and by nothing else” (Hare 
1981, 51). As a matter of fact, it is an utilitarian way of reasoning. The fact that judgments 
about moral relevance do not belong to the critical level, which is loosely analogous to 
Greene’s System2, makes us wonder whether those judgments, that are so important for 
the AMIF, are reliable in Greene’s view. Furthermore, Hare (1981, 100) writes that claims 
about moral relevance must be initially provided through a “guesswork,” which seems to 
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 Hare thinks that prima facie principles like “One ought never to do an act which is F,” where F is a certain 
property, are typical of the intuitive level of moral reasoning. Of course such principles can clash with each 
other and the critical level of moral thinking is engaged to solve these instances of conflict. The clash is 
usually caused by the fact that “one of the principles picks out certain features of the situation as relevant 
[…] and the other picks out certain others” (Hare 1981, 52) Besides, prima facie moral principles “will have 
to be unspecific enough to cover a variety of situations all of which have certain salient features in common” 
(Hare 1981, 36). So the talk about ‘salient features’, i.e. factors of a situation, primarily belongs to the 
intuitive level and not to the critical level. 
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indicate that intuitions have a role in the elaboration of these judgments. Hare’s claim is 
supported by the general epistemological principle that all judgments are influenced by the 
theory in which they are embedded. Judgments about moral relevance are made inside a 
given moral framework and this framework is defined by the general principles that are 
valid in it. Hence, these judgments importantly depend on the overall architecture of the 
moral context in which they are made. 
Further light on judgments of the form “X is a morally irrelevant factor” comes from the 
considerations by Campbell and Kumar (2012) on moral inconsistency. They take up the 
dual process model, but in the weak form I mentioned in § 2.3.
144
. They start from the 
uncontroversial fact that humans do not like moral inconsistency. As I have hinted in § 
3.1., suppose there are two cases or situations, S1 and S2 (which Campbell and Kumar 
sometimes refer to as ‘target’ and ‘base’ and which may be either real or hypothetical), and 
two moral reactions to these cases, M1 and M2. Then, if S1 and S2 are not separated by 
any morally relevant difference and M1 and M2 are very different from each other (i.e. 
approval vs. disapprobation), then moral inconsistency obtains. Moreover, the moral judge 
is usually more confident of her reaction to the ‘base’ case (say, M1) than of her reaction to 
the ‘target’ case, often a new case (say, M2). Moral inconsistency generates negative moral 
intuitions à la Haidt. One automatically feels moral disapprobation toward individuals, 
including oneself, when they exhibit moral inconsistency. Since moral inconsistency 
generates negative moral emotion and emotion is often taken to have an intrinsic 
motivational force
145
, moral inconsistency motivates us to get rid of itself. How to do so? 
Normally, through System2, that carries out top-down regulation of emotion. More 
specifically, moral inconsistency is likely to be resolved by modifying the emotional 
response to S2, i.e. M2, because the moral judge is more certain of her M1 than of her M2. 
What I find particularly interesting to my purposes is that Campbell and Kumar claim that 
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 The characteristics of the two Systems are unchanged, but the connection with deontology and 
consequentialism is eliminated. 
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 This is questionable, but Campbell and Kumar seem to assume this and I do not want to discuss this point 
here. For more about this issue, see my (2012). 
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moral inconsistency is evaluated by both System1 and System2. System1 is seen as 
containing a series of norms that respond to particular features of cases
146
. The exact 
mechanism according to which the human mind deals with moral inconsistency is the 
following:  
(1) In the presence of different moral reactions to a pair of cases, the moral judge identifies 
the salient differences between them – this is done through System2.  
(2) These differences are fed as input to the moral judge’s System1.  
(3) If none of the norms that are present in System1 is activated, then System1 issues in a 
negative affective response.  
The negative affective response flags one’s moral responses to these two cases as 
inadequate. Norms may be thought as having a conditional form, e.g. “If X is Y, then X is 
morally wrong.” A difference is structured in this way: “A is B, whereas C is non-B.” If 
both B and non-B, i.e. both horns of the difference, trigger none of the norms present in 
System1, i.e. if both B and non-B are not Y (any of the Ys of the various norms), then 
System1 issues in an unpleasant emotional experience. 
This may be clarified through an example. For instance, one could have a consequentialist 
response to Switch and a deontological response to Remote Footbridge, a Footbridge case 
in which the man with the backpack is let fall by using a remote control that opens a 
trapdoor under him. In this case, System2 identifies as salient the necessary means vs. 
foreseen side-effect difference: in Switch the death of the man is a foreseen side-effect, 
whereas in Remote Footbridge his death is a necessary means to save the five from doom. 
This difference is fed as input to System1. If none of the norms in System1 is triggered, 
then System1 generates a negative affective response and signals to other cognitive 
systems that there is something bad going on with these judgments. The moral judge will 
think that the two cases are sufficiently similar for the same type of moral response to be 
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 It is not important here to know whether these norms are something like the ‘second-order modules’ 
postulated by Haidt and Joseph (2007) and criticized by Suhler and Churchland (2011) or something else. Cf. 
§ 3.1. above. 
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expected. In contrast, the moral judge has issued two very different responses, which puts 
her in a difficult situation. 
A morally relevant difference between two cases is normally experienced as morally 
relevant in an emotional and motivational way. According to Campbell and Kumar, only 
System1 can generate this kind of experience, so that there cannot be correct judgments 
about moral relevance if System1 is not working properly. This creates what I find a very 
interesting phenomenon, that Campbell and Kumar dub as ‘second-order moral 
dumbfounding’. Similarly to the original ‘moral dumbfounding’ in Haidt (2001), this 
phenomenon indicates a lack of justifications. In particular, people cannot justify why they 
find a factor either morally significant or insignificant. For example, a person could be 
asked: “Do you think that the number of people that die in this scenario is a morally 
relevant factor?” and could answer: “Of course it is!”. Then she could be asked: “Why do 
you think so?” She would find it problematic to give an answer to that. The idea of second-
order moral dumbfounding strengthens the aforementioned analogy posited by Hare 
(1981), according to which judgments about moral relevance and prima facie moral 
principles are equivalent, as they both elicit this phenomenon. A prima facie general 
principle such as “All cases of consensual incest are morally wrong” elicits dumbfounding 
and is difficult to justify, as we know from the empirical data reviewed in Ch. 3. As both 
judgments about relevance and prima facie general principles elicit moral dumbfounding, 
they are likely to arise from unconscious processing, i.e. from the activity of System1. This 
however does not guarantee that they are equivalent. The fact that they share this feature is 
just additional evidence to buttress the case of equivalence, but it is not conclusive 
evidence. It is Hare’s argument for equivalence that does most of the explanatory work 
here. Be as it may, if both kinds of judgments arise from the activity of System1, then it is 
true that, as Campbell and Kumar (2012, 297) put it, inconsistency is per se “invisible to 
System2.” Similarly, System2 is probably not involved in forming prima facie general 
principles such as the one concerning incest. System2 may “identify ways in which the 
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target situation and the base situation are dissimilar in morally relevant ways” and exert 
top-down regulation of emotion, but cannot by itself detect or deal with inconsistency. As I 
have written above in § 3.1., Campbell and Kumar do not marshal empirical evidence to 
support their descriptive hypothesis. Hence, their ideas just remain a from-the-armchair 
philosophical hypothesis. However, what would the consequences be for Greene’s 
neuromoral claim if second-order moral dumbfounding actually existed and System1 were 
central to judgments about moral relevance? Could these judgments be considered 
‘reliable’? If so, under which conditions? The possibility that these important judgments 
are in turn based on cognitive systems that Greene takes to be blind and often unreliable is 
open. Greene owes answers to these questions if the AMIF on personal force is to run. I 
hope he will address these issues in his subsequent research. This concludes my 
preliminary analysis concerning judgments about moral relevance. This analysis was 
important because Normative Premise 2 of the AMIF against personal force is such a 
judgment.  
To my purposes in discussing Greene’s neuromoral theory, another important point that 
emerges from this analysis of judgments of moral relevance is that these judgments are 
moral in nature (since they are equivalent to moral principles) and as likely to be 
controversial as claims about the correctness of general moral principles or moral 
judgments about specific cases.  
Summing up, I claim that judgments about moral relevance necessarily involve reference 
to a (sometimes implicit) moral principle. If a moral principle M1 that refers to factor F1 
holds in a given moral framework, then F1 is morally relevant inside that framework. Vice 
versa, if F1 is morally relevant inside a given framework, then there will be some moral 
principle M1 in that moral framework that refers to F1. The number of victims of a 
situation is usually seen as morally relevant because most humans endorse a principle like 
“If the only difference between two alternative outcomes is that in the one outcome more 
people will suffer some harm than in the other, then select and strive for the outcome in 
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which the lesser number of people incur that specific harm.” Hence, a factor is morally 
relevant for a judge when the judge already endorses a principle that takes that aspect of 
reality into account. The evaluation of moral relevance is not made in a moral vacuum. On 
the contrary, it expresses the morality one already endorses. So we must expect at the level 
of attribution of moral relevance some degree of disagreement, since we find disagreement 
at the level of moral principles. For instance, examine the judgment “Ethnic affiliation is a 
morally irrelevant factor” and the moral principle “It is morally wrong to judge differently 
two cases if the only difference between them is that in the one action the agent was an 
African American man and in the other action the agent was a Caucasian man.” These two 
claims are equally controversial. Given that disagreement about some moral principles 
such as the DDA, the DDE, and many others is rampant and long-standing, it is 
exceedingly unlikely that the assessment concerning the moral relevance of factors such 
“being an action as opposed to an omission”, “being a necessary means instead of a 
foreseen side-effect”, and so on, will not stir considerable amounts of disagreement. 
Hence, moving from the level of judgments to the level of which factors of a given 
scenario count as relevant does not lead the debate to a significantly higher level of 
consensus, i.e. closer to solution.  
An ambiguity ought to be dispelled here. When one says “X is morally relevant”, one 
usually makes, as I have said, a normative point. For instance, Greene is claiming that 
there should be no moral principle that appeals to personal force. It would be wrong for 
humans to deem personal force morally relevant. This counts as a normative claim. 
However, the judgment “Personal force is morally irrelevant” could also be seen, in a 
context such as experimental moral psychology, as a descriptive judgment. This is known 
in moral philosophy as ‘morality in inverted commas’ (Hare 1952, 18-19), i.e. morality 
considered as a social phenomenon, from the descriptive point of view only. So, when one 
says “X is a morally relevant factor,” one could mean (even though it is rare) that “People 
take X as a morally relevant factor.” If Greene et al (2009) are correct, a descriptive claim 
156 
 
“Personal force is a morally relevant factor” could be true. However, this must not be 
confused with the more common, normative interpretation of a judgment about moral 
relevance. Only this latter interpretation matches with the kind of judgments that are 
required for Normative Premise 2 in the AMIF against personal force. So Greene is saying 
that from the descriptive point of view “Personal force is a morally relevant factor” is true, 
in the sense that it is implicitly endorsed by experimental participants through their 
behavior, and that, at the same time, “Personal force is a morally relevant factor” is false 
from the normative point of view, as this factor should not count in the decision of moral 
judges. This normative claim opens up interesting questions. What kind of resources can 
be marshaled to justify it? What kind of normativity is Greene appealing to? In order to go 
deeper into this issue, we have to examine again the meta-normativity problem. In what 
follows, I will avail myself of “X is a morally irrelevant factor” in the normative sense, 
unless explicitly noted. 
 
4.10. The meta-normativity problem 
When Greene says that improved knowledge of the machinery for moral judgments makes 
humans understand that some of their moral judgments about cases track morally irrelevant 
factors and that this in turn may be used to make “better” moral judgments, what is the 
meaning of this “better?” Although Greene is not entirely explicit on this, it is quite clear 
that he has a moral interpretation in mind. The analogy with capital juries he makes in 
(forthcoming) suggests that he intends the ‘oughts’ to be understood in moral terms. When 
one says that capital judgments ought not to be sensitive to race, the ‘ought’ is most 
plausibly interpreted as a moral one. It is morally wrong for a jury to make decisions about 
capital punishment on the basis of racist prejudices, as well as it is morally wrong for 
jurors to rely on their intuitions if such intuitions are (known to be) affected by 
unconscious racist biases, because racist biases seem to be morally irrelevant. As I have 
argued, saying that a factor is morally irrelevant seems equivalent (in the more common 
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interpretation; see the preceding §) to saying that there should be no moral principle that 
tracks that factor. It is a normative and not a descriptive claim. Hence, the decisions the 
factor affects are likely to be morally wrong decisions in which the moral judge has been 
led astray. And, surely, it is morally wrong to (knowingly) make morally wrong decisions. 
After all, morally wrong decisions are likely to lead to morally wrong actions
147
. Hence, 
Greene seems to solve the meta-normativity problem by choosing the moral horn and 
excluding the use of different forms of normativity, such as prudence. This means that, in 
Greene’s view, the normative interpretation of the judgment “Personal force is a morally 
irrelevant factor” counts as a moral judgment. This fits well with my (and Hare’s) idea that 
claims about morally relevant / irrelevant factors and claims about moral principles are 
equivalent. So, if we grant the normative premise of the AMIF, we face a conflict between 
moral judgments. On the one hand we have the common and widely held deontological 
response to Footbridge. On the other hand there is the commonly held view that personal 
force is a morally irrelevant factor. The conflict has two sides: a descriptive one and a 
normative one. 
From the descriptive point of view, one could ask: “Would people choose to keep the 
judgment about moral relevance or the deontological response to Footbridge?”  
From the normative point of view, one could ask: “Should people choose to keep the 
judgment about moral relevance or the deontological response to Footbridge?” 
From the descriptive standpoint, we do not know how many of those who make the 
deontological judgment on this scenario (more or less 80% of the participants) would 
dump the deontological judgment in order not to be committed to the thesis that personal 
force is morally relevant. Greene seems to assume that most people would change their 
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 It could be argued that to be wrong about moral facts is morally wrong, and that this moral wrongness is 
supplementary relative to the wrongness of a moral action that originates from such erroneous moral 
knowledge. Alternatively, it could be argued that errors in moral knowledge are morally wrong just because 
they lead to morally wrong actions. I do not want to enter this interesting issue here, since what concerns me 
at the moment is to show that to follow a morally irrelevant factor is likely to be an instance of moral 
wrongness (as opposed to other kinds of wrongness). 
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minds in front of the AMIF, but this is not clear. We need empirical data to know whether 
the AMIF can (descriptively) be an effective tool of moral reform
148
.  
From the normative standpoint, the normative premise in the AMIF against personal force 
is a (general) moral judgment and the deontological response to Footbridge is another 
(particular
149
) moral judgment. There is a clash between two very widely endorsed moral 
judgments and Greene does not provide justifications for his (normative) claim that we 
ought to prefer one over the other but the fact that lots of people think that personal force is 
morally irrelevant. But this is a descriptive statement. It is not clear how it can per se 
justify a normative claim. Furthermore, we must descriptively take into account that also 
the deontological response to Footbridge is widely shared. This clearly shows that this 
kind of justification is insufficient. Greene owes his readers a better answer to the question 
as to why we ought to solve this conflict in the way he suggests. 
Of course Greene could have gone prudential, so to speak. Greene’s normative claim that 
people ought to dump the deontological response to Footbridge and to push the man down 
to his death instead could be interpreted prudentially, so that it is prudentially better if 
people sacrifice one life to save five. On this view, avoiding following the deontological 
response and adopting a more consequentialist way of thinking would be the best way 
people have – when faced with this specific case – to secure some important desired 
outcomes, such as the reduction of suffering. This is an interesting view and it seems 
capable to avoid many of the problems raised by the view discussed above, the one 
according to which the ‘oughts’ are moral ones. But this alternative view may well have to 
face other difficult problems. Only a thorough exploration (both psychological and 
philosophical) can tell us. The only thing I would like to point out here is that the truth of 
the claim that one ought (prudentially) to block one’s deontological responses about these 
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 I commit here to no claim both about whether moral reform is desirable in general and about which kind 
of moral reform Westerners ought to strive for. I am completely agnostic about this. However, Singer and 
Greene (together with Unger, that I mention below) are not and do see themselves as moral reformers. 
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 I.e. about a case – it is not a principle. 
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cases and that one ought (prudentially) to avail oneself of a more consequentialist way of 
thinking is an empirical issue, and a difficult one to investigate. 
 
4.11. An argument by Kumar and Campbell  
Before moving to a more general discussion of the AMIF in the context of Greene’s 
neuromoral theory, I would like to dispel an argument about this theory that in my opinion 
does not work. Kumar and Campbell think that the AMIF against personal force in the 
form I presented cannot run even if it is granted that the difference between physical harm 
inflicted through personal force and physical harm inflicted via other means is, indeed, 
morally irrelevant. I agree on this, but I do not agree with the motivations they adduce and 
I think that their point is no hindrance to the AMIF against personal force. Kumar and 
Campbell argue that Greene’s AMIF on personal force works like that:  
 
[1] The deontological judgment about Footbridge is a response to personal harm.  
[2] The consequentialist judgment about Bystander [aka Switch] is a response to impersonal 
harm.  
[3] The difference between personal harm and impersonal harm is morally irrelevant. 
Therefore, [4] Either the deontological judgment about Footbridge or the consequentialist 
judgment about Bystander is unwarranted.
150
 (Kumar and Campbell 2012, 317)  
 
So Kumar and Campbell think that the argument made by Greene does not undermine the 
deontological response to Footbridge, but just the possibility of reconciling it with the 
consequentialist response to Switch. They are accusing Greene of concluding too much 
from his argument. But it is very likely that Greene would not grant [2]. He would say that 
the (empirically frequent) consequentialist response to Switch relies on the body count, and 
he would make the normative assumption that the body count is morally relevant, which is 
quite a safe assumption, as almost everybody except Taurek (1977) thinks that the numbers 
                                                 
150
 I modified the numbers of the propositions relative to the original text. 
160 
 
count, at least ceteris paribus. Greene is not making the point that the two responses 
conflict – this is rather obvious. He is claiming that one response tracks a morally relevant 
factor (i.e. body count) and that the other response tracks (together with intention) a 
morally irrelevant factor (i.e. the distinction between personal and impersonal violence, 
e.g. shooting a long-range rifle vs. punching in the head), so that the latter ought to be 
rejected
151
. He assumes what factors are relevant or irrelevant, as he thinks these claims are 
uncontroversial. As explained above, this is not so obvious. 
 
4.12. The extended AMIF 
This being said, Greene tries to extend the AMIF against personal force to other factors, in 
order to show that characteristically deontological judgments are unreliable under a broad 
series of circumstances. Greene aims indeed at a general debunking of deontology. In 
particular, for reasons I examine below, System2 must in Greene’s opinion override 
System1 in all cases of conflict. This opens up some further issues. There are some cases 
that elicit a clash between deontological responses and consequentialist principles, but in 
which the contested factor is not personal force, but spatial distance. The most famous case 
is yielded by the two scenarios in Singer (1972). We feel compelled to help a dying child 
that is going to drown in a shallow pond (Drowning Child case), but we do not feel 
compelled to help a dying child that is starving in some distant village in troubled 
Bangladesh (Envelope case). We usually condemn those that do not help the drowning 
child, but we do not morally condemn those who fail to help the Bangladeshi child
152
. 
What drives this differential response?
153
 Jay Musen, in a still unpublished Honors thesis in 
Greene’s lab at Harvard, has experimentally shown that this differential evaluation is 
descriptively driven by spatial distance. People are actually influenced by this factor when 
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 Because Greene assumes Normative Premise 1 of the AMIF, above. 
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 Unger (1996) is a thoughtful elaboration starting from this dilemma. 
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 It is interesting to notice, as Campbell and Kumar (2012) correctly point out, that Singer’s (1972) 
argument as to whether there is no relevant moral difference between Drowning Child and Envelope does not 
involve a utilitarian principle. It is an argument that is based on the seeming implausibility of considering 
distance as a legitimate moral principle. 
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making moral judgments and “Mere spatial distance is a morally relevant factor” is 
descriptively true. Greene, together with Singer and Unger (1996), deems this factor 
morally irrelevant from the normative point of view. Is it indeed morally irrelevant? In the 
personal force case, we could reach agreement (there is virtually no one that thinks that 
personal force as described by Greene is morally relevant) and we were left puzzling about 
the meaning and normative significance of this agreement. In this case things fare worse 
for the AMIF. There are moral philosophers that defend the moral relevance of distance. 
For example, Kamm (2007) spends two full chapters (ch. 11 & 12) to articulate how spatial 
distance influences justified moral judgments, i.e. the moral judgments we ought to make. 
The title of Kamm’s book (2007) is Intricate Ethics. It is thus a foregone conclusion that 
her position is highly complex. In what follows I will just sketch the basic lines of her 
articulated position.  
Kamm takes into account distance only relative to the duty one has to help other humans 
who are in danger. Hence, her discussion is clearly inspired by, and a response to, the 
views put forward by Singer (1972) and Unger (1996). Kamm’s first claim is that 
Drowning Child and Envelope are not equalized. The two cases differ in many respects 
apart from distance. We cannot know for sure what drives participants’ differential 
responses to that pair of cases. Hence, we need equalized cases, that differ on distance 
only. An example of equalized cases is the following: 
 
Near Alone Case: I am walking past a pond in a foreign country that I am visiting. I alone see 
many children drowning in it, and I alone can save one of them. To save the one, I must put the 
$500 I have in my pocket into a machine that then triggers (via electric current) rescue 
machinery that will certainly scoop him out. 
Far Alone Case: I alone know that in a distant part of a foreign country that I am visiting, many 
children are drowning, and I alone can save one of them. To save the one, all I must do is put 
the $500 I carry in my pocket into a machine that then triggers (via electric current) rescue 
machinery that will certainly scoop him out. (Kamm 2007, 348) 
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Kamm thinks that there is an intuitive difference between the two cases: we have stronger 
obligations in the former scenario than in the latter, which does not mean that we have no 
obligation in the latter. In particular, in the former case the agent can be required to pay 
more costs and to make more efforts to help the victim. For instance, it might be the case 
that morality demands from the agent to pay an even larger amount of money
154
.  
Then she argues for the moral relevance of distance. Against Singer and Unger, she writes 
that  
 
We cannot conclude that distance is never morally relevant simply by showing that one time or 
even sometimes it makes no difference to the strength of a duty in equalized cases. This is 
because a property that makes no moral difference in some equalized contexts may make a 
difference in other equalized contexts. By contrast, we can show that distance is morally 
relevant by showing that we think it matters morally sometimes—even one time—in equal 
contexts, even if it does not always make a moral difference. (Kamm 2007, 348) 
 
After having established that distance morally matters, since it creates a moral difference in 
equal contexts as shown by responses to the Near Alone Case and the Far Alone Case, 
Kamm examines both the ‘Standard view’ and the ‘Standard claim’.  
The ‘Standard View’ is the idea that the problem of distance in morality is “whether we 
have a stronger duty to aid strangers who are physically near to us just because they are 
physically near than we have to aid strangers who are not physically near, all other things 
being equal” (Kamm 2007, 345). In her opinion, describing the problem of distance in 
morality in such a way that it involves reference to the distance between ourselves and 
victims only is misleading, since the problem may also pertain to the distance between 
means to help (e.g. a car) and victims, or to the one between ourselves and threats (e.g. a 
runaway trolley), or between means to help we own and threats, and so on.  
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 Kamm recognizes the difficulty to draw any clear-cut boundary relative to what we owe to each other in 
this sense. 
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The ‘Standard Claim’ derives from the ‘Standard View’. It is the idea that, if distance 
matters morally, we have a stronger duty to aid a near stranger than a far stranger, given 
their equal need. Kamm thinks that this is actually false. She maintains that the moral 
relevance of distance to helping does not conflict with the intuition that we have a strong 
obligation to help distant strangers. In her opinion Westerners have a strong intuition that, 
when the threat is near to the agent but the victim is far, the agent still has a strong duty to 
help. The agent ought to stop the nearby threat from hurting the faraway victim, e.g. by 
stopping a near killer from firing a rifle. Hence, if nearness is intuitively important, “this 
very fact may imply that we have strong obligations to aid distant strangers.” (Kamm 2007, 
369). 
The overall point which Kamm is driving at is that “we have greater obligations to take 
care of what is in the area near us (victims, threats, means)” (Kamm 2007, 370) and that 
“the responsibility to aid the near victim is stronger than the duty to stop near threats, and 
both obligations are stronger than the duty to rescue a victim’s near means or activate an 
agent’s distant means near a victim, other things being equal.” (Kamm 2007, 377).  
Therefore, the problem of distance in morality ought to be understood in this alternative 
way: can we “justify our intuition that we have a greater responsibility to take care of what 
is going on in the area near us or near our (efficacious) means, whether this involves needy 
strangers, threats, or means belonging to strangers” (Kamm 2007, 376)? Kamm admits that 
intuitions are not self-justifying. They need to be connected with some principles that are 
unquestionably morally relevant in order to be justified. In order to justify the distance 
effects described above, Kamm maintains that there is a personal prerogative to give 
greater importance to one’s own interests and projects rather than giving equal weight to 
oneself and to others. In other words, we are morally allowed to be partial
155
. If an agent 
chooses to be partial, she gives importance to things out of proportion to the weight they 
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 Of course moral theorists such as Singer (1981) would not necessarily agree with this, even though they 
could accept partiality if it turned out to be a good way to maximize the furthering of the interests of sentient 
beings. 
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have from an impartial perspective. However, this option to be partial also creates a duty 
generated from the perspective on life from which the agent is acting. This duty is to take 
care of what is associated with the agent, for example, the area near her and her means. 
The moral import of distance therefore depends on adopting this partial stance in one’s 
moral life. The person who has chosen impartiality could disregard distance effects. 
Finally, Kamm rejects Unger’s (1996) debunking explanation according to which distance 
effects are due to salience. According to Kamm, it is true that in Near Alone Case and in 
Far Alone Case there is a difference in the emotional salience of victim’s need, so that 
salience itself is much less in the far case than in the near. Nonetheless, she also thinks 
that, if we equalize these cases relative to salience, we still find a difference in Westerners’ 
responses: “When the Near Alone and Far Alone cases also both have salient need, it is 
nearness and not salience that gives rise to our intuition that we have a strong obligation to 
help in the Near Alone Case” (Kamm 2007, 357). 
I do not want to discuss whether Kamm is right about both this latter point against Unger 
and her previous point concerning the justification of distance effects through the personal 
prerogative to partiality. Whether she is right or not, Kamm constitutes a clear example of 
a contemporary moral philosopher who strongly asserts the moral significance of distance 
for humans’ obligations to help fellow humans in need. As a consequence, it is far from 
clear whether spatial distance is a morally relevant factor or, on the contrary, a morally 
irrelevant factor. Therefore, we cannot run the AMIF for scenarios that look like Envelope. 
We usually pass judgments of mere moral acceptability for this behavior, at variance with 
the famous Drowning Child. But the normative premise that distance is a morally 
irrelevant factor (from the normative point of view) cannot be granted without evoking a 
substantial moral disagreement. Greene hopes to make deontology collapse by appealing to 
some claims about the moral relevance of factors that he deems widely accepted. However, 
he will persuade only those that do not hold moral principles that are connected with 
allegedly morally irrelevant factors. Greene’s argument works, but only for those that grant 
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the normative premise. And it is not clear whether those who will grant the premise about 
the moral irrelevance of distance, thereby jettisoning the widely held deontological 
response to Envelope, are significantly more than those that endorsed the consequentialist 
solution to Envelope in the first place. 
 
4.13. The deontological response to the extended AMIF  
At this point, when confronted with an extended AMIF, the deontologist still has some 
tricks to play. She could easily say that the consequentialist response to Footbridge fails to 
track some factors that the deontologist sees as morally relevant, such as the separateness 
of persons, or the fact that human life is inviolable. In this latter case, she might argue, as 
Thomson (2008), that Switch and Footbridge ought to have the same solution, just as the 
utilitarian claims, but that this solution ought not to be that the agent should kill one to save 
five in both scenarios, but that she ought to let the five die in both scenarios because one 
morally relevant factor, i.e. that you cannot kill humans to save humans, overrides the 
harm minimization principle quoted above. Here not only the consequentialist theorist does 
not take into account an important factor, i.e. the inviolability of human life, but she also 
fails to understand that this factor trumps considerations concerning aggregate harm. 
Therefore, it is still very open to the deontologist to disagree with consequentialists such as 
Singer, Unger, and Greene about which factors are morally relevant and about the priority 
relationships between them. So Berker is perfectly correct when he writes: “In order to use 
the neuroscientific results and some philosophical theorizing to discount certain intuitive 
verdicts about trolley-like cases, Greene in effect needs to have already solved the trolley 
problem” (2009, 327). Finally, Berker (personal communication) argues that 
characteristically deontological and consequentialist responses to Footbridge are likely to 
respond to multiple factors and that the more adequate the description of these factors 
becomes, the more implausible their moral irrelevance will be. I agree with Berker on that. 
The idea that ‘intention + personal force’ is morally irrelevant is already disputable (cf. § 
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4.7.) If further factors are added, the claim of moral irrelevance could become even more 
implausible. Although empirical investigation only can tell what deontological judgments 
are exactly responding to in different cases, it is true that there seems to be a trade-off 
between the descriptive adequacy of empirical investigation and the claim that the factors 
tracked by deontological judgments are morally irrelevant.  
Besides, Nichols and Mallon (2006) showed that the differential response to Footbridge 
and Switch is independent from the entities in danger being human beings. It appears with 
china cups too. Therefore, it may be conjectured that the personal force factor is not 
relevant to participants’ responses because it is usually coupled with violence against 
animals. The causal story behind these responses seems to be more complex than we are 
inclined to think.  
An important qualification is needed. Greene (forthcoming, § IV) specifies that “An 
empirically-driven normative argument is non-question-begging if the normative 
assumptions it requires are less interesting (i.e. less controversial) than its normative 
conclusion.” So it is not required, in Greene’s view, to find uncontroversial normative 
premises. Trading easy assumptions with trickier conclusions already constitutes moral 
progress, in his view. Empirical results can thus be used to develop particular traditions in 
moral thinking, such as for instance act utilitarianism. Traditions are identified through a 
set of normative assumptions. If empirical claims are added to these assumptions, you get 
more precise and controversial moral judgments that, however, will be valid inside the 
parochial circle of that specific tradition only. Those who do not grant the assumption will 
be utterly unimpressed by this kind of AMIF. Yet, Greene’s idea of parceled moral 
progress, i.e. a moral progress that happens by empirical refinement of specific normative 
assumption inside separate moral traditions, clashes against the sweeping claims Greene 
himself makes. The idea in itself is interesting and even appealing. Surely it would be 
worth discussing. However, Greene himself does not seem to actually believe in it. Indeed, 
Greene does not argue that deontology is debunked for those who accept some normative 
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premises only. He thinks that deontology is debunked in all cases of conflict with 
consequentialism, or at least in all cases that are ‘unfamiliar’ in the sense described below, 
and for everybody. For any reasonable, adult human being, deontology is a bad idea 
because it is the rationalization of System1 intuitions
156
, and those intuitions are often 
driven by morally irrelevant factors. This is Greene’s view. If Greene wants to limit the 
scope of his empirical debunking of deontology to those who grant that personal force, 
distance, and inviolability of life are morally irrelevant, then one of the problems for his 
neuromoral theory is solved
157
. But in this case, philosophers such as Thomson and Kamm 
could simply ignore his debunking argument, since they deny the assumptions of his 
argument. 
Another interesting point concerns the role science plays in Greene’s neuromoral 
argument. Berker (2009) claims that empirical research makes no work in Greene’s 
argument. I think Berker is wrong on this. Experimental moral psychology, as Greene 
(2010, 14) correctly points out, makes us understand what the factors are which some 
moral judgments are responding to. I do not want to enter the empirical issue whether 
Greene persuasively showed that deontological judgments on Footbridge respond to 
intention + personal force, since I am assuming arguendo Greene’s descriptive theory here. 
What I want to say is that empirical science can in principle tell what are the factors that 
causally influence specific moral judgment about cases
158
. No matter whether Greene has 
succeeded or not in his empirical research, it is clear that experimental psychology can do 
this and, I add, it is the only kind of inquiry that can yield this result. It is not possible to do 
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 Insofar as it is a reflective cognitive operation, deontology needs System2 to be elaborated. However, its 
raw material comes directly from System1. Hence, Greene sees it as a direct expression of System1, even if 
System2 is a necessary condition for its existence. If humans had no System2, there would be no deontology. 
Greene’s idea is that moral reasoning in deontology works like individual moral reasoning in the SIM: it 
mostly confabulates explanations for emotionally-loaded moral intuitions. 
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 Other problems that I described above, such as the one concerning the interaction between personal force 
and intentions, would stay, though. 
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 Kumar and Campbell (2012, 322) agree with me on this: “Empirical research can be of service here. The 
research cannot of course tell us whether a proposed difference is morally relevant. What it can tell us is 
which of the usually many differences between the cases is driving the divergent responses.” 
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this from the armchair, even though some, like Unger (1996)
159
 and Kamm (2007), have 
tried and try to do so. In contrast, I agree with Berker (2009) and Levy (2007, 305) that 
deciding which factors are morally relevant / irrelevant is an armchair operation that has 
nothing to do with the lab. Nonetheless, Greene (2003) never claimed that the opposite was 
true and always stuck to Hume’s Law.  
Still on this topic, Greene (forthcoming, § IV) reports an objection by Tim Scanlon, 
according to which “the work done by the science, while not insignificant, is morally 
insignificant. The science does not challenge anyone’s values. Instead, it simply alerts us to 
an application of the values we already have.” I think Scanlon is perfectly right on this. In 
order to reply, Greene puts forward an empirical debunking of a widespread moral 
intuition about consensual incest. The argument runs in the following way: 
Empirical Premise 1: The inclination to condemn incest of all kinds is based on an 
emotional response whose evolutionary function is to avoid producing offspring with 
genetic diseases. 
Empirical Premise 2: Vasectomy makes birth defects impossible, since it makes conception 
impossible. 
Normative Premise: If humans condemn consensual incest with vasectomy due to an 
emotional response that evolved to prevent birth defects, then we ought not to condemn 
this kind of incest. 
Normative Conclusion: We ought not to condemn consensual incest with vasectomy.
160
 
But empirical science does not seem in this case to introduce any new value, or to change 
values. The normative premise is substantial and arguably many people would not grant it, 
even though only careful empirical work can tell us this. An open alternative, for instance, 
is to think that incest is wrong per se, because it offends God or some other deity, or 
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 Unger (1996) tried to carry out some informal surveys to test his intuitions about cases, but his work is not 
conducted according to Null Hypothesis Significance Testing, which is the standard statistical procedure in 
this case. 
160
 De Lazari-Radek and Singer (2012, 21) put forward a very similar argument, even though their argument 
is more explicitly an instance of the EDA. 
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because it offends human dignity. Those who hold this position will not accept the 
Normative Premise above and therefore will not change their values. Hence, this argument 
challenges nobody’s values, but those of people who accept the Normative Premise above 
(who are likely to already accept the Normative Conclusion, by the way). 
This can suffice as far as the AMIF is concerned.  
 
4.14. The indirect route 
Greene also uses a second, more general way to attack deontology. The extent to which 
this broader, indirect route depends on the direct one (which was constituted by the AMIF 
against personal force, distance, and other factors) is unclear. At present I will consider it 
as independent from the considerations and doubts above. Greene claims that System1 and 
System2 show an efficiency vs. flexibility trade-off. On the one hand, System1 is less 
flexible and more efficient, i.e. fastest and computationally less expensive, than System2. 
On the other hand, System2 is more flexible and less efficient than System1, since it can 
evaluate scenarios and situations to which the individual has not been previously exposed. 
Greene then argues that “Automatic settings [i.e. System1] can function well only when 
they have been shaped by trial-and-error experience” (forthcoming, § V). This kind of 
experience can also not be personal experience. It can be the experience of some 
individuals that lived before a given human being and that have passed their experience 
down to her through either genetic or cultural transmission. A given individual has thus a 
functioning System1 relative to a given scenario S1 only if she has some experience of S1 
through (1) genetic transmission, or (2) cultural transmission, or finally (3) learning from 
personal experience. The further step in Greene’s normative argument for the indirect route 
is to define unfamiliar problems as “the ones with which we have inadequate evolutionary, 
cultural, or personal experience” (ibidem). Yet it is difficult to understand what scenarios 
or problems human beings are unfamiliar with. Hence, Greene provides two proxies. First, 
“moral problems that arise from recent cultural developments, most notably the rise of 
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modern technology and the intersection of disparate cultures, are especially likely to be 
unfamiliar.” Secondly, moral disagreement which is not due to diverging opinions on non-
moral facts is another tell-tale sign that a scenario or problem is unfamiliar. Therefore, 
Greene claims that we ought to rely more on System2 than on System1 when dealing with 
scenarios or problems that either elicit disagreement or derive from modern tech.  
There are some issues relative to this line of argument.  
First, most hypothetical scenarios used by Greene and other experimental moral 
psychologists are unfamiliar (relative to the above definition of this term). Westerners have 
undergone neither genetic nor cultural learning for Switch, Footbridge, or Loop, nor do 
they have any direct experience of similar cases. It does not happen often to have to choose 
between the survival of one person in danger and the survival of five people in danger. 
Hence, these cases are likely to lead System1 astray, if Greene is descriptively correct. So a 
problem arises. As I have written in Ch. 2, the empirical evidence for Greene’s descriptive 
model mostly depends on experiments based on “trolleyology.” But System1 is likely not 
to work well relative to these unfamiliar cases. Hence, during the experiments, participants 
will exhibit a defective functioning of System1, from the descriptive point of view. In other 
words, their System1 would not work as it works in most cases in real life, i.e. when 
confronted with familiar problems and cases. So, if Greene is correct, the view of System1 
we derive from “trolleyology” is probably incorrect, again from the descriptive point of 
view, i.e. from the standpoint of experimental moral psychology. It might be the case that 
the dual-process model provides a deforming view of System1. System1 would look 
unreliable because it has been studied in cases for which it is not trained. Hence, it might 
also be the case that the dual-process model needs to be checked through “non-
trolleyological” experiments, in particular to control that the picture of System1 proposed 
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by this model survives to experiments in which the participants are exposed to familiar 
situations
161
. In spite of this, I still assume arguendo that the dual-process model is correct. 
 Secondly, it is hard to see how moral disagreement could be a reliable indicator of 
‘unfamiliarity’. Consider for example those tendencies of System1 that were shaped by 
natural selection in the EEA and are universal in the human species. In the context of 
moral problems and scenarios that are relevantly different from those that our ancestors 
had to solve, such tendencies may well lead to what Greene would consider misleading 
emotion-based intuitions. But given that such tendencies are universal, everyone is likely 
to be misled in the same way and in the same direction. Unfamiliar moral dilemmas do not 
necessarily produce moral disagreement. Furthermore, it can be shown that moral 
disagreement can be present in problems that are perfectly familiar, for instance the death 
penalty, the moral admissibility of torture, the killing of tyrants that legitimately hold 
political power, or the justification of wars. Issues relative to torture and the death penalty 
were already present in work of Italian Enlightenment man Cesare Beccaria (1996/1764) in 
the late 18
th
 Century. Focusing on the last moral problem in my list, in order to make a 
long story short, the existence of alleged ‘just wars’ was already discussed by Saint 
Thomas Aquinas in the 13
th
 Century and by Immanuel Kant (1963/1795), so that 
Westerners seem to have quite a lot of cultural learning about this topic. This is not at all 
an unfamiliar problem (in Greene’s sense), but there is much disagreement about it. People 
like Albert Schweitzer and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi seemed to think that no war is 
just. People like former US President George Walker Bush seemed to think (and perhaps 
still think) that some wars are just. Hence, both of these claims hold: (1) there are cases of 
moral disagreement in which unfamiliarity plays no role; (2) there are cases of 
unfamiliarity that elicit no moral disagreement. As a consequence, moral disagreement and 
unfamiliarity are likely to be uncoupled. 
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 In a still unpublished Honors Thesis in Greene’s Lab at Harvard, Katherine J. Ransohoff has probed 
participants with familiar cases, e.g. medical doctors with difficult medical choices. All of the scenarios were 
very high in ecological validity. Her results do not indict Greene’s model. On the contrary, they confirm it. 
So it seems that the dual-process model passes quite well the test of high ecological validity experiments.  
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I doubt that Greene’s criterion of unfamiliarity, in the sense defined above, is helpful. It is 
difficult to grasp what makes System1 on-track or off-track, since the issue seems to be in 
turn normatively loaded. It is so because to claim that a factor is morally relevant / 
irrelevant (in the normative sense) is to endorse a moral principle. System1 can then be on-
track or off-track just relative to a set of moral principles. If the meta-normativity problem 
is solved by choosing the moral horn, then the assessment as to whether System1 responds 
in a way that is on-track or off-track when the individual is confronted with a given 
scenario or problem is relative to moral claims that the judge holds. In this case there is no 
way to decide whether and when System1 works properly in a moral vacuum, i.e. absent a 
set of moral principles. The meaning of ‘properly’ depends on those principles and, if they 
are nowhere to be found, that meaning is void. Lastly, empirical science can do no work in 
establishing which factors are morally relevant or irrelevant. Happily enough, Greene 
(2010) agrees with me on this latter point. But unfortunately Greene does not realize that to 
endorse the latter point also means that empirical science can do no work in establishing 
when System1 works properly. 
 
4.15. Greene’s argument against the DDE 
A final part of Greene neuromoral argument is the following: an improved understanding 
of the machinery for moral judgments may cause humans to make “better” moral 
judgments because it can show that some moral principles are not valid. Hence, improved 
knowledge in moral psychology helps us not follow “bad” moral principles, i.e. avoid false 
moral beliefs, beliefs which usually correlate with carrying out morally wrong actions. In 
particular, Greene (forthcoming, § VI) runs an argument against the DDE
162
. In Greene’s 
opinion, System2 can be used in two ways in moral philosophy: either as a tool to 
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 Another argument to the same effect is present in the draft of Greene’s forthcoming book I was able to 
read. However, since Greene asked me not to quote from his draft, as it is still a work-in-progress, I refer to 
the (in my humble opinion) weaker argument that is present in Greene (forthcoming). It is an instance of 
straw-manning, but I was forced to carry it out. The argument against the DDE that is present in the draft of 
the book I was able to read does not concern RE and is based much more on experimental moral psychology 
than the one present in (forthcoming). 
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rationalize given moral intuitions, or as a tool to find out rational moral principles from 
which judgments about cases are derived in a deductive way. In Greene’s opinion, 
deontology makes use of System2 in the former way, whereas consequentialism makes use 
of System2 in the latter way. This latter operation of System2 is called ‘true reasoning’ and 
it is independent of previous moral intuitions about cases. In contrast, it spots moral 
axioms that are similar to Sidgwick’s philosophical intuitions. Since the consequences of 
these ‘philosophical’ intuitions can conflict with well-established Haidtian moral intuitions 
about cases, true reasoning involves a lot of “bullet-biting”, i.e. rejecting those intuitions so 
that the principle can prevail. In contrast, rationalization chases intuitions and rejects them 
only at the margins, when RE dynamics push the theorist to do so in order to enforce 
consistency. At a maximum, deontologists can reject consequentialist judgments for the 
sake of consistency with deontological principles, an operation that Greene calls ‘biting 
rubber bullets’. Greene claims that a principle such as the DDE derives its justificatory 
power from moral intuitions only, i.e. it is the result of the rationalization of unreliable 
Haidtian intuitions. In other words, the justificatory power of the DDE lies in intuitions 
only and provides no independent justificatory force. In Greene’s opinion “the DDE was 
codified because it was observed that certain intuitive patterns in moral judgment could be 
summarized by a set of principles now known as the DDE” (ibidem). As evidence of this, 
Greene quotes the fact that the DDE gets discarded when it does not track Haidtian moral 
intuitions, such as in the Loop (also known as Ned) case, relative to which roughly half of 
the experimental participants accept to turn the trolley even though in that scenario the 
death of the one is a necessary means for reaching the end of saving the five. 
There are some problems with this argument, just like with the previous ones.  
First, it is not clear whether Greene’s empirical investigation has persuasively shown that 
reasoning plays this kind of double role in the two normative theories under examination. 
There seem to be no empirical data that buttress this double-function interpretation of brain 
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areas such as the DLPFC and the ACC. However, I want to be charitable and to concede 
arguendo this empirical point.  
Secondly, Greene claims that the DDE derives its justification from Haidtian moral 
intuitions. But the DDE is usually a part of deontological ethical theories and many of 
these theories justify moral claims through RE and variants thereof. So it is incorrect to 
claim that the DDE derives its justification from moral intuitions only, especially if WRE 
is considered. Under a WRE framework, the DDE would be justified because it is a part of 
an equilibrated set of CMJs, moral principles, and background theories. Hence, it would 
derive its justificatory force from all other components of the final state of WRE (final set 
of CMJs, final set of principles, and final set of background theories) and from the 
relationships between these items
163
.  
Besides, as I pointed out above, it cannot be taken for granted that there is a strong link 
between System1 and the various forms of RE, since RE starts from CMJs and not from 
moral intuitions à la Haidt. So Greene’s analysis of the workings of System2 as a tool to 
rationalize and systematize the output of System1 in deontology tells us little about the 
goodness of RE and (especially) WRE as a method for justifying moral claims. Greene has 
not shown his readers so far that WRE is an unsound method to justify moral claims, 
provided that he actually wants to show this. However, he needs WRE to fall in order to 
show that the link between moral intuitions and the DDE is problematic. In other words, 
since in many deontological frameworks the justification of a principle such as the DDE 
depends on the workings of (one of the multifarious variants of) RE, Greene has to show 
that RE is a “bad” method to justify moral judgments if he wants to show that the DDE is 
unjustified. Alternatively, he has to show that no final state of equilibrium
164
 including the 
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 It is unclear whether Greene wants to attack RE as a method of moral justification. On the one hand, he 
writes (forthcoming, § VI) that “Ethicists need to worry about their intuitions, and not just the ones that 
they’re willing to dump in order to save the ones they really want to keep.” This seems to be a critical 
description of a form of RE. On the other hand, he advocates a “double-wide reflective equilibrium” (ibidem) 
that includes moral intuitions, moral principles, background theories, and facts about moral psychology. 
Greene’s views about moral justification are murky, if we take into account what he has published so far. I 
hope he will make things clearer in his forthcoming book. 
164
 The state in which we are when we have stopped going ‘back and forth’ in RE. 
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DDE is possible starting from plausible CMJs, other moral principles, and background 
theories, i.e. that the DDE is excluded from any plausible final state of equilibrium. But 
this would be exceedingly complex to show and, luckily enough, Greene does not even 
attempt to do so. As Greene does not provide any convincing arguments to show that the 
multifarious variants of RE are wrong as methods of moral justification and does not take 
into account that moral intuitions à la Haidt are very unlikely to enter RE or WRE, his 
attack against the DDE will be properly assessed only when he makes his position on RE 
more explicit. So far, the argument concerning RE and the DDE is unfortunately not 
persuasive.  
 
4.16. Levy’s argument against the DDE 
A more interesting attempt to debunk the DDE is the one made by Levy (2011). I examine 
it here because it is interesting to contrast it with the analogous endeavor by Greene. Levy 
tries to show that the DDE fails to provide any justificatory force because the attribution of 
intentionality, that is paramount according to the DDE to decide whether an action is 
morally acceptable or not, is normatively loaded. Levy is making reference to the famous 
Knobe (2003a, 2003b, 2006) effect
165
. Experimental philosopher Joshua Knobe has shown 
that if an effect E1 of action A1 is seen as positive by a judge and there are reasons to think 
that E1 is not the main end of A1, E1 is likely not to be considered as intended. On the 
contrary, and surprisingly, if E1 is seen as negative but the same reasons obtain, then E1 is 
more likely to be considered as intended. The effect is now well-known and a recent paper 
by Pinillos and colleagues (2011) shows that this effect is an emotional bias that tends to 
disappear in very reflective experimental participants. Hence, Levy’s argument seems to be 
the following: 
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Empirical Premise 1: Attributions of intentionality of outcomes depend on substantive 
ethical claims held by the attributer – namely judgments as to whether the outcome is 
morally good or bad. 
Empirical Premise 2: The DDE is regularly used to distinguish between morally acceptable 
and morally inacceptable actions. 
Logical Premise: The DDE depends on attributions of intentionality.  
Normative Premise: Principles that depend on substantive ethical claims cannot be used to 
discriminate between morally acceptable and inacceptable actions, since they simply re-
instate and confirm the normative claims on which they are based
166
. 
Normative Conclusion: The DDE ought not to be used to distinguish between morally 
acceptable and morally inacceptable actions. 
I grant the second Empirical Premise, the Logical Premise, and the Normative Premise. I 
have serious doubts about the first Empirical Premise, though, if this is interpreted without 
qualifications, as the argument seems to require. The problem is the same as in Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong’s skeptical claims (cf. § 3.6.): if we know that some instances of a 
phenomenon (e.g. attribution of intentionality, moral intuitions) are biased, are we then 
authorized to consider all instances of that phenomenon as biased? In particular, what is 
the threshold that must be overcome in order to allow generalization? Of course there will 
be a problem of vagueness of the boundary
167
 and it will be impossible to draw any non-
arbitrary cutoff. In particular, is the Knobe effect widespread enough to warrant the claim 
that all attributions of intentionality for morally relevant actions are biased and hence 
depending on substantive ethical claims? And is the effect powerful enough in terms of 
effect size to justify this claim? Or is the influence of the Knobe effect rare enough and 
weak enough to justify the claim that most attributions of intentionality humans carry out 
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 As Levy (2011, 6) puts it, “In what follows, I argue that these intuitions are sensitive to moral 
considerations in a way that makes appeal to them question-begging. It is question-begging because agents’ 
preexisting moral views influence the application of the doctrine in such a manner that it generates the 
appropriate output.” 
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 I.e. it will be difficult to decide whether the cases are enough or not to generalize if their number gets 
close to the threshold that has been posited. 
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are reliable, so that Empirical Premise 1 above cannot be granted? Finally, are there 
plausible alternative explanations of Knobe’s empirical results?  
Knobe (2003a, 2003b, 2006) describes a very strong effect: attribution of intentionality 
moves from 23% for a positive outcome to 82% for a negative outcome in the 2006 paper 
and from 30% for a positive outcome to 77% for a negative outcome in the second 
experiment of the 2003a paper. Therefore, it may be conceded that this effect is sizable. 
Furthermore, the body of evidence marshaled by Knobe ranges over quite different cases. 
They are not just variations on a same theme. Of course, interpretation of these results is 
not obvious. Adams and Steadman (2004) suggest that pragmatics could be involved. The 
participants could not want to say that a negative outcome is unintended because this 
would pragmatically imply that they condone the outcome and do not see it as morally bad. 
Since they do not want to revise their moral judgment and do not want to look as though 
they were shying away from it, they do not say that the outcome is unintentional even 
though their capacity of assessing intentions has established so. The experiments carried 
out by Knobe (2004) quite persuasively show that this alternative explanation is 
unjustified, but at the same time they show that there is a big difference, from the 
experimental point of view, between ‘having the intention of carrying out A1 [and doing 
it]’ and ‘to perform A1 intentionally’. Subjects are much more likely to say that a negative 
outcome has been brought about intentionally than to say that the agent had the intention of 
bringing that outcome about. This is not easy to accommodate into Knobe’s explanation of 
the effect, namely that attribution of intention is a multi-purpose tool that features the 
attribution of blame and praise as one of its main functions. For some reason, subjects 
seem to treat “to have an intention to do X” and “to do X intentionally” differently. Only 
further empirical work can solve this issue and properly answer the questions above. It is 
going to be very complex and hard empirical work. Attribution of intentionality ought to 
be measured in real life and in a longitudinal way to assess real-world frequency of the 
bias. Lots of different side-effects should be taken into account, even though Knobe has 
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already done much. Be as it may, Levy’s argument is more persuasive than Greene’s in 
(forthcoming), because it would work well if it could start from the right kind of empirical 
premises. Experimental moral psychology is unfortunately not there yet and I do not know 
whether it will ever warrant the empirical premises that are needed for this interesting 
argument to run. Nonetheless, I agree with Levy that “the data reviewed here presents a 
powerful challenge to a time-honored philosophical distinction” (2011, 8). 
 
4.17. The ad hominem argument against the utilitarian theorist 
Greene’s position is explicitly utilitarian. A version of the “ad hominem argument” 
(henceforth AHA) has been used to attack the political conservative and could be used to 
attack the utilitarian. The AHA derives normative consequences from empirical facts. The 
AHA against the utilitarian counts as a neuromoral theory because it claims that improved 
knowledge in experimental moral psychology, namely that people having certain negative 
traits tend to carry out certain types of moral judgments, leads humans to reject those 
judgments as untrustworthy. As a consequence of rejecting those judgments, humans 
would make better moral judgments as a result of increased empirical knowledge. Greene 
does not put forth an AHA. On the contrary, an AHA, which is a neuromoral argument, 
could used against him. In this section I assess the AHA and I establish whether it is 
significant for Greene’s normative position. It is unclear whether anybody is presently 
trying to attack the utilitarian on those grounds, but it is at least possible to do so. 
Furthermore, a recent paper has gone very close to doing so. This paper is Bartels and 
Pizarro (2011). Pizarro and Bartels have measured in a sizable amount of undergrads three 
traits: psychopathy, Machiavellianism
168
, and the tendency to perceive live as meaningless. 
Then they administered 14 dilemmas that are similar to Footbridge and asked for moral 
                                                 
168
 Machiavellianism is “the degree to which people are cynical, emotionally detached from others, and 
manipulative.” (Bartels and Pizarro 2011, 156) 
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acceptability of the consequentialist response
169
. As expected, just a few people gave 
consequentialist responses, but people who scored high for these three traits were 
significantly “more utilitarian.” Please notice that all of the subjects were non-clinical. This 
result parallels the increased utilitarian responses shown by clinical groups such as low-
anxiety psychopaths (Koenigs et al. 2011) and VMPFC patients
170
 (Ciaramelli et al. 2007; 
Koenigs et al. 2007). It must also be noticed that Westerners currently tend to consider the 
three traits under consideration as negative. Westerners would like people to be neither 
psychopathic nor Machiavellian. Nor would they like that people perceive life as 
meaningless. Each Westerner holds a different picture of the ideal of the good life, but just 
a tiny minority of them would include these traits into the picture. From these results 
Bartels and Pizarro draw a methodological claim: psychologists ought not to use 
consequentialist standards as definitional of rational behavior in empirical studies. This is 
therefore another chapter of the ‘rationality wars’171. Bartels and Pizarro argue that a 
behavior that is linked to disreputable personality traits ought not to be considered as a 
standard of rationality. Since utility-based standards are linked to these traits, Bartels and 
Pizarro implicitly question the position by Baron and Kahneman and seem to move closer 
to the views of Gigerenzer and followers. In their words, 
 
we should be wary of favoring a method that equates the quality of moral judgment with 
responses that are endorsed primarily by individuals who are likely perceived as less moral 
(because they possess traits like callousness and manipulativeness). In other words, adopting 
such a method can lead to the counterintuitive inference that ‘‘correct’’ moral judgments are 
most likely to be made by the individuals least likely to possess the character traits generally 
perceived as moral (Bartels and Pizarro, 2011, 158). 
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 Bartels and Pizarro (2011, 157) specify in a footnote that they re-run the statistical analysis of their data 
by only using the 7 dilemmas certified as pitting utilitarianism against deontology by Kahane and Shackel 
(2008). The re-analysis confirmed their results. 
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 For discussion about these patients, see § 2.2. 
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 See § 3.4. 
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However, Bartels and Pizarro do not claim that this shows consequentialism, or 
utilitarianism more specifically, to be unwarranted as a normative ethical theory, since they 
correctly acknowledge that “the characteristics of a theory’s proponents cannot determine 
its normative status.” What they argue against is “the validity of using these measures [i.e. 
utilitarian criteria] as a metric for optimal moral judgment in everyday life.” But what is 
exactly the difference between a normative benchmark in experimental moral psychology, 
and a normative ethical theory about the moral good? I think that there is some difference, 
so that I doubt that Bartels and Pizarro are actually attacking the utilitarian
172
. A standard 
for rationality can be relative to an experimental setting only. For instance, suppose that an 
experimenter wants to measure the responses of participants to some morally relevant 
cases. Suppose further that, in the human group which the participants come from, there 
are some widespread moral intuitions, and that the researcher wants to compare the 
responses to a standard that is based on those intuitions. So she wants to check whether the 
responses from her sample comply with the moral intuitions that are present in the overall 
population. She could say that responses that conform to the population benchmark are 
‘rational’ and those that are not conform are ‘irrational’. However, she can find this 
standard completely misconceived in everyday life. She might not endorse and recommend 
the benchmark outside the lab. Hence, it might be the case that a psychological benchmark 
has no binding force and no motivational clout for the person who makes use of it. The 
researcher may avail herself of the norms of her society in inverted commas, i.e. simply 
using them as a yardstick to check whether a sample is similar to the population, but 
without taking them in earnest
173
. Hence, there is no necessary correspondence between 
claims about rationality in experimental moral psychology and claims about the moral 
good. Nonetheless, this correspondence is not impossible. For instance, when people like 
Baron (1994) defend a consequentialist framework to distinguish between rational and 
irrational decisions in experimental moral psychology, they seem to subscribe to a 
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consequentialist ethical theory. One possible interpretation of what Bartels and Pizarro are 
saying is therefore that they are disguising their substantive ethical claims under the gowns 
of methodological wisdom
174
. But it cannot be shown that this is necessarily the case. 
Since they explicitly write that “the characteristics of a theory’s proponents cannot 
determine its normative status”, it is more plausible to interpret them as not running an 
AHA against the utilitarian. Nonetheless, it is interesting to examine an AHA against the 
utilitarian even though Bartels and Pizarro are actually not putting it forth.  
This kind of AHA would go like this: 
Normative Premise 1: If some people possess some psychological traits (psychopathy, 
Narcissism, Machiavellianism, tendency to see life as meaningless, etc) above a certain 
threshold, they have bad characters and they are bad people. 
Normative Premise 2: If bad people endorse some moral claims significantly more than the 
rest of the population, that moral claim is unwarranted. 
Empirical Premise: Utilitarian judgments about Footbridge-like dilemmas are made 
significantly more often by low-anxiety psychopaths and non-clinical individuals that are 
high on psychopathy, Narcissism, Machiavellianism, etc. 
Normative Conclusion: Utilitarian judgments about Footbridge-like dilemmas ought to be 
deemed unwarranted. 
A critic could object that nobody has actually put this argument forward: this is a blatant 
instance of straw-manning. As I have written above, it is correct that it has not been put 
forward (it is not correct that I am straw-manning, as I am attributing the argument to 
nobody). However, this point has been suggested. Levy (2007, 297) wrote that, due to the 
empirical results on VMPFC patients, utilitarian responses ought to be rejected as suspect. 
Furthermore, Marcus Arvan (2011, 2012) has run a very similar argument against the 
political conservative, especially against the conservative in social matters such as gay 
marriage, gun control, restriction of individual liberties to fight terrorist groups, death 
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penalty, and so on. After having replicated Bartels’s and Pizarro’s result that utilitarian 
responses to Footbridge correlate with Machiavellianism and psychopathy, Arvan found 
very significant, quite strong (in terms of Pearson’s r) correlations with the Dark Triad175 
(Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy) and typical conservative judgments in 
social matters. Then he explicitly runs the AHA against the conservative, quoting virtue-
ethicist Hursthouse (2002, 28), who argued that we should understand morally right actions 
in terms of what the virtuous person would choose. He illustrates his point with this 
example: 
 
Suppose we knew (A) that people like Hitler are not morally virtuous individuals (a safe 
assumption), and we empirically demonstrated that (B) it is typically people like Hitler (i.e. 
“counteractive narcissists”) who find anti-Semitic or racist moral views attractive. If both of 
these things were the case and Hursthouse’s definition of right action is correct, then we would 
have strong inductive grounds for rejecting anti-Semitic and racist views on the basis of the 
personality traits to which they are empirically linked. (Arvan 2011, 9) 
 
This argument is similar to the AHA against the utilitarian I reconstructed above. 
However, Arvan adds a further part to his AHA against the political conservative. This 
addendum usefully includes the notion of a trait threshold
176
: 
 
In order to determine which levels of the Dark Triad are morally bad, we should seek to 
determine which levels of those traits correlate with higher levels of behaviors that are widely 
or universally considered to be morally bad – for example, criminal activity. […] If particular 
levels of the Dark Triad are […] found to correlate significantly with the kinds of moral 
misbehaviors responders self-reported, we would then have real empirical evidence that those 
levels of the Dark Triad are related to morally bad behavior. What we could then do is test the 
data from my studies to see whether the morally bad levels of the Dark Triad correlate 
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 Please notice the normatively-loaded expression Arvan uses.  
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 As usual, the insertion of the threshold creates the familiar problems of vagueness and arbitrariness of the 
cutoff. There will be cases that fall in the ‘grey area’ around the threshold and the decision concerning the 
position of the threshold itself will have some degree of arbitrariness. Though these are interesting issues, I 
will not discuss them here. 
183 
 
significantly with conservative or liberal judgments on the social issues […] If we did find that 
morally bad levels of the Dark Triad correlate with conservative (or alternately, liberal) views 
on particular issues […] then we would have strong correlational evidence that those 
(conservative or liberal) judgments are related to morally bad behavior. (Arvan 2012, 11) 
 
Bad traits become “bad enough” to qualify the person as “bad” only if there is a significant 
correlation between levels of the traits that are above the threshold and some 
uncontroversial form of moral evil, such as violent crime (e.g. torture, rape, and murder of 
innocent toddlers). In the Hitler example above, this would mean that the “counteractive 
narcissist” is a bad person only if her score in Narcissism is high enough to significantly 
correlate with some uncontroversial form of moral evil, as specified above. In spite of this 
important addition, this argument is problematic. In what follows I will discuss together 
the AHA against conservatism and the one against utilitarianism, since their overall 
structure is similar. I am more interested in the overall form of the AHA than in its specific 
instances.  
First, the notion of “people like Hitler” and “bad people” in my Normative Premise 1 
seems to be problematic, even adding the threshold and the correlation with 
uncontroversial forms of moral evil. Doris (2002) has persuasively argued that results in 
social psychology have shown that people’s behavior is influenced by the context much 
more than it was previously thought. The ‘fundamental attribution error’, according to 
which Westerners tend to attribute behavior to features internal to the agent rather than to 
contextual factors, is widespread, although contextual factors actually tend to be causally 
much more important than personality traits. The situation in which an individual is put 
exerts a powerful influence on her behavior, as shown by the well-known experiments by 
Milgram (1963), Zimbardo (2007), Latané and Darley (1970)
177
. So the concept of 
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normally regarded as immoral if authorized to do so by an authority (no pun intended) figure, such as a 
researcher. Latané’s and Darley’s experiments are about the so-called bystander effect: people help a person 
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character needs to be empirically validated. Contrary to provide a basis on which to build 
neuromoral arguments, the concept of character seems to be called into doubt by results in 
experimental psychology. Those who want to run the AHA either against the conservative 
or against the utilitarian ought, at the minimum, to provide a defense of the concept of 
character from the situationist challenge put forth by Doris.  
Secondly, it cannot be taken for granted that traits like Machiavellianism and Narcissism 
are negative. There is a widespread moral intuition that they are morally bad, but of course 
this intuition could turn out to be unwarranted, just as intuitions against consensual incest 
with vasectomy seem to be unwarranted to many consequentialists. Many utilitarians spend 
most of their time trying to show that well-entrenched and cherished moral intuitions (à la 
Haidt) are unwarranted and should be thrown into history’s dustbin. Hence, they are 
unlikely to buy moral intuitions at face value, including the one concerning these traits. 
Machiavellianism could be morally bad because it could correlate with a tendency to be 
deceptive, even though I know of no empirical study that has shown such a correlation. 
Narcissism could correlate with a tendency to ride roughshod over other human beings’ 
interests, rights, and sensibilities. However, from the point of view of the consequentialist 
theorist what is morally bad is the act that causes a reduction in aggregate well-being or a 
setback of the interests of a sentient being, to use (roughly) Singer’s wording. As I have 
shown, Arvan (2012) correctly builds his argument in such a way that a connection 
between the ‘Dark triad’ and “behaviors that are widely or universally considered to be 
morally bad” is required for the argument to run. Therefore, this latter version of his 
argument is more likely to be palatable to the consequentialist theorist than the previous 
(2011) one, in which this point was overlooked. The connection between psychopathy and 
violent crime is well-known, but I think reliable empirical material
178
 must be marshaled to 
show that Machiavellianism, Narcissism, and the tendency to perceive life as meaningless 
                                                                                                                                                    
in need if alone, but do not help a person in the same state of need if somebody else can help too. The result 
is that the victim is often better off when she encounters a lonely potential helper than a whole group of them.  
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are actually connected with behaviors that even consequentialists deem morally bad. This 
is an empirical issue and so it must be dealt with using the methods of experimental 
science. Arvan also suggested what kind of experiment to perform
179
. I hope that he (or 
others) will carry out this important empirical investigation. In the absence of this, the 
argument seriously risks begging the question against the consequentialist theorist. 
Thirdly, even in presence of an established correlation between some psychological traits 
and some morally bad activity, this correlation could still be devoid of moral import. It is 
not clear whether the existence of hypothetical correlations between high 
Machiavellianism and lying and between high Machiavellianism and a consequentialist 
response to Footbridge tells us anything morally significant about the latter judgment. 
Lying is prima facie morally wrong: this is a safe assumption. But it could be objected that 
correlations are no conclusive evidence for causation and that as a consequence 
Machiavellianism is not problematic. Still, let us make the case of the upholder of the 
AHA stronger. Let us suppose arguendo that those correlations are causal links, i.e. that 
high Machiavellians lie significantly more frequently than others because they are 
emotionally blunted and that they pass that moral judgment because they are emotionally 
blunted. Does this undermine the judgment? Not necessarily. The judgment could have 
other causal histories in other populations. For instance, people with high need for 
cognition (Bartels 2008) tend to respond to Footbridge in an utilitarian way significantly 
more often than others. Hence, there is another explanation, different from emotional 
blunting, for consequentialist responses to Footbridge: extensive use of inferential 
reasoning can lead to that response. I stress that the explanation through emotional blunting 
is not a debunking explanation, because it is a partial explanation only. It solely holds for a 
subgroup of the population, namely those who score high in Machiavellianism, 
psychopathy, and meaninglessness of life. Utterly different psychological processes might 
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bring about those judgments in other groups. Perhaps those groups hold those judgments 
because they have carried out a brief cost-benefit analysis and have followed the dictates of 
the ‘body count’. This third point is, I think, the reason why Greene (forthcoming, § V) 
boldly bites the bullet when faced with the AHA. He writes that people ought to rely more 
on System2 than on System1 when faced with unfamiliar problems. This implies, he 
argues, that clinical populations that happen to use System2 more than System1 across the 
board will behave morally better than ‘normal’ people when faced with unfamiliar 
problems. This is a simple contingency, that detracts no merit, in his opinion, from the 
claim that in unfamiliar cases we ought to use System2. I cannot but agree with Greene on 
this point. 
Contrary to other arguments examined so far, I doubt the AHA will ever work, because the 
concept of character seems to be problematic on experimental grounds and because, even if 
it was possible to show that the correlations found by Bartels and Pizarro for the utilitarian 
and by Arvan for the political conservative are causal links, this would not amount to a 
debunking explanation for utilitarian and conservative judgments. Other avenues of 
justification for these judgments seem to be open. The fact that some sub-populations, no 
matter whether clinical or non-clinical, carry these judgments out because members of 
these populations are emotionally blunted, or callous, or cynical, or detached from human 
life, does not exclude that these judgments could be perfectly correct and justifiable. When 
the utilitarian is concerned, it is already known that very reflective and rational people tend 
to endorse utilitarian claims significantly more than others, so that an alternative causal 
explanation is at hand. Hence, Greene’s neuromoral claims, that already have to deal with 
a broad and multifarious gamut of problems, do not have to add the AHA to the list.  
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Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have explored the complex relationship between normative ethics and 
experimental moral psychology by examining one widely discussed attempt to derive 
normative conclusions from empirical facts, i.e. Joshua Greene’s neuromoral theory. 
According to Greene, an improved understanding of the machinery for moral judgments 
leads us to become wary of deontological tenets, especially when these ethical claims 
concern unfamiliar problems and conflict with competing consequentialist claims. Greene 
grounds this claim on a strong dual-process account of the machinery for moral judgments, 
that couples the fast and automatic System1 with deontology and the slow, conscious, and 
flexible System2 with consequentialism. In what precedes I have shown that:  
(1) the empirical evidence available so far for the strong version of the dual-process 
model proposed by Greene is not conclusive;  
(2) there are alternative accounts of the functioning of the machinery for moral 
judgments that cannot be ruled out by current empirical evidence; 
(3) there are descriptive views (other than Greene’s) that try to derive normative 
consequences from their descriptive content (e.g. Gigerenzer’s) – in other words, 
there are other neuromoral theories than Greene’s; 
(4) these theories share with Greene’s the meta-normativity problem, i.e. they do not 
clarify in what sense the advancement of empirical knowledge can bring about 
better moral judgments; 
(5) even granting arguendo the validity of Greene’s dual-process model, Greene’s 
normative claims are problematic because his normative theory lacks a deep 
discussion about the attribution of moral relevance. 
More specifically, in Ch. 1 I have drawn a working hypothesis relative to different 
meanings of ‘moral intuition’. In Ch. 2 I have described Greene’s descriptive views, 
reviewed evidence and counter-evidence for his model, and concluded that the latter is the 
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one that best fits data points stemming from ‘trolleyology’. In Ch. 3 I have analyzed 
several other views in experimental moral psychology that compete with Greene’s. I have 
shown that most of them cannot be ruled out at the moment, so that theories in 
experimental moral psychology are still underdetermined by the data. The descriptive 
debate is not going to end any time soon. Furthermore, I have discussed the normative 
implications these scientists draw from their views, if they do so, and noticed that the 
meta-normativity problem is a recurring issue for neuromoral theories. In Ch. 4 I have 
analyzed Greene’s neuromoral theory more in detail, claiming that his main argument, the 
AMIF, does not work even if all of Greene’s descriptive claims are granted for the sake of 
argument. From the descriptive point of view, Greene’s view is importantly linked with 
empirical evidence that stems from the use of hypothetical cases. Since many 
psychologists and neuroscientists contest the use of hypothetical cases to study moral 
behavior (§ 2.3.), an important part of Greene’s theory stands or falls together with the 
viability of that methodology. However, Greene’s experimental work (and especially 
Greene et al. 2008, 2009) is praiseworthy and has greatly contributed to gain some initial 
insight in the workings of the machinery for moral judgments. The normative part of 
Greene’s work, that avowedly follows consequentialist lines, is more problematic than his 
descriptive work. The AMIF, which is by far the most intriguing and promising argument 
Greene marshals to attack the deontologist on empirical grounds, is puzzling because 
Greene has not devoted a specific analysis to judgments about moral relevance, which are 
the key normative premises of the AMIF itself. The AMIF would work well, if the 
normative premise could easily be granted. Nonetheless, premises about the relevance of 
factors are equivalent to moral principles and as likely to be controversial as moral 
principles. They are not necessarily uncontroversial, as Greene seems to suppose. 
Moreover, the AMIF runs into further problems concerning the interaction of different 
factors, the involvement of System1 in the assessment of moral relevance, and the fact that, 
in a clash between judgments about moral relevance and Haidtian moral intuitions about 
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cases, it is not clear why judgments about relevance should necessarily prevail as Greene 
seems to assume. 
As to the more general relationship between experimental moral psychology and normative 
ethics, most neuromoral theories that have been put forth so far have to address the meta-
normativity problem, which is a philosophical issue. Another important issue is a 
philosophical analysis of the attribution of moral relevance to factors. Nonetheless, the 
relationship will be better understood the more experimentation in moral psychology 
progresses. At the moment theories are still largely underdetermined by the available data 
points and consensus must be reached on important methodological quandaries such as 
hypothetical scenarios. Most arguments trying to derive normative consequences would 
benefit from both philosophical and empirical work. I have no doubts that experimental 
moral psychology could prove fruitful to normative ethics, if only to take into account 
hard-wired tendencies and proclivities of the human mind. It could turn out that improved 
knowledge of the machinery for moral judgments may help human beings to perform 
judgments that are better from the prudential point of view, even though this is a 
thoroughly empirical issue, and besides a difficult one to investigate. It could also turn out 
that a global EDA may lead to a general anti-realism about evaluative facts, as Street 
(2006) claims, or it might happen that morality is not a natural kind from the scientific 
point of view, as Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley (2012) suggest. There is still a lot to 
discover in experimental moral psychology, so that we cannot know how things will turn 
out to be. However, it is very probable that the set of plausible theories will slowly shrink 
and that, with less theories on the table, we will be able to understand more clearly what 
the eventual normative implications might be. It would be helpful to integrate 
philosophical and experimental research into a common research program, as experimental 
philosophers are trying to do. Surely armchair theorizing is not very helpful if we want to 
know whether a moral intuition is widespread or not. At the same time, empirical research 
can identify psychological processes, such as the Knobe effect, that could undermine the 
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credibility of some normative ethical claims, such as the DDE (cf. Levy 2011). The future 
of experimental moral psychology seems to be rosy and I confidently wait for the exciting 
developments the following decades will undoubtedly yield. 
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Appendix: Culture – a problem for experimental moral 
psychology 
 
Experimental moral psychology faces a problem, together with the other ‘behavioral 
sciences' (cognitive science, experimental economics and psychology). It is not a new 
problem, but it has recently been put back into the limelight by a beautiful paper by 
Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010). This problem is a sampling bias. Most 
experiments in these sciences are carried out on culturally homogeneous samples. As 
Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan point out, people in the typical sample for these studies 
are WEIRD (Western Educated Industrialized Rich Democratic). Arnett (2008) has 
surveyed the articles of the main peer-reviewed journals in psychology in the 2003-2007 
period and has found that 68% of the subjects come from the US. Furthermore, 67% of this 
US population is composed of university students who take psychology courses. Therefore, 
the bulk of experimental subjects in the behavioral sciences is composed by a very specific 
human group: US undergrads in psychology. On the one hand, this is an advantage, 
because very homogeneous samples allow the attribution of differences in the subjects' 
behavioral responses to the differences in the experimental conditions (e.g. distinct 
stimuli), which are manipulated by the researchers. Moreover, university students are 
easily available, cheap, and permit a fast replication of the experiments. On the other hand, 
this poses serious questions of generalizability of experimental findings. How can a 
researcher be sure that the experimental results are valid under different cultural 
conditions? This risk is particularly serious if we take into account that university students 
are a very specific sample relative not only to the global human population, but also to the 
US population. As Rozin (2010) has pointed out, the university student experiences a 
unique life transition from family life to a peer-centered life. Moreover, they usually earn 
little or no income, live in a very liberal, educated, and open-minded environment (the 
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campus), and have not built their own family yet. Therefore, their behavior on several 
accounts, such as economic decisions, is likely to be different even from that of the 
average US 30-year old person. Wide variability in economic behavior is also underscored 
by cross-cultural studies (Henrich et al. 2005) showing that the behavior of university 
students coming from Western, industrialized countries on some economic games like the 
UG and the dictator game is very different from the behavior found in many small-scale 
societies around the globe.  
Before dealing directly with cultural variability, it is useful to briefly illustrate the concept 
of ‘culture’ I avail myself of. Please take what follows as a working hypothesis. As I take 
it, ‘culture’ refers to features of human groups that typically vary according to geographic 
areas and which depend on social learning. Languages, religions, shared attitudes and 
beliefs, family structures, and hierarchies are all parts of culture. Culture varies not only 
moving from one social group to another, but also from an individual to another in the 
same group
180
. Culture possesses several dimensions, which are notoriously difficult to 
measure, so that it is much more complex to take this source of variation into account than 
others, such as for instance a mono-dimensional factor like age. One framework that I find 
helpful to deal with the complexity of culture is Hofstede's (2001) five dimensional model, 
which collocates each culture along these dimensions: 
1. individualism – collectivism;  
2. small – large power distance: It measures the difference in power between the most and 
the least powerful members of the group. If power distance is large, the leaders of the 
group are much more powerful than the subordinates. If power distance is small, the 
leaders of the group are almost on the same level as subordinates;  
3. short – long term orientation: to what degree a group considers the remote future when 
making decisions;  
4. weak – strong uncertainty avoidance: how much a group is willing to take up risks;  
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 See for instance Haidt and Graham (2007) and Haidt, Graham, and Joseph (2009) about the different 
moral foundations used by liberals and conservatives according to Haidt’s MFT. 
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5. masculinity – femininity: here Hofstede uses the Western stereotypes as metaphors, 
without any commitment about the actual psychology of men and women. Masculinity 
symbolizes an assertive and competitive stance, whereas femininity indicates a caring and 
modest attitude. According to this model, every society is characterized by a set of five 
values that describe its position along the dimensions, but any individual in the society 
might depart from the group's values. For instance, the United States (US) are considered 
as one of the most individualistic societies in the world (Henrich et al. 2010), but a single 
US citizen can endorse collectivist values for a variety of reasons, such as religious tenets 
or family education.  
As to the behavioral sciences more specifically, cross-cultural variation in human 
psychology is pervasive (Nisbett and Masuda 2003; Norenzayan and Heine 2005) but it is 
rarely addressed in the behavioral sciences (Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan 2010; Sears 
1986). Cross-cultural variability in psychology corresponds, in some cases at least, to 
cross-cultural neural variability (for a review about cross-cultural neural variation, see Han 
and Northoff 2008). Both geographical variability and individual variability have 
behavioral consequences. For instance, Chua, Boland and Nisbett (2005) have 
demonstrated that the Americans and the Chinese feature different saccades
181
 patterns 
when they are shown a picture composed by a salient object and a background: the Chinese 
tend to focus more on the background than the Americans. As to individual variation, 
priming for individualism or collectivism
182
 performed on bicultural individuals, such as 
Japanese-Americans, modulates both their ways of self-description (general, context-free 
descriptions vs. contextual descriptions) and the corresponding BOLD signals in areas 
related to self- representation (Chiao et al. 2009). Lastly, it must be understood that 
ethnicity is not a synonym of culture, since immigrants retain their ethnicity for some 
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 Saccades are quick and simultaneous movements of both eyes in the same direction. Human beings are 
usually not aware of performing saccades. 
182
 Individualists think that people are independent from each other and that they are characterized by a 
context-independent set of personality traits. Collectivists see persons as interconnected and describe them as 
embedded in specific social situations, which constitute a part of their personality.  
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generations (as long as they mate with other immigrants coming from the same ethnic 
group), whereas they rapidly lose their original cultural traits (Heine and Lehman 2004). 
Individual and intra-national variation also prevents us from identifying culture with 
nationality, even though nationality has a great influence on culture.  
Given the intricacies of culture, experimental moral psychologists that are interested in 
studying the moral judgments of H sapiens and not the moral judgments of the US 
undergrad should be aware of the problem and include cross-cultural experiments into their 
experimental strategies, in order to check if data are consistent across different cultures. If 
this is not done, the experiments risk having a low external validity, i.e. they are based on 
an idiosyncratic sample which is not representative of the general population. In this case 
the results would tell little about what happens outside the lab.  
A further consideration is that cultural variability does not only involve social behaviors 
like theory of mind and its neural correlates (Kobayashi Frank and Temple 2009) or 
economic behavior, but has a much broader scope. For instance, at the behavioral level 
culture influences general strategies of reasoning (Nisbett et al. 2001), the performance on 
the visual ‘rod-and-frame' task (Kitayama et al. 2003), and the effectiveness of visual 
illusions (Segall, Campbell, and Herskovits 1968). Since one may understand the aim of 
the behavioral sciences as describing universal features of human behavior and accounting 
for those features by means of appropriate theories, experiments that are carried out on a 
very specific sample are of little utility to the pursuit of such a purpose, at least as long as 
they are not repeated in different human groups that diverge culturally. It should be noted 
that universality must not be intended as a binary (0 or 1) variable: there are discrete 
degrees of universality that can empirically be tested. For instance, a cognitive 
phenomenon can be present in almost all human groups, but perform different functions in 
different contexts, or it can be consistently present and robustly perform the same function 
in all contexts, or it can be present in some groups only. Universality can be tested by 
means of three kinds of experiments: (1) the two-cultures experiment, (2) the triangulation 
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study, and (3) the cross-cultural survey (Norenzayan and Heine 2005). In a two-cultures 
experiment a determined response to an experimental setting is taken into account. Two 
cultures that differ on many cultural dimensions are examined and the experimenters check 
whether the effect is conserved. If it is, the experiment provides some evidence for some 
degree of universality; if it is not, the difference in the behavioral effects of the setting 
must be traced back to a cultural dimension. But since the two cultures that have been 
examined differ on many dimensions, identifying the dimension that is responsible for the 
variation is not straightforward. In order to do so, a triangular study is needed. Such a 
study must start from a theory that allegedly explains the previously tested effect and that 
allows researchers to make hypotheses as to which cultural dimension is responsible for 
the variation. Then the experimenters take into account three cultures that differ from each 
other along two theoretically relevant cultural dimensions. For instance, if the theory leads 
to the prediction that dimensions D1 and D2 may be relevant, the cultures will be selected 
in such a way that cultures C1 and C2 differ on D1, and C1 and C3 differ on D2. If the 
behavioral difference is spotted between C1 and C2, D1 will be the relevant dimension; if 
the difference is found between C1 and C3, D2 will be chosen as explanatory instead
183
. Of 
course, it must be assured that in the different cultures the experimental conditions are 
interpreted by the subjects in the same way and that the experimental protocol does not 
change. A cross-cultural survey entails examining many human groups around the world, 
both in small-scale societies and in urban societies. If no differences are detected, it 
provides a strong evidence for some degree of universality. Nonetheless, it is costly and 
difficult to carry out, as experimental rigor cannot be maintained without considerable 
efforts when different research teams have to work in diverse environments. These cross-
cultural investigations can also be carried out by means of meta-analyses, if sufficient data 
have already been gathered.  
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 A dimension may be one of the constructs identified by Hofstede (2001), such as individualism or power 
distance. 
196 
 
Furthermore, there are some types of behavioral research in which universality is not an 
issue, so that idiosyncratic samples can be used without any problems in these cases. As 
Gächter (2010) correctly points out, US freshmen and sophomores can be very useful to 
falsify theories in behavioral economics. Falsification is about the research of 
counterexamples, not about generalizability, so that using undergrads as participants in an 
experimental study is appropriate when a study aims at falsification. Furthermore, students 
are cognitively sophisticated as economic theories often require agents to be.  
The sampling bias does not involve experimental psychology only, but cognitive 
neuroscience too. Here, the situation is probably even worse than in experimental 
psychology. According to Chiao (2009), 90% of the peer-reviewed neuroimaging studies 
come from Western industrialized countries. But the sampling bias would be a problem 
only if significant evidence for cultural variability at the neural level has been gathered. 
Cultural neuroscience provides substantial evidence to this effect. I briefly review part of 
this evidence (for a more comprehensive review, see Han and Northoff 2008). Gutchess et 
al. (2006) have used fMRI to identify the neural correlates of a cross-cultural difference 
between Caucasian Americans and East Asians in image processing: Americans fixate a 
salient object more than East Asians. This proves that culture modifies neural function 
when non-verbal stimuli are processed. Zhu and colleagues (2007) have found a 
differential activation of the Medial PreFrontal Cortex (MPFC), which explains the distinct 
construal of the self in American and Chinese subjects. In Americans, whose concept of 
self does not include intimate relatives, the MPFC is activated only in response to 
judgments concerning the subject herself, whereas among East Asians the same area of the 
brain also responds to stimuli concerning close relatives, such as the subject's mother. 
Hedden and colleagues (2008) uncovered the neural correlates of another cross-cultural 
effect: East Asians are better than Americans at performing tasks that have contextual 
demands. Conversely, Americans are better than East Asians at ignoring the context if this 
is required. By means of an fMRI study on Japanese bilinguals, Kobayashi, Glover and 
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Temple (2006) have found differences in BOLD activation in Japanese and American 
cultures when subjects perform false belief tasks
184
. Wong and colleagues (2004) have 
shown in a Positron Emission Tomography (PET) study that the processing of auditory 
pitch patterns engages the left or right insular cortex when the pitch has a linguistic 
function, as in Chinese, or not, as in English, respectively. This demonstrates that linguistic 
variation across cultures correlates with distinct BOLD activation patterns. One can 
conclude that cross-cultural variation at the neural level concerns both basic brain 
functions, such as visual processing, and 'higher' functions, such as self-construal. How can 
this problem be tackled? MRI scanners are expensive and it is difficult to find them in 
developing countries or to bring them to the homelands of small-scale societies. 
Conducting cross-cultural experiments in cognitive neuroimaging is therefore difficult. 
Nevertheless, East Asia provides a rich and industrialized area in which cultural variability 
relative to the West is still sufficiently high to make two-cultures neuroimaging 
experiments meaningful. One possible agenda for cultural neuroscience is to look for the 
neural correlates of the behavioral variation that has been found between East Asia and the 
US in cultural psychology.  
The precise mechanisms by which culture can sculpt the human brain have not been 
elucidated yet, but the existence of brain plasticity is now an established fact. The brain 
changes its physical conformation following environmental stimuli or damage. It has been 
studied both in the context of functional recovery after lesions (Frost et al. 2003; Wall, Xu, 
and Wang 2002; Winship and Murphy 2009) and in the context of learning (for instance 
Maguire et al. 2000). Brain plasticity yields a good theoretical framework to create detailed 
neural explanations of cross-cultural variability in behavior, but cultural neuroscience still 
has a lot of work to do in order to reach the neurophysiologic level on which small neural 
populations are taken into account. In addition, there are well-known and warranted ethical 
limitations to neurophysiologic experimentation in humans. 
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 The false belief task is one of the main tests for theory of mind. 
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Summing up, experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience both show a sampling 
bias: too many experimental participants are drawn from peculiar and idiosyncratic human 
groups, such as undergrads in psychology. Since both psychological and neural processes 
feature a remarkable degree of cross-cultural variation, the samples ought to come from 
diverse cultures in order to have results that can be generalized to H sapiens at large. The 
sampling bias can be overcome, but experimentation will become more costly and complex 
if researchers want to implement cross-cultural checks. However, these checks seem 
necessary to make good empirical science and not to trick both funding bodies and the 
taxpayer. As to experimental moral psychology, some work, such as most of Haidt’s, is 
already cross-cultural (starting from Haidt, Koller, and Dias 1993). Some experimental 
work is known to survive cross-cultural checks and this holds for most variations of the 
trolley dilemma (cf. Hauser, Young, and Cushman 2008). Nonetheless, much experimental 
work and especially neuroimaging experiments need to be checked for cross-cultural 
variation. If scientists want to elaborate a good theory of human (as opposed to Western or 
WEIRD) decision making in moral matters, they need to take cultural variation into 
account. This shows that experimental moral psychology still has a very long future ahead. 
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